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Chapter One 
 
The News Media, Human Rights and Foreign Policy 
 
Human rights are seen by many to be an essentially modem concern. Modern concern, in this 
context, is defined as a late twentieth-century process of international debate about human 
rights that began with the foundation of the United Nations and came to prominence in the 
United States during the presidential campaign of Jimmy Carter. Human rights are a powerful 
issue because the concept implies not only the way the world is — that is, by intimating that 
essential rights exist for every human being — but also the way the world should be — by 
suggesting goals for the protection of individuals. Thus, statements about human rights are 
essentially ideological, especially in that the concept of ideology presents, in the words of the 
historian Peter Novick, “(1) a picture of the way the world is; (2) a picture of the way the 
world ought to be; (3) a set of propositions about the relationship between the first and the 
second.”1 
 
The goal of research for this dissertation research was to examine the construction in the 
twentieth-century United States of an ideology of human rights by looking at political 
rhetoric and media representation of the role of human rights in foreign policy. While chapter 
two more fully outlines definitions of human rights, what is meant here is the fundamental 
equality of all human beings and the innate entitlement of each to protection of rights that 
come from being human — what political scientist Jack Donnelly calls the “rights one has 
simply because one is human.”2 
 
These rights are generally perceived in terms of how governments treat their citizens but 
Donnelly identifies human rights at their most basic level as “paramount moral rights.”3 This 
immense goal of examining the discourse of human rights in terms of twentieth century 
American foreign policy can be broken down into manageable research questions, answers to 
which can contribute towards building up a picture, albeit partial, of this developing ideology. 
The period of study extends beyond post-World War Two events because this ideology was 
the product of specific historical circumstances and was not created in isolation. These 
historical circumstances were studied through media coverage of diplomatic events and 
through primary diplomatic and political materials. 
 
A broad question addressed by the research — informed by the theory of hegemony outlined 
below — is how certain ideas come to be seen as “common sense” in a society. The early 
twentieth-century Italian marxist
4
 thinker, Antonio Gramsci, referred to common sense as the 
“traditional conception of the world” or the “traditional popular conception of the world - 
what is unimaginatively called ‘instinct,’ although it too is in fact a primitive and elementary 
                                                          
1
 Peter Novick, (1996), That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question’' and the American Historical Profession, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University), p.20. 
2
 Jack Donnelly, (1993), International Human Rights, (Boulder, CO: Westview), p.19. 
3
 Donnelly, (1993), International Human Rights, p.20. 
4
 The term marxism is used throughout this text without capitalization in order to indicate that it is not a single 
concept or theory but a term that covers a number of approaches. Using marxism as a proper noun indicates that 
it is a fixed notion or approach rather than different ways of thinking based on certain assumptions common to 
the writing of Marx and subsequent writers. 
2 
 
historical acquisition.”5 Thus, common sense is a view of the “way things are” that has, 
through various historical processes, become the “natural” view — that is, the seemingly only 
right way to see them. 
 
The particular ideas of interest here are the “discourses of morality,” defined here as 
discourses that draw on values and ideas concerned with distinctions between right and 
wrong and universal or societal standards of human behavior. Another way of defining 
discourses of morality is to say that they are located outside the realm of pragmatism; that is, 
utility is not seen to be the standard against which behavior -- of individuals, institutions or 
governments -- is judged. Discourses of morality tend to use lexicons composed of 
dichotomous sets of terms such as right/wrong, good/bad, appropriate/inappropriate, and 
just/unjust. A contemporary American example is the current debate over the behavior of 
President William J. Clinton who compromised his office though sexual dalliance with a 
young woman working in the White House. Opponents of Clinton set the discourse clearly in 
the domain of morality by saying that leadership of the country is associated with certain 
standards of morality that have been violated. On the other hand, supporters attempted to 
sustain this debate as a political discourse — arguing that personal attacks on Clinton are 
really political attacks — and focused attention on the political affiliations of prosecutors. 
 
The concept of human rights encompasses many such discourses for, while debate over 
human rights draws strongly from ideas of universal standards of human behavior and 
judgments of right and wrong treatment of individuals, it also includes political argument. 
 
Western, and more specifically, North American, interpretations of human rights have come 
to dominate international discourse about human rights since the end of the second world 
war. Thus, in order to understand how international norms of human rights came to exist the 
role of the United States in the norm-making must be examined. As a student of media, my 
assumption is that both mass and popular media play important roles in the creation 
of“common sense.” In the case of foreign policy, it seems that news media have a larger role 
than do other forms of media in defining and articulating meaning for the general American 
public because the news media may be the only source of information for many Americans 
on foreign policy. However, many scholars assume that news media do not usually play a 
role in the formation of foreign policy; rather, some scholars assume that media tend more 
towards support than advocacy of specific policies.
6
6 The interaction of the press and 
national or international policy is a complex process. By examination of foreign policy 
documents and relevant events, one may answer the question of whether human rights and 
policy were linked first in public policy or in the press. 
 
In addition to addressing the question of how ideas come to be seen as “common sense,” 
then, this research could potentially make contributions in several areas. One contribution 
may be increased understanding of present-day human rights discourse in the United States. 
Also analysis of a specific case may contribute by focusing attention on the role of news 
media in the social construction of national identity and discourse. In addition, understanding 
                                                          
5
 Antonio Gramsci, ‘The Modern Prince’ in Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (Translated and edited), 
(1971), Selections from the Prison Notebooks, (New York: International Publishers/London: Lawrence and 
Wishart), p.197 and p.199. 
6
 Tsan-kuo Chang, (1993), The Press and China Policy: The Illusion ofSino-American Relations, 1950-1984, 
(Norwood, NJ: Ablex), pp.1-3. 
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of how American notions of human rights came about could contribute to understanding of 
international human rights discourse. 
 
Questions and Broad Research Outline 
The guiding research questions for this project ask when and how linkages between foreign 
policy and human rights issues became common in the American news media. When did 
foreign policy become seen as a weapon of, or a tool for, the spread of American ideals, 
specifically the ideals of human rights? What statements about human rights are found in the 
press at certain vital times in the twentieth century when the American role and identity in the 
world were being questioned by Americans? What statements about human rights in the news 
media were identified as being linked to United States ideals and identity? Were these ideals 
linked to foreign policy? Finally, what is the construction of various “stories” about human 
rights? And what do these constructions tell us? 
 
These questions will be dealt with here in the context of media case studies of historical 
issues relating to national identity and the “appropriate” role of the United States in the 
world. Periodization of history is always fraught with controversy, but, in the context of the 
development of American human rights ideas, certain events represent distinct changes or 
developments in ideas about human rights. Historian Gene Wise argued that “historical ideas 
don’t just grow out of other ideas, nor do they just reflect circumstances around them; instead 
they come from precise moments of confrontation between idea and circumstance.”77 Thus, 
certain events can be central in the creation of a discourse. Political scientist Jack Donnelly 
identifies four crucial phases in the development of United States human rights policies as 
being: initial enthusiasm (1945-1948); subordination to the cold war (1949-1973); human 
rights as prominent in public diplomacy (1974-1980) and the new cold war era (1981-1988).
8
 
 
Donnelly’s focus is entirely on the post-World War Two period, but the roots of so-called 
“modem” concerns for human rights can be traced to a much earlier time - particularly the 
founding of the League of Nations in 1919. Donnelly agrees that the League of Nations was 
concerned with the protection of the rights of some minorities and that the International 
Labor Organization was involved in the protection of the rights of workers, but he says that, 
‘With these marginal exceptions, before World War II broke out in 1939, human rights had 
not been a topic of international relations.”9 Analysis of news coverage and congressional 
debate of 1919 shows that human rights ideas were very much part of political discourse at 
the time. In fact, while the focus for this dissertation is the twentieth century, links can be 
drawn between the discourse of human rights and the discourses of nineteenth-century 
American imperialism and concepts of manifest destiny.
10
 Alan Brinkley, in an essay linking 
effects of World War Two to the tradition of American innocence, argues that a powerful 
ideological force operated in the postwar period (and earlier) that saw “America as a special 
moral force in the world; America as a society with an unique mission, born of its 
righteousness.”11 This “discourse of morality” that Brinkley refers to is important because it 
                                                          
7
 Gene Wise, (1980), American Historical Explanations: A Strategy for Grounded Enquiry, (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota), p.153. 
8
 Donnelly, (1993), International Human Rights, p.99. 
9
 Donnelly, (1993), International Human Rights, p.6. 
10
 (1949), Human Rights: Unfolding of the American Tradition - A Selection of Documents and Statements, 
Division of Historical Policy Research, Office of Public Affairs. Department of State,foreword. 
11
 Alan Brinkley, (1996), ‘World War II and American liberalism’, in Lewis Erenberg and Susan Hirsch (Eds.), 
The War in American Culture: Society and Consciousness During World War II, (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago), p.323. 
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has close ties to human rights discourse. Indeed, in much of the media, congressional and 
other documents examined for this dissertation, these discourses are conflated, making 
difficult the identification of specific human rights discourses compared to more general 
discourses about morality and values. 
 
For this research project Donnelly’s World War Two focus was a useful point at which to 
begin, but two additional periods were added — one pre-dating his work and the other post-
dating it. Post-World War One discussions about the Treaty of Versailles and the League of 
Nations and media coverage of Chinese human rights incidents from 1989 into the 1990s 
were studied. Thus, news coverage of the following events and issues were studied for this 
dissertation. 
Period I: Paris Peace Talks, 1919-1920 encompassing the United States’ decision not to ratify 
the Treaty of Versailles and not to join the League of Nations. 
 
Period II: San Francisco Conference: 1945 and the creation of the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
Period HI: Carter presidential campaign, 1976. 
Period IV: Tiananmen Incident, 1989. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
The concept of ideology is a vital part of the theoretical framework of this dissertation. 
Definition of the term and its uses could take up several volumes, so only a brief outline of 
essential historical development of the term and an explication of its use in this work are 
offered here. 
 
Use of the term “ideology” has long been associated with marxist theory, which offers an 
useful point from which to start. Jorge Larrain does an elegant job of summarizing the 
changes in the meaning and use of ideology, even within marxist thought. Larrain argues that 
Marx and Engels used the term ideology exclusively with negative connotations, stating that: 
 
… the critique by Marx and Engels seeks to show the existence of a necessary link 
between ‘inverted’ forms of consciousness and men’s material existence. It is this 
relationship that the concept of ideology expresses by referring to a distortion of 
thought which stems from, and conceals, social contradictions. Consequently from its 
inception ideology has a clear-cut negative and critical connotation.
12
 
 
This inversion refers to ideology representing what does not exist in reality. For example, in 
religion, Larrain argues that Marx saw that ideology “compensates in the mind for a deficient 
reality; it reconstitutes in the imagination a coherent solution which is beyond the real world 
in order to make up for the contradictions of the real world.”13 
 
It was only when Marx and Engels began to examine the idea of historical materialism that 
the notion was introduced that the function of ideology was to serve the interests of the ruling 
class. At this time ideology was still being used as a negative concept because, as Larrain 
argues, “Ideological distortions cannot be overcome by criticism, they 
                                                          
12
 Jorge Larrain, (1991), ‘Ideology’, in Tom Bottomore, Laurence Harris, V.G. Kieroan and Ralph Miliband 
(Eds.), (1982/1991), A Dictionary ofMarxist Thought, (Oxford: Blackwell), p.248. 
13
 Larrain, (1991), ‘Ideology’, p.248. 
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can disappear only when the contradictions which give rise to them are practically 
resolved.”14 In Marx’s third stage of theorizing, ideology such as “freedom and equality,” 
was seen as a tool for concealing the truth about the economically determined realities of life. 
Larrain argues that after Marx’s death, the concept of ideology emerged as a more neutral 
concept, as both “the totality of forms of social consciousness - which came to be expressed 
by the concept of ‘ideological superstructure’ - and the conception of ideology as the political 
ideas connected with the interests of a class.”15 Lenin is seen in the marxist perspective as the 
major contributor to developing the concept of ideology as neutral. Ideology no longer is seen 
as a distortion; rather use of the term generally merely refers to class consciousness, whether 
bourgeois or proletarian.
16
 
 
Larrain presents the ideas of Althusser as the most influential modem ideas about ideology, 
referring specifically to Althusser’s distinctions between a theory of ideology and specific 
ideologies. In the theory of ideology, “the function of ideology is to secure cohesion in 
society” while, for specific ideologies, “the former general function is overwhelmed by the 
new function of securing the domination of one class.”17 Critical theory has been the main 
beneficiary of Marx’s contributions to the examination of ideology and society, but Iring 
Fetscher argues that these concepts and approaches themselves have become part of a 
“Marxist world view,” or ideology, and that as such they have been devalued as theory.18  
 
Fetscher’s argument ignores the major contribution to the study of ideology by cultural 
studies and by British cultural studies in particular. British cultural studies scholar Stuart Hall 
describes ideology as “practices and rituals” and argues that “ideologies are the frameworks 
of our thinking and calculation about the world • the ‘ideas’ which people use to figure out 
how the social world works, what their place is in it and what they ought to do.”19 For Hall 
one of the main contributions of marxist thought is the idea that, in any analysis of society, 
individual and group experiences have to be taken into account as much as do structure and 
production.
20
 
 
In contrast to the different marxist perspectives, the historian Peter Novick uses ideology very 
generally to mean “simply an overarching, and at-least-tacitly-coherent outlook on the 
world.”21 As mentioned above, Novick also sees ideology as a relationship between the way a 
person sees the world and the way that person sees how the world should be.
22
 He further 
categorizes ideology as being dominant, accommodationist and oppositional. Dominant 
ideology perceives the way the world is as identical to, or close to, the way the world should 
be. Accommodationists perceive some differences between the way the world is and the way 
it ought to be but remain hopeful about closing the gaps — what Novick describes as perhaps 
militant “but not…disaffected; often troubled, they remain at least moderately, and often 
                                                          
14
 Larrain, (1991), ‘Ideology’, p.249. 
15
 Larrain, (1991), ‘Ideology’, p.249. 
16
 Larrain, (1991), ‘Ideology’, pp.250-251. 
17
 Larrain, (1991), ‘Ideology’, p.251. 
18
 Iring Felscher, (1991), ‘Development of Marxism’ in Bottomore et al. p.349. 
19
 Stuart Hall, (1996), ‘Signification, Representation, Ideology: Althusser and the Post-Structuralist Debates’ in 
James Curran, David Morley and Valerie Walkerdine (Eds.), Cultural Studies and Communications, (London: 
Arnold), p.19. 
20
 Colin Sparks, (1996), ‘Stuart Hall, cultural studies and marxism’, in David Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen, 
Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies, (London and New York: Routledge), p.81. 
21
 Novick, (1996), That Noble Dream, p.61. 
22
 Novick, (1996), That Noble Dream, p.62. 
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immoderately, optimistic.”23 Oppositional ideology sees the world as very different from the 
way that it ought to be and the gap between these as almost insurmountable. 
 
The perspective that grounds the use of the term, ideology, in this dissertation draws on both 
a marxist perspective and Novick’s simple model of ideology as the relationship between 
“reality” and an ideal world. Novick’s model is attractive in its very simplicity and in its 
assumption that ideology can be identified wherever a discrepancy is perceived by someone 
between the way things are and the way things should be; that is, ideology exists wherever 
reality is seen to diverge from perfection. This first level of definition — the identification of 
a gap between perceptions of the way the world is and the way it should be — is perhaps the 
easiest form of ideology to identify. 
 
While Althusser distinguishes between the functions of a theory of ideology and those of 
specific ideologies, the demarcation between functions is not always clear-cut. It is at this 
point that the ideas of the Italian marxist thinker, Antonio Gramsci, contribute to the 
discussion (although Gramsci wrote during an earlier period than did Althusser, theoretical 
development is not always linear). Gramsci’s ideas about hegemony draw together the theory 
of ideology and its practice. In Gramsci’s view, cohesion in society is achieved by the ruling 
class through a combination of coercion and consent — that is, through hegemony rather than 
straightforward imposition of power.
24
 Analysis of power requires careful examination of 
relationships between actors and institutions to elicit the aspects of coercion and consent that 
constitute the process of hegemony. 
 
Coercion and consent are not simple concepts in their own right and may not be overtly 
displayed in practice. Norman Fairclough argues that “Hegemony is about constructing 
alliances, and integrating rather than simply dominating subordinate classes, through 
concessions, or through ideological means, to win their consent.”25 He goes on to argue that 
hegemony works on two main levels and should not be conflated with discourse itself, for 
“Hegemony is a process at the social level, whereas most discourse has a more local 
character, being located in or on the edges of particular institutions...However, hegemony still 
provides both a model and a matrix.”26 This characterization of hegemony as both a model 
and a matrix is valuable for trying to understand not only what hegemony is but how it is 
constituted and how it operates. As a model, hegemony operates as described above; that is, 
by the creation of alliances rather than through sheer imposition of dominance. Alliances, 
Fairclough says, are created through “constitution of and struggle around local orders of 
discourse.”27 Hegemony operates as a matrix by integration of institutions and power 
relations, that is, at a social or structural level. The creation of “common sense” plays an 
important part in the processes of hegemony and the production of ideology. 
 
The creation of common sense is a by-product of ideological struggles within discourse, 
which is itself a part of the hegemonic process. Fairclough argues that: 
 
                                                          
23
 Novick, (1996), That Noble Dream, p.62. 
24
 Antonio Gramsci, (1949), Quaderni del carcere: Note sul Machiavelli, sulla politico e sullo Stato moderno, 
pp.102-103 in Hoare and Nowell Smith, (1971), Selections, footnote 49, p.80. 
25
 Norman Fairclough, (1995), Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study ofLanguage, (London and New 
York: Longman), p.76. 
26
 Fairclough, (1995), Critical Discourse Analysis, p.78. 
27
 Fairclough, (1995), Critical Discourse Analysis, p.78. 
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perhaps the relationship between discourse and hegemony is a matter of the latter 
limiting the potential of the former: there is no specifically discoursal reason why 
there should not be an unlimited articulation and rearticulation of elements. It is 
hegemony – history that curtails the discoursal potential and constrains which 
articulations actually come about, their durability and so forth.
28
 
 
The process of constructing common sense can be seen as the “fixing” of certain definitions 
or the constraint of options in talking about a subject. Another way of talking about common 
sense is to talk about the naturalization of ideology. As ideologies are “naturalized” they 
become invisible as ideologies. Fairclough argues that: “the naturalization and opacity of 
ideologies is a significant property of discourse...Naturalization gives to particular ideological 
representations the status of common sense, and thereby makes them opaque, i.e. no longer 
visible as ideologies.”29 Stuart Hall refers not to naturalization of ideology but to the 
“naturalistic illusion,” saying that the “point at which we lose sight of the fact that sense is a 
production of our systems of representation is the point at which we fall, not into Nature but 
into the naturalistic illusion: the height (or depth) of ideology.”30 
 
Hegemony exists wherever unequal power relationships exist as one class or group seeks to 
maintain dominance over another or several others. Unequal power relationships give rise to 
ideology as groups struggle for the right to define meaning and discoursal boundaries. This 
right is significant because the power to define the terms of discourse (whether through 
creation of common sense, defining boundaries and meanings, or through other means) is 
central to social, cultural, economic and political dominance. Thus, hegemony can be seen as 
the exercise of power through coven means — what Fairclough describes as the “broad shift 
from coercion to consent, incorporation and pluralism in the exercise of power.”31 Jon 
Stratton and Ien Ang explain the coven and ideological nature of hegemony by arguing that 
“hegemony derives its effectivity from a self-presentation as universal, one that does not 
acknowledge its own particularity.”32 The concept of hegemony provides a more nuanced 
approach to analysis of the function of ideas and institutions in society than does a purely 
structuralist or historical analysis. 
 
It is important to remember that institutional ideologies are not the same as beliefs and views 
held by individuals. Ideology may be implicit in certain institutional ways of doing things or 
talking about the world, but it does not imply a coherent thought-out pattern of beliefs on the 
part of an individual. Fairclough refers to ideologies as “ways of seeing” and suggests that the  
 
acquisition of normative “ways of talking” associated with a given subject position 
must simultaneously be the acquisition of the associated “ways of seeing” (ideological 
norms); that is, since any set of discursive norms entails a certain knowledge base, 
and since any knowledge base includes an ideological component, in acquiring the 
discursive norms one simultaneously acquires the associated ideological norms.
33
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Any analysis of discourse must then examine both event and institutional structure because 
ideology is located in both. Thus, a comprehensive analysis in Fairclough’s view includes 
three dimensions: “social practice, discoursal practice (text production, distribution and 
consumption) and text” and relationships between/among these.34 
 
One problem that often arises in the study of ideology is a focus limited to trying to identify 
ideological meaning in texts only from the perspective of the producer -- that is, trying to 
identify the meaning of texts rather than looking at the range of potential meanings within the 
text. Neither a focus on the producer nor an exclusive focus on audience reception provides a 
comprehensive picture of the processes of the circulation of ideology. Stuart Hall’s notion of 
“preferred meaning” provides an useful insight in this regard. By this, Hall means that while 
audiences bring their own experiences to interpretation of media messages, messages are 
often “coded” to be interpreted in a certain manner. Therefore, analyses of text must examine 
both the dominant code or the “preferred meaning” enscribed within a message and audience 
decoding of the dominant code as well as the audience’s resistant interpretations.35 Hall 
further integrates structure and experience in his analysis, suggesting that “[s]tructures exhibit 
tendencies - lines of force, openings and closures which constrain, shape, channel and in that 
sense ‘determine’. But they cannot determine in the harder sense of fix absolutely, 
guarantee.”36 
 
The ideas outlined above about ideology, hegemony and the creation of common sense are 
central in this dissertation. An assumption underlying the research was that the state and 
dominant groups in society produce and maintain popular ideas and practices that become 
“common sense.” This process is by no means a sinister conspiracy on the part of the state; 
rather it is here assumed to be a natural process of the maintenance of power in society that 
occurs on many levels. In most cases, subordinate groups adhere to these ideologies, allowing 
the state to remain in power. In order to consolidate power, state mechanisms operate to 
absorb opposition, or if that cannot be done, to transform meanings in support of state 
authority.
37
 By being able to define the “rules of the game,” state apparatuses can also define 
political legitimacy and social relationships. One element of defining the rules is the 
production of foreign policy that is able to define what is the “other” and what is “not 
American” at a national and international level. This identification of the “other” may be 
important in understanding the creation of an American ideology of human rights as 
“common sense.” This Gramscian perspective informed the research of media coverage of 
human rights and foreign policy. 
 
A fundamental assumption underlying this work is that language is not a neutral medium.
38
 
Thus, language itself must be examined as well as the context of language production and the 
media of language transmission. This is not a linguistic project, but a study of the 
communication of ideas and the institutions within and between which ideas are created, 
constrained, transmitted and circulated. It is also a study of power and of the exercise of 
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power through ideology. Ideology seeks acceptance as common sense. One task of critical 
scholars is to identify and reveal ideology whether for the purpose of resistance or for other 
scholarly purposes, without, of course, merely imposing their own ideologies.
39
 The ultimate 
purpose here is to identify the ideology of the rhetoric of human rights in order to gain insight 
about alternative or multiple conversations about definition, power, international 
relationships, national identity and the role of the domestic history of individual nations in 
international discourse about human rights. The roles of domestic actors and institutions in 
the processes of foreign policy-making are often ignored in the examination of international 
relations. The purpose here was not to examine the international discourses of human rights 
— that is another dissertation entirely — but to examine the American discourse of human 
rights and foreign policy in the twentieth century to begin to develop a basis for later 
examination of international discourses which are assumed to be multiple conversations. 
 
Having outlined the theoretical underpinnings of this dissertation, other important literature 
must be examined, such as the historical role of human rights in foreign policy, the 
importance of the concept of sovereignty in understanding human rights, who is responsible 
for the making of foreign policy and the role of the media in the construction of national 
discourse. 
 
The Making of Foreign Policy 
Since the 1960s in the United States, a huge body of work has been painstakingly constructed 
around the concept that human rights considerations should play a role in foreign policy. 
Library shelves are lined with texts on the subject, far more than any one researcher could 
adequately tackle. Yet the task is made easier by the fact that a number of common themes 
runs through the literature. These themes encompass ideas about the historical role of the 
nature of the United States in the development of a world concept of human rights; the role of 
World War Two in prompting global discussions about basic rights of individuals; 
sovereignty and international norm-making; institutional and individual actors in the 
processes of codifying international norms; and outcomes of policies related to human rights. 
In extremely general terms, it can be said that research has divided along disciplinary lines, 
with political scientists and historians focusing attention on foreign policy outcomes and the 
role of different actors in the creation of policy whereas mass communication research (of 
which little exists) has focused on analysis of amount and content of media coverage of 
human rights issues. Little research has attempted to integrate these differing approaches or to 
explicitly examine the roles of media institutions, journalists or media coverage in the foreign 
policy process. 
 
Very little work exists on the connection between human rights and foreign policy in the 
early part of the century. However Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points speech of 1918 
outlining his proposed model of peace, the formation of a league to maintain this peace and 
suggesting international guarantee of various rights is often mentioned in the context of an 
American historical association with human rights.
40
 Thus, the focus here is general 
twentieth-century literature about human rights and foreign policy. For each work several 
questions are addressed: what definition(s) of human rights are being used; what is identified 
(implicitly or explicitly) as the connection between human rights and foreign policy? When 
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did this connection (if identified) begin? What parties are identified (explicitly or otherwise) 
as playing a role — first, in the creation of foreign policy and second, in making human 
rights part of foreign policy? What theoretical and methodological approaches and paradigms 
are used? Finally, what areas still need to be studied and how can such research be done? 
 
Before these questions can be addressed, a basic outline of foreign policy processes be 
sketched out to identify the legal and customary roles of different actors in the policy-making 
process. Some concepts basic to an understanding of foreign policy and the human rights 
debate must also be noted. Among the latter, sovereignty and allocation of responsibility for 
foreign policy are discussed below. 
 
The Concept of Sovereignty and Human Rights 
Much debate concerning the role of human rights in foreign policy arises out of issues related 
to national sovereignty. As a sovereign state in a system of nation-states, the United States 
retains exclusive authority in domestic governance while having authority also to establish 
relationships with other nation-states. Sovereignty comes not from the United States 
Constitution but is plenary; that is, it comes from the nature of the United States as a nation.
41
 
Though Elmer Plischke calls the concept of sovereignty a “legal fiction,” this concept is 
essential to understanding the difficulties in establishing norms of behavior for nation-states 
at both the international and domestic level. Political scientist Kathryn Sikkink argues that the 
“doctrine of internationally protected rights offers one of the most powerful critiques of 
sovereignty as the concept is currently understood.”42 It does so by undermining a nation’s 
exclusive domestic authority and by providing recourse for a citizen external to that citizen’s 
nation, for example, by allowing individuals to appeal to international treaties when decisions 
of domestic courts fail to meet treaty provisions.
43
 
 
Responsibility for Foreign Policy 
In the United States, constitutional responsibility for foreign policy is retained exclusively for 
the federal government (Article 1, Section 10 of the United States Constitution).
44
 However, 
responsibility is divided between the executive and legislative branches in the classic “checks 
and balances model.” Plischke argues that the United States Constitution identifies the 
executive and legislative branches of government as “joint trustees” of foreign policy.45 
Legislation proposed by congress can be vetoed by the president, but congress can overturn 
this veto. In the area of foreign policy, however, the initiative usually comes from the 
president and the executive branch, with support, though it may be conditional, from 
congress. David Forsythe argues that this support comes from a continuing belief in congress 
that a need exists for bipartisanship in foreign policy in order to show an united front to the 
world.
46
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Mass communication scholar Tsan-Kuo Chang argues that the executive branch is central in 
foreign policy, with a few elite players involved in making decisions.
47
 Plischke seems to 
concur, although his conception of the executive branch involves “any administrative 
individual or agency that the President might legitimately use.”48 While foreign policy may 
be announced by the president in addresses to congress or the nation, Plischke argues most 
foreign policy initiatives and formulations come from within the U.S. Department of State.
49
 
However, even if a foreign policy initiative comes from the U.S. Department of State, it 
“must be construed as having presidential approval.”50 Both Chang and Plischke see a greater 
measure of power in the executive branch than in the legislative branch. Using the 
governmental politics models of G.T. Allison and R. Hilsman, Chang depicts the executive 
branch as being the inner circle of decision-making. The role of congress is in the second or 
third circle.
51
 Plischke argues that the greatest power of congress lies in the “power of the 
purse.”52 However, while congress can limit foreign policy by refusing funds or attaching 
explicit instructions to appropriations, these may not be defined or placed in context In the 
area of human rights, terms such as “freedom,” “fundamental rights,” “democracy” and “civil 
society” are used without clear definition. Many of these terms can be argued to be culturally 
relative, yet they are often used in media content apparently without consideration of 
alternative definitions. 
 
Media and the construction of National Discourse 
While many individuals may not be exposed to news media on a daily basis, media merit 
study because they can “reproduce in miniature the contradictions in our thought, action, and 
social relations.”53 As James Carey emphasizes in defining the ritual view of communication 
— that is, “not the act of imparting information but the representation of shared beliefs” — 
media serve functions beyond merely informing people.
54
 This emphasis on media’s role in 
sharing of beliefs is also evident in Benedict Anderson’s perspective on the role of 
newspapers in the creation of national identity. To Anderson, one of the ties binding together 
a nation is the simultaneous consumption of the newspaper every day by individual citizens.
55
 
However, both Anderson and Carey emphasize the constructed nature of that shared identity. 
Anderson refers to the “newspaper-as-fiction” and the “profound fictiveness” of newspapers 
as a cultural product; and Carey, who refers to a “theory of fictions,” defines communication 
as “a symbolic process whereby reality is produced, maintained, repaired, and 
transformed.”56 
 
This extremely brief overview of some perspectives on the role of media in creating common 
sense, emphasizes the social constructionist model of media studies that was used in research 
for this dissertation. The social constructionist approach basically sees ideas and ideology as 
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socio-historic constructions that both shape and are shaped by social structures.
57
 This 
approach focuses on what some scholars have called the “ongoing processes of making 
history and meaning” and “takes communication to be the primary social process by which 
we create meanings and engage in cultural practices.”58 Fairclough argues that any analysis of 
text needs to focus on the institutions and discourses associated with it because the “social 
institution is an intermediate level of social structuring, which faces Janus-like ‘upwards’ to 
the social formation, and ‘downwards’ to social actions.”59 Fairclough further cautions that 
institutions are not monolithic in ideology or discourse, and that different ideological and 
discourse options exist not only at different times and places within an institution; they may 
also coexist as the result of internal organizational power struggles.
60
 
Following this brief overview of some perspectives on the role of media in creating common 
sense, a review of further relevant literature follows, focused on definitions and paradigms of 
human rights in foreign policy, the history of human rights and foreign policy and the role of 
the press in foreign policy. 
 
Literature Review 
The conceptual foundation for the research purpose and method used here become clearer 
from a review of relevant literature. The review below explores definitions of human rights in 
foreign policy literature; connections between human rights and foreign policy; and the role 
of the press in foreign policy. Recent scholarship has suggested that the power relationship 
between the executive and legislative branches is not static but continually shifting. As 
discussed below, in recent years the role of congress in the formulation and execution of 
foreign policy has expanded. 
 
Human Rights in Foreign Policy: Definitions and Paradigms 
One of the notable features about literature on human rights and foreign policy is the lack of 
an agreed upon definition of human rights. This may be due to authors’ reluctance to 
explicitly state positions in the human rights debate or the difficulty of pinning down a 
definition as a concrete concept. In monographs on the subject, discussion of ideas about 
human rights and their philosophical bases are relegated to the second, third or even later 
chapters, with the bulk devoted to policies and concepts that apparently are presumed to 
embody implicit definitions of human rights.
61
 Some individual essays within collections on 
the subject seem specialized to the point that such basic definitions seem to be deemed 
unnecessary.
62
 However, definition is important because human rights are not a simple, 
universally comprehensible concept. It is important to understand exactly what values 
researchers include in talk about rights so one does not impose one’s own definitions onto the 
framework of others’ arguments. For example, I may include the right to food and shelter as a 
fundamental human right and think this is included in claims about universality of rights, but 
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another making those claims may mean only civil and political rights as universal human 
rights. 
 
Human rights ideas have been categorized into three “generations” that roughly correlate with 
the French revolutionary slogan of “liberté, egalité, fraternité” and with their appearance in 
the discourse of human rights.
63
 First-generation rights (liberté) are generally identified as 
civil and political rights — the rights of freedom. Second-generation rights (egalité) 
incorporate social, economic and cultural rights— rights of equality and fair distribution of 
resources. Third-generation rights (fraternité) are what have been called “solidarity rights to 
peace, to development, to a healthy environment, to the common heritage of mankind, and to 
humanitarian assistance.”64 In general, American foreign policy has focused mainly upon 
first-generation rights, and these are what are being discussed when human rights are linked 
to foreign policy. However, this antecedent is rarely explicitly stated in the literature, perhaps 
because authors may share (or assume their readers share) this conception of human rights. 
 
Political scientist Charles Frankel defines human rights as “claims by the individual which 
organized society is under a binding obligation to fulfil; [human rights] define the elementary 
duties which governments assume as a condition of their right to govern.”65 While this 
definition clearly focuses on civil and political rights, Frankel does avoid the common error 
of conflating American democracy and human rights.
66
 For Frankel, clear differences exist 
between suggestions about what would be good versus what would be rights. In his 
perspective, rights tell us about what has outraged people’s consciences, and “they [rights] 
express a resolution so as to organize the affairs of nations that such outrages will not take 
place.”67 Frankel views these considerations of justice for individuals independent of and 
superior to the claims of government as having been associated with the United States since 
its inception.
68
 He argues that Americans have long hoped that their concepts of rights are 
more than an American concept and that “[t]he creation of the 
American form of government, with its affirmation of these rights meant... the introduction 
into the world of a new standard by which the behavior of all governments might be 
judged.”69 
 
While Frankel makes a conscious effort to present different perspectives on human rights as 
part of the mission of the Foreign Policy Association Headline Series, the theoretical 
paradigm within which he works is clearly that of Western historic progressivism. The 
concept of human rights is portrayed as gradually developing alongside Western 
Enlightenment, industrialization, and the foundation of the United States. Human rights are 
naturalized as the domain of “reflexive and morally conscientious people”to whom 
“philosophical assurance satisfactory to all reasonable people can be offered, as things now 
stand, that in believing in human rights they are standing four-square with the Higher Reason 
of the universe.”70 However, “the modern doctrine of human rights... in the non-Western 
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world ... is still capable of provoking surprise among many people.”71 Thus, his claim to 
universality of rights is undermined by his own argument in suggesting that universal rights 
may cause surprise among non-Western people. This progressive paradigm, however, 
suggests that one party or nation, by setting the terms of the discourse and through vague and 
generalized definitions of key components, is able to define the achievements and progress, 
indeed the level of civilization, of another. 
 
Political scientists Peter Brown and Douglas MacLean’s collection of essays focuses mainly 
on the foreign policy aspect of human rights. However, in their introduction to the collection, 
they define human rights as the “universal requirements of social justice,” saying that “all 
persons have them, all persons share them equally, they do not depend on any special status 
of relations, and they can be claimed from or asserted against the actions of any and all other 
humans and institutions.”72 Definition of these rights for all people is based on three 
categories used by (1977-1980) Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance: rights of personal security 
(the rights to life, liberty, fair trial and freedom from torture); civil and political rights 
(“thought, religion, speech, the press and movement”); and economic rights (“food, shelter, 
healthcare and education”).73 In spite of the wide spectrum of rights identified in the book’s 
introduction, the chapters deal only with civil and political rights — the so-called rights of 
freedom. Mark Schneider argues in the first chapter that the “United States Government 
frequently defined individual freedom, self-determination, and civil liberties in statements 
condemning violations of human rights by other governments.”74 It is possible that this 
emphasis on civil and political rights is an artefact of the area under study. That is, foreign 
policy itself emphasizes this type of rights. Or perhaps these rights are the only type that 
foreign policy can properly address. On the other hand, the American discourse about human 
rights has traditionally emphasized civil and political rights above others, according to 
literature reviewed. 
 
Transcending even that discourse, Tom Harkin, congressional author of two major human 
rights laws, argues that “Human rights is a sine qua non of civilization.”75 He further asserts 
that “[t]he other achievements and progress of a culture are meaningless unless the dignity of 
individual people - their human rights - is protected and affirmed in the daily life of 
nations.”76 This again illustrates the progressive paradigm visible in much writing about 
human rights. 
 
Tracy Strong’s stance on human rights means he can be characterized as a “moderate 
proponent” of American exceptionalism. While he perceives the United States as special due 
to the circumstances of the country’s founding, he sees a future where Americans will not 
stand out in the world community. However, this American position would emerge not 
because other nations espouse similar human rights principles — that is, no country would 
“be constituted by an attitude toward any human being that would make our [the American] 
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attitude ‘exceptional’.”77 He argues that a source of legitimacy for America as a nation is the 
concept that rights are universal.
78
 With relation to the founding of the United States, Strong 
suggests that “Americans have argued that America’s existence as a nation entitled it to speak 
out and to act in the name of those principles upon which it was founded.”79 However, a 
cautionary note is sounded with the argument that American conceptions of rights cannot be 
seen as universal just because they are held to be so. He states that “the general 
characteristics of human beings appear as self-evident when we hold them to be so. The 
naturalness of the physical realm depends on the volition in the act of founding” (italics in 
original).
80
 
 
The essays on human rights in The Dynamics of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy display 
a distinctly pragmatic bent in that they focus on the reality of the implementation of human 
rights policies rather than on philosophical approaches to the concept of human rights. 
Political scientist Richard Falk argues that individual stances on human rights are strongly 
correlated to ideological stances and positions in the United States political spectrum.
81
 As a 
self-described pragmatic realist, he suggests that human rights can only move forward when 
the relationship between different actors and sectors is in the right balance.
82
 Although 
political rhetoric, particularly from former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, included economic 
and social rights among essential human rights, Falk’s perspective is that the political focus 
has been entirely on civil and political rights.
83
 
 
Echoing Falk’s pragmatic realism, political scientist Robert Borosage introduces a note of 
cynicism when he argues that human rights, or “liberal evangelism,” is not humanitarianism 
but a political stance “providing moral purpose for intervention abroad and a logical excuse 
for military expenditure, secrecy, and repression at home.”84 In contrast to this perspective on 
human rights policy as a renewal of anti-communism, political scientist Bruno Bitker 
concludes that human rights history in general, and the American experience in particular, 
focuses on the protection of the rights of individuals.
85
 This conclusion is drawn from an 
analysis of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms speech of 1941 (freedoms of speech, 
expression, and religion; freedoms from want, from fear and physical aggression
86
) and from 
Carter’s 1978 Paris speech in which he claimed that “[t]here is one belief above all others that 
has made us what we are ... belief that the rights of the individual inherently stand higher than 
the claims or demands of the state.”87 
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This emphasis on the civil and political rights of individuals is the focus of political scientist 
Lars Schoultz’s 1981 comprehensive analysis of United States human rights policy in relation 
to South America. Schoultz’s focus is even narrower than general civil and political rights in 
that he exclusively examines so-called “antitorture rights,” that is, the rights to “life, liberty, 
and the integrity of the person in the sense that [these rights] cannot be denied without the 
impartial application of due process of law.”88 He argues that these antitorture rights do not 
transcend or “trump” other rights but have been the main focus of United States policy 
towards Latin America.
89
 
 
Political scientist David Forsythe has written extensively about human rights, with three 
books published since 1988. While each book addresses different, though often overlapping, 
areas of human rights, his general perspective has remained consistent His working definition 
of human rights as a balance of civil, political and socioeconomic rights, while 
acknowledging the historical importance for the United States of civil and political rights, 
takes a middle-of-the-road approach.
90
 However, his perspective is both progressivist and 
activist, with an emphasis on the central role played by the United States on the world stage. 
His work incorporates ideas about the revolutionary aspect of world human rights policies 
and the concept of the world starting on a gradual path upon which it has some distance to go.
 
91
 Thus, there is a clear progressivist theme but the actual goal of the progress remains 
unclear. 
 
Historical Connections Between Human Rights and Foreign Policy 
A constant theme through the literature on human rights and foreign policy is the need to 
balance moral concerns with geopolitical realities. While the theme is constant, emphases 
differ as to the relative importance of each aspect Self-described realists tend to emphasize 
national security concerns and national interest while idealists, as defined by realists, are seen 
to make unreasonable demands for ephemeral moral concerns. Idealists naturally see their 
own position as reasonable and realistic while they see the so-called “realist” stance as 
amoral, if not immoral, and unbecoming to American traditions and ideals. A consensus 
seems to exist however, that since World War Two, U.S. foreign policy has been tied to 
human rights concerns, but the extent has varied, depending on the context and 
contemporaneous geopolitical concerns. Frankel argues that “considerations of justice and 
moral principle have a legitimate place in U.S. foreign policy”92 and that this is related to 
“history, tradition and basic national interest.”93 However, he concedes that, while human 
rights may have a legitimate place in foreign policy, they must be balanced with geopolitical 
reality and be “realistically deliverable.'’94 In a variation on the “means to an end” argument, 
he says the demands of the Cold War and fears of nuclear proliferation make it an 
“imperative of American foreign policy - to maintain American security within an […] 
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Strong emphasizes the difficulties in the incorporation of human rights into policy when he 
argues that the “pursuit of human rights goals in foreign policy tends to place the 
policymaker in a contradiction between that which he is obliged to acknowledge as an 
American and that which is possible and desirable for a state.”95 Strong’s solution to this 
contradiction is that policy should not focus on the status of individuals within a country but 
should emphasize a relationship between states in order to “promote policies... to produce 
changes in the social fabric of a particular society.”96 
 
In a more pragmatic turn, Falk argues that the only way to deal with the contradictions 
between the perceived different goals of human rights legislation and traditional foreign 
policy is to focus on results rather than rhetoric. Human rights rhetoric should be ignored 
unless it can be seen to actually influence policy action.
97
 Falk presents a two-page checklist 
for assessing human rights policy that calls attention to diplomatic settings, government 
settings, policy domains and domestic implementation in the United States.
98
 By use of such 
a list, he expresses a hope that researchers and academics can step outside the endless and 
mostly useless debate over the relative importance of different foreign policy concerns. 
Schoultz in a similarly pragmatic tone asserts that “in no case has a commitment to increase 
the importance of human rights considerations in foreign policy been to deny the legitimacy 
of other competing values. Thus, the impact of human rights is always a function of the other 
potential interests and values that impinge upon any given policy decision.”99 
Congress was seen (in the literature) to play a vital role in bringing human rights concerns 
firmly into foreign policy considerations. Tom Harkin sees foreign policy as a coalition 
among people, the executive branch and congress, in which the role of congress is not only to 
publicize human rights issues through resolutions, censures and cutting aid, but also to 
institutionalize human rights concerns through legislation.
100
 In contrast, Henry Kissinger as 
Secretary of State from 1973-1977 argued that foreign policy was not the best way to deal 
with issues of human rights because it was “too inflexible, too public, and too 
heavyhanded.”101 MacLean argued that congress is vital in the foreign policy process because 
if policy is left entirely to “experts” in the U.S. Department of State and other administrative 
branches, pragmatism dominates over “right.”102 John Salzberg concurs with this assessment 
and adds that the State Department in its reports to congress is constrained by the tension 
between congressional requirement for honest information and maintenance of friendly 
relationships with other countries.
103
 
 
Political scientist Paula Newberg argues that congress was pushed into an active role in the 
1970s because of presidential reluctance to incorporate human rights concerns in foreign 
policy. Congress saw human rights as a “powerful antidote to the ideological force of 
communism and therefore an issue to be pursued vigorously.”104 Newberg raises an important 
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issue overlooked in much of the literature — that human rights and morality are often 
conflated, not only in public debate but also in analysis and academic research. She argues 
that “separating human rights as an operational dimension of foreign policy from the broader, 
familiar issue of morality in politics has proved to be a difficult issue to overcome, both 
domestically and internationally.”105 Much analysis of U.S. historical links with human rights 
concerns does not attempt to, or perhaps cannot, separate these concepts. 
 
Newberg also presents a useful summary of the different perspectives on the role of human 
rights in foreign policy discussed above. The first perspective sees human rights as a weapon 
in an ideological war. A second perspective sees human rights as the “touchstone,” or 
beginning point of all action. Other perspectives approach human rights as either an 
independent issue in policy or as a component of all issues.
106
 
 
Robert Boettcher argues that congress, through such committees as the Subcommittee on 
International Organizations of the House International Relations Committee, played an 
important role — not only in formulating policy but in changing the role of the U.S. State 
Department in the early 1970s. He argues that even before Carter’s emphasis on human 
rights, congress forced human rights onto the agenda of the executive branch and the State 
Department in particular.
107
 Forsythe places similar emphasis on the role of congress. 
However, he argues that, although congress put human rights on the foreign policy table, 
congress remains subordinated to the executive branch in most aspects of foreign policy.
108
 
Congress is limited to three types of actions: hortatory statements (general statements about 
what “should be,” also known as “dead letters”); general norms (laws to which congress tries 
to ensure executive compliance); and specific rules, either country- or function-specific.
109
 
Within the boundaries of these three types of actions, congress has four possibilities for 
enforcement The first is to make general policy statements — in a way, statements of notice 
to the executive. Attempts to enforce these policy statements can be by withholding consent 
on treaties and presidential appointments, passing legislation requiring reporting either before 
taking action or accounts of exact action, and by refusing or limiting executive appropriation 
requests.
110
 
 
However, Forsythe argues that congressional influence on human rights policy is limited in 
two major ways. The first is that human rights action within congress is heavily dependent on 
individual concerns and personalities. For example, Representative Donald Fraser was able to 
have the House Subcommittee on International Organizations renamed to include human 
rights in the title as part of his personal interest in the area.
111
 Once individual members lose 
interest or leave congress, attention may focus on other areas. Congress is also limited by the 
belief that foreign policy requires bipartisanship. Thus, according to Forsythe, ‘Congress 
usually acts by way of compromise. It does not say ‘no’ to an administration; it says ‘yes, b u 
t’”112 Even if congress places financial restrictions on the administration, the administration 
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can continue to rhetorically support a perceived violator of human rights.
113
 However, 
Forsythe concludes that congressional action regarding human rights has “psychological and 
political importance” and that “Congress has made an important contribution to United States 
foreign policy by its insistence that what happens to people matters.”114 Yet, he is still able to 
argue in a later work that, in a world nation-state system, priority must be given to security 
over human rights.
115
 
 
In contrast to emphasizing the role of congress, Borosage sees the role of the president as 
extremely significant in policy because the president establishes the framework for public 
discussion. This is an important role because, “in his choice of themes, a president creates a 
new language for the bureaucracy, structures argument in Congress, provides grist for learned 
milling, and creates hopes and expectations in the citizenry.”116 Chang’s perspective is 
similar in that he sees the inner circle of policy makers, of which the president is the central 
figure, as able to define the “terms of play” or the “rules of the game.” This in turn 
circumscribes the roles of so-called ad hoc “players,” such as congress, the media and the 
public.
117
 
 
Using a slightly different approach, Weissbrodt and Sikkink see non-government 
organizations as playing a central role in the incorporation of human rights concerns into 
foreign policy. In conjunction with this idea, both also see human rights as a multilateral 
policy issue in addition to bilateral policies. Weissbrodt argues that interest groups may not 
try to directly influence policy, but “their information-gathering and publicity about human 
rights violations may have important impacts on U.S. policy.”118 Congress remains important 
because it is the traditional focus for activities of non-governmental organizations. The U.S. 
State Department tends to resist outside input into policy-making, but congress remains one 
of the few institutions through which the public can influence policy.
119
 This receptivity to 
public influence may be due to demands of constituents. In addition, individual members of 
congress may pass information to the administration that may generate responses or practical 
help for individual human rights victims.
120
 Sikkink argues that non-governmental 
organizations play a vital role as “carriers of transformative ideas.”121 She argues that these 
transformative ideas have brought concerned individuals together into international 
“principled issue networks” that can influence both multilateral and bilateral human rights 
policies.
122
 
The Role of the Press in Foreign Policy 
 
The argument that the public can participate in foreign policy by gathering information and 
creating publicity may apply to the media as non-governmental actors. However, most of the 
literature discussed above largely omits discussion of the role of the media. Some 
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acknowledge a public opinion role in the formation of foreign policy (or at least a slight 
influence) but apparently are reluctant to suggest that policy may be influenced by (unelected, 
unrepresentative) private corporate institutions. Yet others implicitly allocate the press a role 
but do not explicitly examine that role. Plischke’s perspective is that “by virtue of American 
freedom of speech and the press, an unpopular foreign policy would soon be undermined 
abroad if it were not popularly supported at home”123; and “in the long run the decisions 
made remain subject to subsequent popular approval and this in itself is a powerful check on 
the executive foreign relations authority.”124 However, he makes no attempt to elucidate this 
assertion, and it remains just that — an assertion. 
 
Historians and political scientists seem to see the media role as that of a conduit between 
public opinion and elected officials.
125
 Schoultz does discuss the role of the press in the 
creation of positive attitudes about violators of human rights in Argentina and other Latin 
American countries. However, he does not examine actual coverage and effects. Rather, he 
notes only that journalists whose visits to Latin American countries were subsidized tended to 
produce much more positive reports about that country and its government than did the 
reports of unsubsidized journalists.
126
 Thus, the implicit assumption is that the press can 
influence opinion but have no explicit importance in the policy-making process. 
 
As no formal or systematic system exists within the executive branch or congress for 
assessing public opinion, the media are seen by members of congress as useful for gauging 
public opinion — but in conjunction with opinion polls (whether reported in the media or 
presented directly to the administration) and letters from constituents.
127
 Schoultz’s 
interviews with individual legislators and administrative staff in congress showed that letters 
from constituents were often defined as public opinion because an“issue public” was seen to 
exist.
128
 He further argues that “many foreign policy makers believe that citizens are 
concerned about human rights in an abstract sense but that their level of interest in the issue 
of U.S. policy toward human rights violations is extremely low ”129  
 
The most significant examination of the role of the press in foreign policy comes from 
Chang’s comprehensive review of three decades of literature on the subject. Chang concludes 
that the media are an important link between people and the government, and while they play 
a role in political and social structures, they cannot be considered as independent actors in the 
policy-making process. He argues that: 
 
the foreign policy environment is a playground where only a very few selected 
players are allowed. As such, the structure of decision apparatus, and its rules of the 
game at the national level, tend to limit the role and power of the press in the game of 
international politics, thus decreasing its initiative and capability as a watchdog over 
governmental actions, let alone as a strong competitor in the process of decision 
making.
130
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Especially during times of war, the government is able to define situations and set limits on 
press coverage that restrict the influence that the press can have on policymaking.
131
 
Furthermore, the executive branch, and especially the president, is seen to set the agenda for 
the press.
132
 While Chang accepts that the media are ad hoc players in foreign policy, with 
press content shaped by policy makers, he sees the press playing a role when foreign policy 
debate moves to the public arena.
133
 At this point the press gives information to the general 
public about government policy while giving information to the government about public 
opinion — “the press becomes a constant tie connecting the government and the public in the 
world of foreign affairs and international politics.”134 
 
Chang then identifies five ways in which the media are important after foreign policy debate 
moves to the public arena: as a source of foreign affairs knowledge for the general public; as 
a link between the government and people interested in foreign policy; as a measure of public 
opinion for the government; as informal information channels between governments; and as 
“a standard source of factual information” for diplomats and the inner circle within the 
executive.
135
 Chang also sees media coverage as important in the formation of public opinion 
in that there are links between media coverage of issues and the public’s rating of issues a s 
important.
136
 
 
While some argue that the press does not play the part of an independent actor in foreign 
policy-making, the sources reviewed seem to suggest that the press does have some role, even 
if primary power is vested in the executive. It has been suggested that American leaders get a 
great deal of their knowledge about foreign affairs from the media. Still questions remain as 
to the role of the media. A question is raised by the idea common in agenda-setting research 
that the media serve to circulate ideas and symbols generated by policy makers.
 137
 This idea, 
and ideas reviewed above about public opinion, grant agency to the general public and the 
branches of government, but they grant none, or little, agency to the media. While this may 
be the case in general foreign policy, the question remains as to whether the media have 
played a greater role in the incorporation of human rights concerns into foreign policy. 
 
Political scientist Jay Ovsiovitch takes an important first step towards addressing this 
question when he says that “news coverage of human rights is important for education, the 
protection of rights, and the development of foreign policy.”138 However, he focuses attention 
on the “different slants and biases that are being reported” and in only one brief paragraph 
deals with the “clear importance” of the media role .139 What role the media actually play in 
the making of foreign policy remains unclear. One area that seems particularly promising for 
research is examination of media content over time to identify origins of the ideas and 
symbols that represent human rights. Are these symbols generated by the government and 
passed unchanged through the media to the public? Do they originate within the government 
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but are transformed into different ideas via the media? Or are they generated in the media and 
picked up by formal players in the policy-making process? 
 
The intention of this research was not an examination of media content for accuracy and 
amount of coverage — the explicit content of media — but the implicit content; that is, how 
are ideas constructed and talked about? In other words, what discourse of human rights exists 
in the media? Is it the same discourse that exists in other parts of society, such as the political 
arenas or civil society? If it is not, has it influenced other discourses? This approach may 
provide insight about the role of media in foreign policy-making, at least in the area of human 
rights. In order to examine this, three main types of texts were used to create a picture of 
twentieth-century human rights discourse: newspaper articles from leading mainstream 
newspapers, congressional records and presidential statements. 
 
The analytical methods, critical discourse analysis and narrative analysis, are discussed in 
more depth in Chapter Two. Thus, the next chapter outlines the specific research questions, 
details the method used and introduces the case studies. Chapters Three through Six present 
findings from, in turn: Woodrow Wilson and the Paris Peace Talks; The United Nations 
conference at San Francisco; the Carter Presidential campaign of 1976 and the United States 
response to China following the events of Tiananmen in 1989. Each chapter describes the 
type of discourse in each case, the stories being told about  human rights, definitions of 
human rights used in each and the possible impact of United States domestic discourse on 
international human rights discourse. Final analysis and discussion of the discourses and 
narratives of human rights and United States foreign policy in the twentieth century follow in 
the final chapter. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Studying the Narratives and Discourses of Human Rights 
 
This dissertation focuses on representations in media content of, and political rhetoric about, 
human rights in foreign policy. Such representations are an important part of any 
contemporary analysis of society, and political rhetoric is fundamental to understanding the 
goals of and reasons for foreign policy. This chapter outlines some essential definitions for 
the work and the method used to study the texts -- a combination of narrative and critical 
discourse analysis. 
Defining human rights 
As a point of departure for this study, human rights are defined using the 1948 United 
Nations’ Statement of Essential Human Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. Human rights are defined as the equality of all individuals and the entitlement of each 
to equal protection and equal guarantees of rights. In summary, these rights include: the 
freedom of religion, opinion, speech, assembly, and association; freedom from wrongful 
interference (torture, arbitrary arrest, punishment), from retroactive laws; rights to a 
nationality, to leave and return to a country, fair trial, education, work and fair conditions 
(including adequate remuneration, hours of labor and equal pay for equal work), food and 
housing, social security, participation in government, property rights (including intellectual 
property). These rights are limited only by the rights of others and the requirements of the 
democratic state (the “just requirements of morality, public order and the general 
welfare”).140 The democratic state where the will of the people is the basis of government 
expressed by “periodic and genuine elections” with universal suffrage by 1  “secret vote or 
equivalent free voting procedures” is seen as the ideal type of government to provide these 
rights.
141
 Given the historically different terrain of each period under examination here 
however, contemporaneous definitions of human rights are identified and incorporated at 
each chronological stage in the study. In these contemporaneous definitions of human rights, 
ideas about rights and morality were often intertwined — that is, ideas about rights that fall 
outside the definitions contained in the UDHR were part of the discourse. Thus, analysis of 
context was necessary to separate discourse about rights and more general moral and/or 
religious discourses. However, this dissertation attempts to illuminate the evolution of a 
twentieth-century ideology of human rights and “discourse of morality” and thus, all of these 
discourses are important 
Method 
To examine how human rights ideas are constructed and talked about in media content and in 
congress, and to identify the discourse(s) of human rights — bearing in mind Fairclough’s 
admonition that texts must be interrogated at multiple levels — methodological questions 
must be addressed. Three main types of text were examined for this dissertation: newspaper 
articles and editorials; congressional records; and presidential statements. Press content and 
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congressional records are separately addressed while presidential statements are interwoven 
throughout analysis both of media content and congressional debate. Archival materials filed 
at the Library of Congress from individuals within the U.S. State Department and from 
journalists are used here for supplementary background information. Both critical discourse 
analysis and narrative analysis were used to approach texts at different levels although the 
findings are presented as a single analysis. Text types were compared to identify different 
types of discourse and possible differences in the type and scope of stories that were told. For 
example, newspaper articles were compared with congressional records and presidential 
statements to illuminate within case differences. Cases studies were also compared to 
examine changes in discourse and narrative over time. 
 
The questions guiding research were when and how linkages were made between foreign 
policy and human rights. Were these linkages related to constructions of American identity, 
and how were human rights stories constructed by the media and in political discourse? These 
questions were asked in the context of the larger question of how ideas come to be seen as 
common sense in society ~ in this case, how certain constructions of human rights came to be 
seen over time as the story of human rights, not only an American story but an universal 
story. 
 
To answer these research questions, discourse analysis was used to reveal how the stories 
were being told. This required answering the following questions: What statements about 
human rights appear (selected under terms of the UDHR)? What definition(s) of human rights 
are being used (other ways of talking about human rights outside the terms of the UDHR)? 
What is identified (explicitly or implicitly) as the connection between human rights and 
foreign policy? Are statements about human rights linked to United States ideals and 
identity? If so, in what ways? What domains of discourse can be identified in statements 
about human rights (political, social, economic, religious, general morality)? What symbols 
and ideas are linked with human rights? What parties are credited as having a role in the 
creation of foreign policy? What parties are identified as having a role in the incorporation of 
human rights in foreign policy? (Necessary definitions of terms in these questions are given 
below.) 
 
Narrative analysis focuses on the specific stories being told in each text to determine whether 
an overarching story of human rights is being told or whether several different narratives of 
human rights are being created. Research questions guiding the narrative analysis were: What 
story(ies) is/are being told about human rights in the text? Who is telling the stories? How are 
these stories being told? 
 
Finally, the findings resulting from application of these interwoven analytical approaches are 
used to inform speculation on questions such as: Why are these particular stories being told? 
What are the results of the fact that certain stories are being told and not others? Whose 
interests are being served or considered? What does the telling of the American human rights 
story(ies) reveal about: a) how ideas are circulated in society? b) the function of ideology in 
foreign policy? c) sanctioned actors in foreign policy? d) the role of the print media in foreign 
policy and in circulating ideas in society? 
 
Narrative Analysis 
Narrative analysis has traditionally been the domain of literary analysis, largely focusing on 
works of fiction. However, recent developments in qualitative research have led to its 
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increasing use in ethnography and other fieldwork-based research.
142
 As use of narrative 
analysis has spread, definitions of narrative have proliferated. Matters are further complicated 
by confusion over the differentiation of narrative and discourse. Historian Hayden White 
presents the difference between narrative and discourse as being that narrative is “objective” 
because the narrator is absent and events are simply presented as having occurred. In contrast, 
discourse is seen to be “subjective” because the narrator or the “ego” is present as someone or 
something that constructs the discourse.
143
 It is clear, however, that White does not see 
narrative as being literally objective; rather, in the absence of an identified narrator, narrative 
is perceived as recitation of fact rather than as a discourse imbued with context and ideology 
or a specific point or points of view. In fact, White points out the clear subjective nature of 
narrative because he says it requires that events must be arranged to form a storyline (a 
process that he refers to as narrativity). The most useful distinction here is that involving the 
narrator — that, ironically, narrative is narratorless while discourse exists only by virtue of 
the presence of a narrator. The question that can and must then be posed by any student of the 
mass media is whether, using such a definition, news reports would be considered narrative 
or discourse. I will return to this question after considering further some other relevant 
definitions. 
 
Some scholars focus on differentiating between story and discourse rather than narrative and 
discourse. Rhetorician Seymour Chatman refers to the story as what happened versus 
discourse as how a story is told. He uses the example of story order as being A, B, C, D, 
where each letter represents the linear progression of events. In contrast, discourse may 
present the story in the order A, C, B, D for the reasons of the narrator.
144
 Further 
complicating the issue, English scholar and semiotician Robert Scholes speaks about 
narration as “a sequencing of something for somebody”145 while a story is a “higher (because 
more rule-governed) category” of narrative.146 English scholar Barbara Herrnstein Smith 
offers an even broader definition in referring to narrative discourse as “someone telling 
someone else that something happened.”147 So perhaps all that is clear is that scholars of 
narrative agree on no single definition of the terms narrative, discourse and story. 
 
This dissertation was informed by the work of historian Marilyn Robinson Waldman, who 
argues that a “full” narrative requires “formal elements of stories, explicit comments on 
connections between events, and some kind of ‘moralizing’ closure.”148 Closure is the point 
to which events lead, or more simply the conclusion of the story. With reference to Chatman, 
a story is defined here as the content, or “what happened,” and discourse is defined as how 
the story is told. Therefore, narrative can be summarized as: 
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narrative = story (what happened or the plot) + discourse (connecting events + 
closure) 
 
The question of whether news is narrative or discourse can then be answered in several ways. 
One may use the definition above — that news reports are narratives because they involve an 
account of what happened and how, and often, they include the conclusion of events or the 
point to which events lead. The conjunction of Hayden White’s distinction between the 
subjective nature of discourse and the objective nature of narrative and standard modem 
journalistic beliefs in objectivity leads to the conclusion that news is indeed a narrative. 
Events may well be organized to form a storyline, but the narrator is absent and events are 
presumed to speak for themselves. Thus, analysis of news requires examination of both story 
and discourse (how the story is told) to delineate the narrative. 
 
This then raises another issue — whether narrative analysis, having derived mainly from 
literary studies, can be applied to texts constructed explicitly as non-fictitious accounts — 
such as news reports, congressional debates and presidential statements. The Oxford English 
Dictionary defines narrative simply as “a spoken or written account of connected events in 
order of happening.”149 Thus, it can be argued that narrative analysis can be applied to a wide 
range of texts as long as the texts are accounts of connected events — and that these texts 
need not necessarily be fictional accounts. Literary scholar Jeremy Tambling argues that: 
 
...perhaps the distinction between fact and fiction is not very useful anyhow. To 
explain anything, you have to move into the area of narrativizing it, putting events 
into a sequence, and representing processes (even scientific processes) in forms that 
can be conceptualized - and the idea of representation means that we are already half-
way to fictionalizing something, realizing that you cannot talk exactly about how 
things are; you have to find a suitable form to do it in.
150
 
 
Tambling says that any event represented in a textual or verbal form as a sequence becomes a 
narrative, even if it is a simple recounting of facts, such as “The king died and then the queen 
died.”151 Thus, his argument is that no form of history and no account of events, such as news 
reports, can avoid being a narrative. He argues that this perspective runs counter to the views 
of Hayden White, whom he presents as seeing morality or a “moralizing impulse” as an 
essential component of narrative, thus rendering narrative history as inappropriate.
152
 
Tambling argues that White is misled by an Aristotelian concept of narrative that requires a 
narrative plot progression of “beginning-middle-end,”153 whereas alternative definitions of 
narrative and plot can, and do, exist. However, White’s argument seems to be much simpler 
than presented by Tambling. White argues that by imposing artificial closure on historical 
accounts — that is, by telling history as a story -- historians are invoking a particular social 
perspective that can be seen as moralizing simply because of the selection of a point in 
history as the end of the story. This is especially relevant to any examination of human rights 
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— stories whose conclusions have yet to be, if they ever will be, decided. This dissertation, as 
discussed below, focuses on American stories of human rights rather than the story of 
twentieth-century American human rights. 
 
Thus, Tambling’s idea that all recounting of events form narratives is important here. The 
purpose of this research was not to study events themselves but representations of events; that 
is, the emphasis was not what happened but what were presentations or interpretations of 
what happened — the story rather than the event itself. Analysis of narratives is important 
because, as Tambling argues, “[N]arratives construct ways of thinking for us - which we 
accept as natural and take for granted. They give us ways of seeing and ways of representing 
reality in an imaginary form.”154 This imaginary form is not fiction but a representation — 
whether in news reports, congressional statements, presidential speeches or some other form 
of story-telling. A researcher interested in ideology and/or the creation of common sense 
cannot then ignore narratives. Tambling maintains that narratives not only contain ideology; 
they are inherently ideological because “any narrative works by interpellation, affirming its 
way of seeing things - its ideology - to be a natural and inevitable way of reading reality.”155 
Narratives not only reveal important details about what individuals and institutions consider 
important; they also reveal what is considered unimportant and therefore excluded. 
 
Narrative analysis takes many forms, but a central focus is plot. Classical studies have 
referred to plot as muthos or myth.
156
 Tambling argues that “in Plato a muthos is a story or 
fable embodying a series of propositions about the world.”157 Examination of series of 
propositions about the world is very close to the type of discourse analysis suggested by Teun 
van Dijk when he analyzes news stories for semantic macropropositions. Thus, a combination 
of narrative analysis and discourse analysis was used here to examine the narrative of human 
rights (the stories told) and the discourse of human rights (how the stories were told) in 
selected media and political documents across nearly a century. 
 
Critical Discourse Analysis 
Critical discourse analysis entails three necessary processes, according to Fairclough: 
“description of text, interpretation of the relationship between text and interaction, and 
explanation of the relationship between interaction and social context.”158 These three 
processes translate into three levels of analysis when applied to individual texts — context, 
text and meaning. 
 
Analysis of context focuses on analysis of text production, reception (target audience, way of 
receiving information and possibilities for response), institution and structure. For example, 
differences between press institutions and congress as an institution will affect all aspects of 
text production and reception. Textual analysis requires investigation of form and content 
Analysis of meaning requires looking at the relationship between context and text with 
attention to relations of power (such as struggles between congress and the executive branch 
over authority to conduct foreign affairs), the identification of specific discourses (such as 
specialized lexicons and articulations of constraints and norms) and the production and 
transmission of ideology. The language and content of newspaper reports differ from those of 
                                                          
154
 Tambling, (1991), Narrative and Ideology, p.66. 
155
 Tambling, (1991), Narrative and Ideology, p.67. 
156
 Tambling uses the Greek term muthos in preference to the mote familiar (to lay people) Latin term, mythos. 
157
 Tambling, (1991), Narrative and Ideology, p.52. 
158
 Norman Fairclough, (1989), Language and Power, (London and New York: Longman), p.109. 
28 
 
presidential statements or congressional records. An important question, which is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation, is what impact these differences have on the production of ideology 
and the creation of specific discourses. A goal of analyses here was to enable comparison 
across time periods both within and between text sources in order to identify the discourses of 
morality and their associated ideologies and to examine changes in these and discuss the 
implications of particular discourses and ideologies for national and international debate 
about human rights. 
 
Context 
The production of texts, traditionally the focus of analyses of context in mass communication 
research, while important, is not a focus here. Extensive literature exists on the influence of 
institutional structures on media content One example is Gaye Tuchman’s sociological study 
of newspaper production.
159
 One criticism of this traditional focus has been that it privileges 
production over reception; communication cannot take place without reception, it is argued. 
The introduction of cultural studies approaches to communication research has shifted 
attention to sites of reception with such already classic works as Ien Ang’s series of studies 
on inter-cultural reception of the television show “Dallas” and Janice Radway’s analysis of 
women’s romance-novel reading habits.160 In many ways, the pendulum has swung the other 
way in some more recent works, which privilege reception as the only possible source of 
meaning. However, the process of reception is excluded here to avoid rendering 
unmanageable an already nearly unwieldy topic. The primary focus here is message content 
because the purpose was to identify what discourses about human rights existed and how they 
were constructed. Thus, while both production and reception are obviously important in the 
analysis of any message, the attention here remains primarily on the message. 
 
Fairclough argues that individuals in an institution are constrained by norms of that 
institution and that they operate within implicit parameters of discourse. However, any 
analysis of institutions must acknowledge that even text aimed at audiences outside a specific 
institution may be part of institutional discourse. Fairclough states that “some institutions 
have a ‘public’ to whom messages are addressed, whose members are sometimes assumed to 
interpret these messages according to norms laid down by the institution, but who do not 
interact with institutional subjects directly.”161 This consideration seems to be important in 
analyzing two text types used for this dissertation — congressional records and presidential 
statements. The context of presidential statements is especially complex because the “public” 
to whom messages are addressed may be both the general public and institutional “publics,” 
including congress. 
 
Text analysis identified themes visible in content that talked about human rights. Analysis of 
context examined these themes for how they reflect the perceived audience plus the 
conditions of production and reception. The final step was analysis of meaning. While 
ideological meaning cannot be “read-off’162 from texts, an important question is how 
particular ways of defining and talking about human rights serve the interests of various 
                                                          
159
 Gaye Tuchman, (1978), Making News: A Study in the Construction ofReality, (New York; Free Press). 
160
 Ien Ang, (1982), Watching Dallas: Soap Opera and the Melodramatic Imagination, (New York: Methuen) 
and Janice Radway, (1984), Reading the Romance: Women, Patriarchy and Popular Literature, (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina). 
161
 Fairclough, (1995), Language and Power, p.39. 
162
 Fairclough, (1995), Language and Power, p.71. 
29 
 
constituencies — whether at the level of production or reception. Comparison of discursive 
similarities and differences across periods may help to answer this question. 
 
Press content 
As discussed in chapter one, case studies were developed on the basis of the importance 
attached to certain events by historians of human rights. Specific time frames were chosen to 
encapsulate the major events of the cases for each case study, and a week of news coverage 
and opinion items was selected for study. Within this week, articles were selected on the 
basis of three criteria: explicit connection in the article between the United States’ foreign 
policy stance and issues of human life and rights; portrayal of the United States as unique 
because of respect for and good treatment of its citizens; and human life and rights were 
clearly valued by the writer and this value was the motivating factor for the article. 
 
Among primary sources, the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the New Orleans Times 
- Picayune, and the Washington Post were studied because of their continuous publication 
from the nineteenth century (in the event the research extends to nineteenth century sources) 
and to allow for potential regional variation in reporting content and style. These sources 
were selected also because of their position as major newspapers that extensively cover 
foreign news. Media historians Michael and Edwin Emery and Nancy Roberts state that 
“Wherever journalists gather, or opinion polls are taken, there is remarkable consensus in 
identifying the preeminent American newspapers. The New York Times, the Los Angeles 
Tunes, and the Washington Post stand tall as a trio of highest quality.”163 These three 
newspapers are assumed to be influential with policy makers and influence news coverage in 
other media — that is, many media simply repeat stories from these papers. Communications 
scholar Tsan-Kuo Chang argues that the news services of the New York Times and the 
Washington Post serve at least 350 major dailies across the country.
164
 The collaborative 
news service between the Washington Post and Los Angeles Times is estimated to rival the 
New York Times News Service as the “world’s largest supplementary agency.”165 The New 
Orleans Times - Picayune was included to allow, as noted, for possible regional variation of 
news coverage. Emery, Emery and Roberts argue that the New York Times has consistently 
been “staunchly internationalist in world outlook but essentially conservative in domestic 
affairs.”166 The Los Angeles Times until the 1970s had long been seen as “strictly 
conservative.”167 However, according to Emery, Emery and Roberts, the newspaper gradually 
moved away from this staunchly conservative pro-Republican stance toward one of “open-
mindedness and independence” thus gaining national respect.168 The Washington Post is 
another newspaper whose editorial policies have changed over time. Now seen as “strongly 
internationalist in outlook,” the Washington Post in earlier times was against U.S. 
involvement in World War I but became pro-war once the war was declared.
169
 As a smaller 
metropolitan newspaper, the New Orleans Times - Picayune has depended heavily on news 
services for foreign news. However, it has also consistently carried its own news 
commentary. In 1962 it was bought by Samuel I. Newhouse, Sr., becoming part of his 
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ownership of numerous major metropolitan dailies. Newhouse was known for a policy of 
allowing local editorial autonomy, and inclusion of this newspaper was considered valuable 
for presenting another piece of American newspaper discourse.
170
 Individual editorial 
changes in the newspapers are not considered in this dissertation (although editorial influence 
is important in studying media discourse), because the intention is to examine what was said 
about human rights at each period in the print media in general, rather than what was said in 
each specific newspaper ~ that is, the overall discourse of the print media, rather than that of 
the New York Times or the other newspapers studied. 
 
In all of the newspapers studied, only news stories and items explicitly identified as editorials 
were considered while general opinion items were excluded. Many of the latter came from 
nationally syndicated columns and were duplicated across sources and thus, there were no 
regional variations to analyze. Each of these sources was read in microfilm format and thus 
each was the final or record version of any daily — for example, the final evening city 
version of the Los Angeles Times. 
 
The specific time periods for research are as follows: 
Period I: Paris Peace Talks, January 1-30, 1919. Press coverage was examined for the 
conclusion of the period that President Woodrow Wilson was in Paris negotiating the treaty 
(January 24-30, 1919). 
Period II: San Francisco Conference, 1945. Press coverage of the opening week of the 
conference itself was examined — April 25 to May 1. 
Period III: The bulk of the Carter presidential campaign took place during October and 
November 1976. However, the week of news coverage examined covers the period of 
Carter’s second television debate with Gerald Ford. This debate was on October 6,1976, 
focused on foreign policy and defense issues. News coverage leading to the debate and in the 
immediate aftermath was intense. Thus, the week of October 4 to October 10 was selected for 
close study. 
Period IV: Tiananmen Incident, June 1989. Examination of news coverage of this event 
focuses on the week beginning the day news of action against students in China first reached 
U.S. newspapers. The period of focus is June 3 through June 10, with emphasis on coverage 
of U.S. response to the events rather than the events themselves. 
 
Two main approaches were used to analyze the news texts. First, a simplified discourse 
analysis as proposed by Teun van Dijk was used, van Dijk argues that all texts have global 
coherence through the use of codified themes and/or topics. He says that “[S]uch topics can 
be described as semantic macro-propositions, that is, as propositions that are derived from 
sequences of propositions in the text: for instance by macro-rules such as selection, 
abstraction, and other operations which reduce complex information.”171 One example of 
such reduction of complexity is reference to geographical groupings instead of individual 
nations, such as news reports about the “Asia-Pacific,” the “West” or the “Moslem” response. 
These terms assume previous knowledge and assumptions on the part of the listener, similar 
to those of the reporter — this is what is meant by intertextualizafion in discourse analysis, 
van Dijk argues that these semantic macropropositions are revealed in the headline and lead 
paragraph of news stories. In addition, concentration on specific topics in the derivation of 
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macro-propositions can have ideological significance.
172
 van Dijk uses the example of a news 
report concerning expulsion of a Sri Lankan refugee in which one newspaper focused on the 
expulsion itself while another emphasized the protests and demonstrations associated with the 
expulsion. Such differences of emphasis may reveal ideology predominating in the content of 
individual newspapers. Use of a simplified discourse analysis here means semantic 
macropropositions are not formally identified. Rather, research sought to identify themes 
within texts regarding human rights, the location of human rights within particular discourses 
(political, social, economic, etc.), ways of talking about human rights and who/what was 
identified as having agency in the foreign policy process. 
 
The headline of each article that meets the definition of human rights (stated in the opening 
paragraph of this section) within sampling periods and themes within the entire text were 
identified, van Dijk suggests that in typical news formats, the headline and lead paragraph 
alone of newspaper articles reveal macrostructures within the text.
173
 However, news formats 
have not remained static across history, so the whole text rather than a partial text was studied 
to capture potential differences in story construction from early to late twentieth century. 
Themes from each newspaper sample were analyzed. Themes and structures (collections of 
themes into coherent arguments or propositions) were then compared across sources; for 
example, it was assumed that a comparison of the coverage in the New York Times, New 
Orleans Times - Picayune and the Washington P ost would reveal regional differences or a 
nationally cohesive discourse. 
 
The news texts were also examined as complete narratives in order to illuminate the 
particular stories of human rights being told. Each text was closely read to answer the 
questions of what story(ies) was/were being told about human rights and who was telling the 
stories. This involved identification of themes and particular representations of ideas. 
 
Congressional records 
Congressional records are an unique type of text in that what is in the official record may not 
be identical to what was said on the floor of congress. Congressional records must be used 
with an awareness that they are a record for posterity of the perspectives of individual 
congresspeople rather than a verbatim transcription of congressional debate. However, they 
remain a valuable source for study of political discourse at a national level. Indices for the 
years relevant to this dissertation were used to locate speeches and documents — of both the 
Senate and the House of Representatives — related to the periods and events of interest In 
addition, indices were used to locate specific references to human rights, on the assumption 
that those references might shed light on definitions and uses of the term, human rights. 
 
An attempt was made to locate every congressional reference to the events relevant to this 
research. However, for Periods I and II — those relating to world wars one and two — 
human rights issues were not classified separately from general war issues, so documentation 
may not be complete due to the mass of material. Every attempt was made to obtain a 
comprehensive record of debates and speeches related to human rights during these periods. 
 
Congressional statements were analyzed as a whole text. The focus of analysis in the 
congressional records was to identify the definition of human rights, the role of human rights 
in foreign policy and who was seen to play a part in the creation of foreign policy. Particular 
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attention was paid to the perceived role of human rights in foreign policy — asking whether 
and how congress saw human rights considerations in the case study periods as playing a part 
in foreign policy decisions. In common with news texts, each congressional text was 
interrogated to answer questions about the specific stories and representations of human 
rights being told. 
 
Presidential statements 
Analysis of presidents’ statements focused on the questions outlined above regarding 
definition of human rights, role of human rights in foreign policy, who was seen as helping 
create foreign policy, as well as questions regarding the specific tales of human rights being 
told. Of particular interest were choice of terminology in defining and talking about human 
rights because presidential leadership was assumed to be important in this regard -- 
potentially influencing both media coverage and congressional debate. 
 
Comparisons 
Comparisons were made at three levels. The first is an intra-case comparison, that is, 
comparison between each type of text within a case. For example, newspaper articles were 
compared to congressional records compared to presidential statements. This level of 
comparison allows building a picture of contemporary dialogue about human rights. The 
second level of analysis involves a comparison of texts across time, that is, search for any 
changes that may occur within each text type over time. This allows for identifying possible 
changes not only in content but also style and discourse ~ the ways of talking about human 
rights. The third level of analysis is a holistic approach comparing cases with each other. It is 
hoped that a picture will be built of each case in its historical context and that insight might 
be gathered about historical change and also changes within institutions as reflected in 
changes within text types. 
 
The next four chapters present the findings from each of the case studies in chronological 
order from the earliest example selected — the Paris Peace Talks — to the most recent -- the 
Tiananmen Square Incident The human rights discourse and narratives of each case study are 
identified and fitted into the overarching twentieth-century American discourses of morality 
and human rights. The final chapter speculates on the implications of the findings for 
addressing larger questions about discourses of human rights, the processes of societal 
discourse and the role of the media in the social construction of national identity and 
discourse — that is, the role of the media in articulating and circulating ideas in society. 
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Chapter Three 
 
The Great War, Peace Talks and the League of Nations: 
Case Study I 
 
Before examining in detail across sources how human rights were talked about in 1919, it is 
worthwhile to look at the overall narrative of human rights in that year. That is, before 
examining the construction of the discourse, the story or the plot one needs to step back from 
the details to study the overall picture being presented by that construction. Two questions 
are important here: what story or stories of human rights were being told in 1919, and who 
were the people telling those stories? 
 
Answering the question of who is perhaps easier than answering w hat Other than the obvious 
narrators of the stories, such as the individual newspapers, members of congress and the 
president all of whom can be called the primary narrators — other narrators were clearly 
present as revealed by primary narrators’ reference to them. Although secondary narrators are 
not themselves telling the story, they influence the discourse by making decisions about 
foreign policy and by talking about human rights in a particular way. 
 
For the print media in 1919, the president of the United States was a central narrator of 
foreign policy. Leaders of other countries and congress were seen as having lesser roles in 
narrating foreign policy. Public opinion, the American Constitution and administrative 
divisions of the executive branch were also seen as playing minor roles. Although the 
president and other elites were attributed a great measure of agency in the incorporation of 
human rights into foreign policy, the general public was also seen to have a significant voice 
as were international organizations, such as the League of Nations itself, and a range of 
interest groups. Thus, it can be concluded that in the story of foreign policy, the print media 
presented the narrators as being in descending order, the president, other heads of 
government, congress, then the minor voices of public opinion, the constitution and 
bureaucrats. However, in the telling of the human rights story, minor narrators of the foreign 
policy were depicted as having a greater measure of agency. In contrast, members of congress 
clearly perceived the only narrators of foreign policy as themselves and the president, with 
the only question being the proportion each contributed to the story. The president’s 
perception of agency seems to have been similar, seeing the majority of power residing 
within the executive branch, a smaller measure of power being held by congress and a still 
smaller measure held by public opinion. However, President Woodrow Wilson seemed to 
clearly see himself as an ambassador of the people rather than as a servant of congress. 
 
In the story of human rights being told in the print media, rights were defined in terms of 
personal security, national self-determination and world civilization — a civilization based on 
certain ideals of principles and right The major components of human rights were security 
and freedom from wrongful interference, peace, justice, law, equality, democracy and self-
determination. The provision of these rights was couched in terms of common interest choice, 
humanity, principles, emancipation, moral law, responsibility for the welfare of others, right 
and civilization in general. Furthermore, provision of human rights was beginning to be 
identified with Western democracy, industrialization and progress and contrasted with 
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Bolshevism. Minor components of human rights included labor rights, economic and political 
development and suffrage. 
 
Congressional stories of human rights were both more specific and more general. Attention 
was focused on the provision of specific political rights through democracy and the 
establishment of legal standards as well as on the right of individuals to speech, food, cultural 
development and to a free press. However, the human rights story was also told in general 
terms related to sweeping ideas of civilization, community, Christianity, morality,  service 
and duty, humanitarianism, progress. The American constitution was talked about as a model 
for the provision of human rights. 
 
We may now return to more detailed discussion of the construction of the discourse of human 
rights. This discourse was identified by asking questions not only about how human rights 
were defined and who or what was portrayed as playing parts in the creation of foreign 
policy; also questions were asked about the language of human rights (the symbols and 
metaphors used to talk about human rights), the connections made in the discourse about the 
role of human rights in foreign policy, linkages between human rights and ideas about 
American identity and the location of the discourses of human rights — that is, what areas of 
society were related to human rights. Some answers to these questions are discussed 
following a brief historical background to the period of study. 
 
The Peace Talks and the League of Nations 
On April 2, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson addressed a joint session of congress and asked 
it and the American people to formally acknowledge that Germany’s recent acts against the 
United States were the acts of a government at war and to respond appropriately. Simply, put, 
Wilson asked congress to declare the United States at war with Germany. After asking 
congress to declare war, Wilson suggested that the purpose of this war was not to be selfish 
or to acquire land: 
 
Our object now, as then [Wilson’s previous addresses to congress in January 1916 and 
February 1917], is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the 
world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and 
self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will 
henceforth insure the observance of those principles... We are at the beginning of an 
age in which it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and of 
responsibility for wrong done shall be observed among nations and their governments 
that are observed among the individual citizens of civilized states.
174
 
 
Wilson’s movingly worded plea was warmly received despite the fact that the United States 
had declared neutrality on August 4, 1914, and had maintained this stance throughout the war 
until this point However, the declaration by the Imperial German Government of a submarine 
blockade of all ports in Great Britain, Ireland, the western coasts of Europe or ports in the 
Mediterranean controlled by enemies of Germany, as well as subsequent sinking of allied and 
American ships, pushed the United States into action.
175
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Even before the United States had officially entered the war, Wilson had spoken about his 
idea for a league of nations, which would create a new world order and maintain peace. This 
new order would be based on the Monroe Doctrine, that is, that every nation should be left 
free to determine their own way of life and actions — what was referred to as determining 
one’s “own polity... own way of development.”176 These principles upon which peace was to 
be based were argued as not only American but universal. In the same speech asking congress 
for a declaration of war against Germany, Wilson argued that these principles were 
“American principles, American policies. We could stand for no others. And they are also the 
principles and policies of forward -looking men and women everywhere, of every modem 
nation, of every enlightened community. They are the principles of mankind and must 
prevail.”177 
 
Thus, an outline of a dialogue of human rights begins to emerge from early twentieth-century 
political rhetoric. This dialogue will be examined in detail later, but, at its most basic level 
across the period included in this dissertation, it consists of the notions of universal morality, 
justice, individual rights and of progress and modernity. By 1949 an U.S. Department of State 
publication on human rights summed up the official historical construction of human rights 
thus: 
 
When our forebears sailed westward across the Atlantic Ocean to seek a new start in a 
new land, they brought with them various aims, plans, and aspirations. One hope 
common to most of them, however, was a fuller freedom for the individual ~ religious 
and political. The new national way of life which they founded in the New World 
represented the fusion of many elements — the teachings of the Holy Bible regarding 
the worth of very human soul; Greek thought and civilization, in which the elevation 
of the individual was a prevailing principle; Roman civil law; the philosophic 
utterances of influential thinkers of East and West; Anglo-Saxon parliamentary 
government. In the New World, the early settlers molded this legacy into a way of life 
characterized by greater stress on the rights of the individual than the world had ever 
seen.
178
 
 
Germany capitulated on November 11, 1918, and the long process of negotiating the peace 
began. Even before Germany’s capitulation, Wilson had laid out fourteen points he said were 
the only basis for peace. Wilson’s plan for a league of nations appeared to be influenced by 
ideas laid out by Frederick Jackson Turner in a paper that Wilson read and annotated on the 
trip to Paris. In this paper, Turner suggested that any league would require a legislative body 
so that international political parties or alliances (using the model of the American federal 
political system) would operate as checks on nationalism and “national feeling” that would 
otherwise paralyze action.
179
 Turner proposed a league focusing on legislation with “limited 
but real powers.”180 Thus, in addition to the fourteen points, Wilson brought a number of 
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ideas to the conference about the structure and function  of the proposed organization. 
However, the European Allies wanted retribution and restitution mote than discussions about 
an ephemeral new world order. Wilson’s idealism was applauded but the peace talks bogged 
down in discussions over war reparations. Wilson insisted on leading the American 
delegation to the Paris peace talks, and this period during the month of January 1919 is the 
basis for the first case study here. 
 
Before turning to the case study, the final outcome of the peace talks must be briefly 
addressed. At first, American public opinion supported ratification of the Treaty of 
Versailles, but Republican opposition was growing and gaining public support. In the 1918 
elections, the Democrats lost their majority in both houses and the Republicans claimed this 
as a repudiation of Wilson and his policies.
181
 Opposition to ratification of the treaty was 
spearheaded by Henry Cabot Lodge, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Lodge 
offered fourteen reservations to counter Wilson’s fourteen points, but Wilson refused to 
amend his peace plan in any way.
182
 On November 19, 1919, ratification of the Treaty of 
Versailles was rejected. As part of that treaty, U.S. membership in the League of Nations was 
also rejected. Finally on August 25, 1921, a separate peace with Germany was signed by the 
United States in which the United States requested and was granted all of the “rights and 
advantages” of the Treaty of Versailles without the international obligations, “not 
withstanding the fact that such Treaty has not been ratified by the United States.”183 
 
Human Rights in the Newspapers of 1919 
The term “human rights” was rarely used in the early part of this century, though the 
concerns that led to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 were 
clearly present in early twentieth-century media and political discourse. The New York Times, 
Washington Post, Los Angeles Times and the New Orleans Times - Picayune were studied 
from January 24 to 30, 1919. Two years remained before the United States would finally sign 
a peace treaty with Germany, but the Paris Peace Talks were drawing to an end — as was 
President Wilson’s time in Europe. Each newspaper had daily reports of Wilson’s European 
activities and speeches as well as the responses of the European statesmen and public to the 
peace talks. It is useful at this point to reiterate that the newspaper articles studied were 
selected on the basis of the writer displaying a concern for human rights; a clear linking of 
the United States to a concern for human life and rights and portrayal of the United States as 
unique in its treatment of individuals, that is, as valuing human life and rights. These 
selection criteria operated whether or not the explicit phrase “human rights” was found in 
texts. In conjunction with this, study of discussions of human rights does not mean that the 
term itself was always used, but that ideas related to the concept of human rights as 
established by the operational guidelines of this study were expressed. 
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Statements About and Definitions of Human Rights in the Print Media 
One of the first questions addressed in studying the newspaper coverage was how human 
rights were defined. Two levels of definition were considered important The first addressed 
whether human rights were defined according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), which was adopted by the United Nations’ General Assembly on 10 December 
1948 (Resolution 217A (III)) and has since remained the touchstone for talking about human 
rights. This was a reference point for this research because it was a negotiated definition of 
human rights and can be used as a form against which other definitions can be measured. The 
second question addressed what other definitions of human rights were used, allowing for 
determining whether definitions of human rights existed at given times, and for the inclusion 
of those. 
 
Understandably, the primary focus for many people after World War I and thus, newspaper 
coverage, was the need, and indeed the entitlement of all people, to security, peace and 
justice in the aftermath of the war. These three ideas were prevalent in the sources studied, 
although individual newspapers differed as to emphasis. The New York Times, Washington 
Post and Los Angeles Times coverage “talked about” human rights as security for people. 
Coverage in the New Orleans Times - Picayune emphasized peace, and emphasis was placed 
on justice in New York Times and Los Angeles Times coverage. 
 
In addition to defining human rights as security of person, the New York Times coverage also 
defined human rights as equality, democracy, law, self-determination and common interest 
Each of these definitions falls under those used in the UDHR. In addition to these definitions, 
the New York Times coverage included other ways of talking about human rights, such as 
choice, humanity, principles, emancipation, moral law and right. 
 
Articles in the Washington Post used a much broader definition of human rights than did 
those in the New York Times. In common with the New York Times, human rights were talked 
about in the context of security and freedom from wrongful interference, democracy and 
peace. In addition, trade and labor issues played a role in the coverage as well as ideas about 
economic security, nationality and freedom. Other definitions of human rights included ideas 
about law and punishment the burden of war, civilization and tyranny. Also at this point in 
American history, the concern for individual lives and rights shown by democratic political 
systems was starting to be set up as a contrast to the ideas and goals of Bolshevism. 
 
The Los Angeles Times coverage of the peace conference used similarly broad definitions of 
human rights as in the Washington Post. In addition to defining human rights in terms of 
security, justice, democracy, freedom and self-determination, several articles incorporated 
ideas about labor rights, economic and political development and suffrage. Other definitions 
of human rights included ideas about civilization, humanity and absence of anarchy; a 
grouping of definitions centered on concepts of responsibility and concern for the welfare of 
others, solidarity and paternalism; and ideas about industrialization and progress. 
 
Definitions of human rights in the New Orleans Times - Picayune were much narrower than 
those found in the Washington Past and Los Angeles Times. Definitions using the UDHR 
were limited to discussion of ideas related to peace, freedom, undefined general rights and 
labor issues. These discussions used definitions very similar to those found in the other 
newspapers. However, when other definitions of human rights are considered, a range 
emerges. Rights are discussed in terms of civilization, progress and ideals, and punishment of 
38 
 
war crimes. Many of the news stories in the Times on the peace conference in the week of the 
sample were from the London Daily News and extensively quoted views of British Prime 
Minister Lloyd George. 
 
Security. Peace and Justice 
The New York Times featured prominently President Wilson’s declaration that: “We are 
bidden by these people [the older men, women, children, the homes of the civilized world] to 
make a peace that will make them secure.”184 This issue of security is a central definition of 
human rights within the UDHR, which declares that all humans are entitled to “life, liberty 
and the security of person.”185 The Washington Post coverage of President Wilson’s address 
to the Paris peace conference in 1919 clearly identified it as being about security and relief of 
individual suffering. The subhead said “Conferees’ Duty Is to Make Peace Secure, He 
Declares, Picturing Sufferings of Women and Children.”186 Security and peace were 
portrayed as by-products of democracy by the statement that “The wish of the people, 
therefore, must be heard. The war had swept away those old foundations by which old 
coteries had ‘used mankind as pawns in a game.’ Nothing but emancipation from the old 
system, he contended, would accomplish real peace.”187 
 
Articles in the Los Angeles Times tended to define security broadly — as not only rectifying 
the damage wrought by war but also as developing ways to avoid repetition of wars of such 
magnitude. This approach is illustrated by a report on the speech of British Prime Minister 
David Lloyd George to the conference. The report suggested, “His speech was chiefly 
notable for the vivid picture of the ruins of France and the need of setting up some system to 
take the place of this ‘organized savagery.’”188 Over and over, the phrase “provide safeguards 
against war” was used in conjunction with such terms as “international obligation,” 
“international agreement” and “international justice.”189 War was referred to as the “most 
horrible calamity that can come to a community” and as the “fever of the world.”190 This 
horror of war was directly connected to a belief that the world itself had changed so that 
people and nations would no longer condone war. One article carried the subheading “No 
Parliament Ever will Sanction Armed Conflict” over a report that U.S. Senator Gilbert 
Hitchcock of Nevada, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had said, “The 
world will be shown that mankind will no longer tolerate war as a means of settling 
disputes.”191 Nations were portrayed as no longer condoning war and as having turned 
entirely to a new way of conducting international relations — “not to see how great the spoils 
they can command for their various nations out of the wreck and ruin of war, but to see what 
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way justice may be done, and to seek the remedy that will the surest cure the fever of the 
world [sic].”192 The rhetoric about this new way of doing things was florid. Under the 
heading “The World’s New Standards,” an article proclaimed the “era when international 
right was the right of the strongest is definitely closed ... the subjects of international disputes 
will be judged according to a code of friendliness and fairness unknown to the peace 
conferences of the past”193 (Immediately after the devastation of a world war there was hope 
and indeed, conviction, that such a war would never again be allowed and that nations 
themselves would change to meet the challenge.) 
 
Equality of Peoples 
Equality of peoples is one of the central notions of the UDHR. The preamble states that 
“recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of 
the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”194 The notion 
of equality of peoples was a radical idea in early twentieth century international power 
politics, when political power came from controlling colonies and when paternalism towards 
so-called “lesser-peoples” was the rule. Wilson’s argument that a new way of doing things 
was needed was translated in the New York Times thus: the “select class of mankind are no 
longer the governors of mankind. The fortunes of mankind are now in the hands of the plain 
people of the whole world.”195 Wilson was further quoted as arguing: 
 
Those foundations [of the war] were the holding together of empires of unwilling 
subjects by the duress of arms. Those foundations were the power of small bodies of 
men to wield their will and use mankind as pawns in a game. And nothing less than 
emancipation of the world from these things will accomplish peace.
196
 
 
Democracy 
Emancipation was linked clearly with democracy in the New York Times coverage, and the 
American task was to “see that every people in the world shall choose its own masters and 
govern its own identities, not as we wish but as they wish.”197 Not only were people to be 
free, but countries too were to be free because “self-determination is a right.”198 
 
In the light of U.S. history, it is tempting to assume that a focus on democracy as central to 
human rights is a particularly American perspective. However, Article 21 of the UDHR states 
that: 
 
1 -Everyone has the right to take part in the Government of his country, directly or 
through freely chosen representatives. 
3 - The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of the government; this 
will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal 
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and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting 
procedures.
199
 
 
Given Western, and especially United States, influence in the United Nations and the crafting 
of the Universal Declaration, it can still be contended that democracy as a human right comes 
from a Western perspective. As results of this research (discussed later) show, democracy as 
a fundamental human right is an American concern that extends across all sources and time 
periods. 
 
Common Interest. Morality and International Standards 
It is clear that Wilson’s perspective included an entirely new way of “doing world politics” 
that required sweeping out traditional notions of power politics and instituting the notion of 
common interest. Wilson said that the role of a league of nations should be as “the eye of the 
nations, to keep watch upon the common interest.”200 This idea of common interest, of 
nations keeping an eye on each other, was the precursor of a concept central to any statement 
of universal human rights — that certain issues override sovereignty of individual nations and 
that domestic issues can be a matter of international concern. In 1919 one of these issues was 
the idea that an individual, the Kaiser, could be held responsible for “crimes done in the name 
of war, but contrary to the laws of war and therefore not excused by hostilities.”201 The idea 
of relationships between nations based on law was tied to the concept of the existence of 
moral laws governing international behavior. An editorial presented the idea that: 
 
There are not two laws, one for Germany’s punishment and another for the Allies’ 
profit. There is but one world law, and for the first time it is to be enforced in the Old 
World as a mandate of conscience as well as of cannon [sic]... Powers need to be tried 
by an acid test of their conformity to the common good under universal law.
202
 
 
Common good, conscience, common interest, moral law and right were all terms used both 
by Wilson and in the New York Times when the proposed league of nations was discussed. 
An editorial in the New York Times said, in concurring with Wilson, “As President Wilson 
said at Manchester, ‘Interest does not bind men together. Interest separates men. Only one 
thing can bind men together, and that is common devotion to right.’”203 The editorial went on 
to argue, “Self-determination is a right, but not the only right, not even the chief right The 
right of all is superior to the right of any, and large nations must make sacrifices as well as 
small if the world hereafter is to be ruled by law instead of by self-interest and force.”204 As 
will be seen in later discussion of other sources, media discourse established a clear contrast 
between the old way of doing things by force and a new way of organizing the world and 
participating in world politics. This new way was undergirded by an emphasis on democracy, 
self-determination and emancipation — fundamentally suggesting choice as both a right and 
as a guiding principle of international politics. 
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Trade. Labor and Economic Development 
While Washington Post articles did not extensively treat trade and labor issues, these issues 
were raised as appropriate concerns for a new world organization. An editorial on the peace 
conference cited the “necessity of drafting international legislation on industrial and labor 
questions.”205 These industrial and labor questions included a “scheme for the international 
regulation of conditions of employment,” the establishment of an international commission 
on trade regulation and intensive consultation with British trade unionists.
206
 The issues of 
trade and conditions of employment were explicitly linked to the concept that nations should 
provide physical and economic security for their citizens through concern for “life, liberty 
and welfare.”207 However, in spite of acceptance of the idea of international regulation of 
conditions of employment, it was argued strongly in an editorial that “[n]ations must 
determine their own standards of living according to their ability.”208 A new world 
organization did not mean that nations were willing to relinquish sovereignty on economic 
and trade issues even for the sake of international assistance in rebuilding. 
 
In contrast, Los Angeles Times coverage closely connected the devastation of war in Europe 
with a need for economic development European countries were described as “writhing in the 
agony of anarchy and lawlessness, murder and unbridled lust ...”209 The new standards for 
international relationships were portrayed as such that: 
 
Peoples no longer desire to live by conquest and exploitation of their neighbors... it is 
with the rights of peoples and not with the interests and perquisites of princes and 
royal houses that the judges are concerned. The right of conquest is no longer 
recognized. A bandit is none the less a brigand because his servants wear livery and 
he wears a crow n... Neither economic nor political servitude is longer tolerable.
210
 
 
This acknowledgment of the need for economic development to take place alongside political 
developments, such as the introduction of democracy and the removal of anarchy, is an 
important addition to discussions of human rights. The need for democracy as a guarantee of 
freedom seems to have been so obvious to the news writers that they did not elaborate it as a 
major theme. In contrast, the need for economic rights at the individual and national levels 
emerged as a more elaborated topic. Economic rights were portrayed as including fair labor 
conditions, the right to join unions and for nations to enjoy economic sovereignty. Labor 
issues were tied to suffrage by the issue of working conditions for both men and women.
211
 In 
the economic domain, concerns similar to those in the political domain were raised by 
delegates to the conference ~ that is, how international regulation or oversight of agreements 
and conditions could impinge upon the sovereign rights of nations.
212
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National Identity. Internationalism and Idealism 
A concern in the Washington Post coverage of the peace conference was about national 
identity — that is, how the new way of organizing world politics would influence, not only 
national identity, but also how the new spirit of internationalization would be manifest in the 
everyday realities of world politics. A January 30 article carried the extended headline and 
subheading: 
 
Colonies To Be Prize: Allies Demand Hun Possession Despite Wilson’s Idealism: 
Opposed To Rule By League: Conquerors Maintain Annexation Is Indispensable to 
Own Safety: Entente Willing To Retain Spirit of Wilson Principles Only to Extent It 
Does Not Interfere With Plans for Spoils - British Opinion Veering From Support of a 
League. Ideals Held A Danger.
213
  
 
The concern was that idealism would only go so far and that old ideas about war spoils and 
the rights of colonial powers would continue to influence any league of nations. The same 
January 30 article argued that the “crux of the situation is that France, Great Britain, the 
British dominions, Japan and Belgium want German colonial possessions and intend to get 
them by one means or another regardless of the fact that in doing so they obviously violate 
the idealism of the President’s preconceived peace program.”214 The article went on to quote 
the London Daily Mail, which portrayed the situation as being that the allies were “seeking a 
plan which, while giving the practical power desired by the nations who want the German 
colonies for their own, will still provide some shadowy form of internationalization for the 
purpose of satisfying Mr. Wilson’s ideals.”215 It becomes clear, when linkages between 
human rights and foreign policy are pursued, that newspapers such as the New York Times 
and the Washington Post portrayed a dichotomy between pragmatism and idealism in foreign 
policy. Pragmatism was portrayed as attending to issues of real politics while idealism 
concerned such issues as justice, human rights and internationalization — in the American 
context, defined as involvement in world affairs rather than the traditional ideal of isolation 
from the affairs of the Old World. 
 
Editorials in the Washington Post particularly concerned nationality and how national 
identity would be affected by post-war world reorganization. Terms such as “super-nation” 
and “United States of the World” were beginning to be used -- in talk about the proposed 
league of nations. One of the major concerns was whether individual nations, and freedom in 
general, would be weakened by participation in a “universal league of nations.”216 One 
editorial argued this point, suggesting: 
 
The civilized peoples of Europe have just saved themselves from slavery by the 
exercise of their strength organized in separate distinct nations... These nations are far 
from perfect organizations, but they are the best working systems yet devised by man 
for making his life, liberty and welfare reasonably secure... Governments organized 
and maintained by free peoples are effective barriers against the tyranny of both 
autocrats and anarchists. Any project which aims at weakening free nations is 
therefore dangerous, if not fatal, to liberty.”217 
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Punishment and Law 
By labeling punishment as a component of the definition of human rights, what is meant here 
is that individuals are seen to have rights, the violation of which constitutes a crime deserving 
punishment. For example, the headline of one article in the New Orleans Times - Picayune 
proclaims, “Plans Are Made To Punish War-Guilty.” War-guilty are defined as the German 
empire and allies who committed “breaches of the laws and customs of war,” and a 
committee was reported as being established “regarding responsibility and punishment of the 
war-makers.”218 
 
As is usual in the aftermath of major wars, the victorious nations sought ways not only to 
prevent immediate resumption of war, in some cases seeking to prevent war ever recurring, 
but also to punish the perpetrators of war. Punishment and law were major themes through 
much of the coverage of the peace conference. Delegates to the conference sought to create a 
commission to “inquire into breaches of laws and customs of war committed by Germany and 
her allies... as well as the degree of responsibility for these offenses attaching to particular 
members of the enemy forces, ‘including members of the general staffs and others, however 
highly placed.’”219 A further radical notion associated with the creation of a league of nations 
was that a permanent international court would be established to adjudicate criminal matters 
between nations. The goal of this court was not only to resolve reparations and criminal 
issues arising from the war but to help prevent that kind of war occurring again. The concern 
arising out of this was that such a court as the tribunal of The Hague “only appealed to moral 
law and was without means of enforcing its decisions.”220 Moral law was seen to be an 
inadequate means of conducting foreign affairs. A January 27 article in the Washington Post 
presented the viewpoint that “senators are not inclined to be unduly excited over any form 
which expression of principles or declarations of moral purpose may take. They assume that 
the nations will not find it difficult to agree on matters of abstract principles as long as the 
element of international force does not enter into the question.”221 
 
The Threat of Bolshevism 
A further major theme that emerged in the Washington Post coverage of the peace conference 
was the positioning of democracy as representing freedom. This was further linked with 
civilization in such phrases as “if civilization is to be saved ...” and “free and civilized 
peoples.”22249 Civilization was contrasted with tyranny; tyranny was linked with anarchy and 
anarchy was tied to Bolshevism. In a particularly strong statement an editorial argued that: 
 
There should not be any league of nations on the original plan. It is in its essence 
internationalism, destructive of nations, and therefore dangerously resembling 
bolshevism ... Autocracy decreed there should be only one nation; bolshevism decrees 
there shall be no nations. The free and civilized peoples beat one of their assailants by 
sticking to the plan of fighting by nations. The fight with the other assailant in now 
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beginning ... They will resist the destructive effect of direct attack by bolshevism, or 
go down in universal anarchy.
223
 
 
Thus, the editorial stance of the Washington Post was that President Wilson’s plan, while it 
represented high ideals, lacked practical application and was, in fact, dangerous because it 
opened the door to the destruction of civilization by Bolshevism. The same editorial 
concluded with the statement that “President Wilson’s original league of nations, the United 
States of the World, armed with military and naval power, and bound to suppress any nation 
that should dare to disturb the world’s peace, has gone glimmering into the shadows of 
Never-Never land.”224 
 
Suffrage 
President Wilson spoke forthrightly while traveling in Europe about women’s suffrage. On 
meeting a group of French working women, Wilson expressed his admiration of them and 
support for their cause while putting forth his belief that working women’s concern was an 
issue that the peace conference was ill-equipped to resolve. While the conference sought “an 
arrangement for the peace and security of men and women everywhere,” and Wilson 
expressed his “admiration for the women of all the nations that have been engaged in the 
war” and “the indomitable power of women and men alike, to sustain any burden if the cause 
was great enough,” little hope was offered for women seeking assistance of the international 
organization in achieving their goals.
225
 
 
Progress and Civilization 
Threaded throughout the Los Angeles Times coverage of the peace conference was a strong 
theme that linked ideas about freedom, peace, security and other rights with ideas about 
civilization and humanity. Simply by implying the presence of international standards by 
which the behavior of nations could be judged, discourse was shifted from the political to the 
moral domain. A later section will more explicitly examine the domains of discourse, but it is 
useful at this point to discuss definitions within the moral domain. The goals of the peace 
conference were explicitly linked with enlightenment and progress by the use of such phrases 
as “all civilized nations,” “the history of civilization,” “all self-respecting nations,”,“the 
world has passed into a new era” and similar phrases.226 Such discussions of progress were 
further linked with the achievements of industrialization. Writers in the Los Angeles Times 
painted a picture of the achievements of cooperation leading to a league of nations as the 
direct result of industrialization and progress. One article declared that: 
 
Industrialism...has turned the thought of the world from conquest to production: it has 
made possible the substitution of justice for armed force... The star of conquest has 
set; its light is forever dimmed and the peoples of the world are now guided by the 
light of industry... Industrialism is the force that makes the new League of Nations 
possible. It has turned the thought of the world from conquest to production ...
227
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Industrialism or industrialization is itself endowed with moral value in such statements as 
“Industrialism is the child of peace and righteousness” and the argument that “the Holy 
Alliance fell because it was supported by force, not by justice and self-determination. It was 
formed a hundred years too soon; the age of industrialism had not yet dawned.”228  
 
Progress was seen to not only arise from industrialization but also from general humanitarian 
development The same article that extolled the virtues of industrialization claimed that 
“Human nature has not changed... but social and political standards and values have 
definitely changed.”229 The main area of change is portrayed as that individual rights have 
become the main concern in national life and international relations rather than only the needs 
of the political elite. Along with this concern for individuals is portrayed a new sense of 
responsibility for the welfare of others that comes out of religious beliefs and conviction. In 
an editorial resonating with Biblical overtones, this concern is voiced as being: 
 
We have however, our fellow human beings of other lands and of other races to think 
of. If we be not exactly our brother’s keeper, there is still a responsibility that we 
cannot escape. It is that common responsibility that each man must bear for the 
welfare of his fellow-man... No man who has never made a sacrifice knows what real 
happiness is. And no nation that has insulated itself in selfishness ever produced a 
race of men worthy to be called the sons of God.
230
 
 
This concern for the welfare of others is cast in this editorial as universal, yet it carries 
overtones of paternalism. These overtones are stated more overtly in the same edition of the 
newspaper in an article entitled “Share Burden of White Man: America may be Called on to 
Govern Arabia.”231 The burden is described as “the care and tutelage of specific struggling 
peoples” and as acting as a “wet nurse.”232 
 
The New Orleans Times - Picayune coverage linked this move away from the destruction of 
war with the notion of progress toward a new world “being brought in to redress the balance 
of power of the old world.”233 Discussion of this new world uses such terms as “civilized,” 
“saner'’ and a covenant based on the “unalterable lines of principle,” while illustrating the 
“ideals of liberty” and “humanitarian ideals.”234 
 
Linkages Between Human Rights and Foreign Policy in the Print Media 
 
One of the main ways human rights and foreign policy were linked in the newspapers studied 
was through the idea that values (whether expressed as morality, principles or idealism) were 
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a valid consideration in making policy decisions. All of the newspapers studied portrayed 
tensions as existing between idealism and pragmatism, but only the Washington Post 
coverage argued that idealism was inappropriate in foreign policy. Coverage in the New York 
Times expressed this idea that idealism had a role in foreign policy by suggesting that certain 
beliefs and values overrode expediency and selfish interests. Law, right and appropriate - or 
civilized — behavior were presented as at times being more important than acquisition of 
power and land. One article quoted Wilson’s statement that there existed a “single cause of 
justice and liberty for men of every kind and place.”235 Another article pointed out that 
countries might have to sacrifice some of their own interests.
236
 The behavior of those who 
served this cause was clearly linked with values associated with civilization as defined by the 
victors of war. An editorial declared that the peace conference would create a “settlement 
according to unwritten law recognized by the practice of all worthy to be included in the 
league of civilization.”237 
 
In contrast, the Washington Post coverage discussed how the ideals identified as being 
associated with human rights values did not, or should not, play a part in foreign policy. 
While articles reported the perspective of Wilson and some of the delegates to the conference 
that idealism played a role in foreign policy, the newspaper’s editorial stance was clearly not 
of the same opinion. One article reported the support of both the Italian premier, Vittorio 
Orlando, and the Chinese delegates for the “high ideals” and “lofty ideals expressed” by 
President Wilson’s proposal for the league of nations.238 This support was contrasted with an 
editorial statement indicating that inclusion of idealism in foreign policy is too difficult, 
saying: 
 
... the league is in its last analysis to be merely an expression of principles, with some 
provision to perpetuate study of the subject through special committees. The 
President’s address is regarded as escaping the faintest suggestion of anything 
concrete or definite... for the reason that his original plan has been so altered that he 
has abandoned all hope of seeing the details worked out in the near future.
239
 
 
In spite of an editorial stance against idealistic proposals in the peace talks that could 
negatively affect nations’ freedom of action, specifically the United States, the Washington 
Post reported extensively on President Wilson’s perspective that foreign policy should have a 
responsibility to meet people’s needs and that nations have responsibilities towards each  
other. The newspaper reported Wilson’s declaration that ‘“We are bidden by these sufferers 
to make peace secure for them and see to it that the strain need never be borne again.’”240 In 
addition, it reported his statement that “It [the league] should be the eye of nations, an eye 
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which never slumbers,” and suggested that this meant that “a league of nations must be a vital 
thing and not casual or occasional. It must have continuity.”241 
 
Idealism and values were seen in Los Angeles Times coverage to be increasingly important in 
world politics and therefore American foreign policy. In an article entitled “The World’s New 
Standards,” the perspective is presented that “The old standards of political weights and 
measures no longer apply... Petitions filed with the Peace Conference are viewed not as 
questions of claim s, but of rights.”242 This approach, using new social and political values, 
was portrayed as “a force that will amalgamate national ideals, cast in the great melting pot, 
into an indissoluble whole which will mark the realization of the ideal of humanitarians of the 
last ten centuries.”243 
 
The reference to national ideals is discussed further in the next section in connection with 
American values and expressions of human rights. This idea, that nations might be motivated 
more by ideals and humanitarianism than by self-interest in developing foreign policy, was 
not new but is a central notion in study of American discourses of human rights. 
 
The discourse being gradually articulated throughout the pages of the Los Angeles Times was 
that certain notions related to humanitarian ideals, such as justice, freedom, democracy and 
law were valid considerations in foreign policy. Inclusion of these values was seen to benefit 
individuals rather than governments, for “it is with the rights of people and not with the 
interests and perquisites of princes and royal houses that the judges are concerned.”244 
Furthermore, incorporation of these ideals in foreign policy was seen as potentially of 
practical benefit for the United States, with increased peace and security, decrease of anarchy 
and the satisfaction of moral virtue. However, it was made clear that along with the benefits 
of peace and security would come the costs of involvement in world affairs. An article 
otherwise discussing the potential of the United States sharing the “white man’s burden” 
argued that: 
 
A   League of Nations is not an academic thing — a pretty ornament which can be 
brought home from the Peace Conference and set up to gather admiration and dust on 
a shelf in the State Department A real League of Nations will be a tremendous world-
wide organization costing much money, time, attention and doubtless the lives of 
many American soldiers and sailors as time goes on.
245
 
 
The New Orleans Times - Picayune coverage suggested that cooperation between nations was 
necessary in order to achieve and maintain peace. Quoting a London Morning Post article, the 
Times presented the perspective that: 
 
Mr. Wilson can afford to be an idealist because ‘his country is not endangered by 
ideals but our countries are...There is the question of tariffs, and there is the question 
of territory. America opposed the Monroe Doctrine to the German desire for 
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expansion in the New World. Would they be prepared to renounce that doctrine? 
These are the two questions which seem to us to constitute a practical test If the 
United States will not sacrifice these two bulwarks of her territorial and economic 
security for the alternative form of security offered under the League of Nations, it 
appears a trifle unreasonable to expect other nations which are more immediately and 
imminently threatened to make even greater sacrifices of security.
246
 
 
The quoted Morning Post article had continued, saying: “The war occurred not because there 
was no machinery of arbitration, but because Germany wanted war...if we want guarantee 
[sic] of peace we m ust put that ambition beyond her power.”247 Thus was the pragmatic 
perspective stated in its bluntest form — that peace would come from traditional forms of 
post-war reparations and punishments, not through establishment of any international 
organization for peace. 
 
In contrast to this perspective, another British newspaper was seen to support the notion that 
nations needed to cooperate in order to guarantee peace. The idea of cooperation and 
community gradually emerges in human rights discourse over the course of the century, but 
at this time the notion was still embryonic with the idea simply being that: 
 
the new world being brought in to redress the balance of power of the old 
world...henceforth the New World must be in partnership with the Old, for it is only 
by that happy necessity that we are able to look forward to the abolition of the 
institution of war and the organization of the world on a basis of peace.
248
 
 
While the role of idealism was one of the central elements of discussion about foreign policy 
in these newspapers, it was closely linked to discussions of the conflicting interests of 
sovereignty and self-interest as well as of sovereignty and potential external interference in 
domestic affairs. This conflict between the perceived goals of idealism and pragmatism was 
illustrated in a Washington Post article headed “Allies Demand Hun Possessions Despite 
Wilson’s Idealism.” For example, some phrases were “the long expected conflict between 
idealism and practical statesmanship”; “American senators and others... resent the idea of 
camouflage involved in trying to make practical acts of annexation look like the carrying out 
of some idealistic plan” ; “if only a very small percentage of the President’s idealism remains 
intact after the conference” ; and “trying to save too much of the idealism against the advice 
of practical statesmen.”249 The same article further identified the conflict as between the “so-
called internationalization doctrine and the 
aims of the powers.”250 
 
The Washington Post took a very strong editorial stance on the issue of potential decrease of 
sovereign power associated with membership in the international organization for peace. The 
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proposed league was seen to potentially weaken individual nations because, “In order to live 
such a league of nations would have had to draw its strength from the nations, and therefore 
each nation would have been left weaker than before.”251 With regard to the United States, 
the editorial declared that “Sovereign nations like the United States will remain sovereign, 
determining for themselves, absolutely without interference, upon such course of action at 
any time as seems best to them. The world is merely to have another advisory, statistical, 
rhetorical headquarters.”252 The question remaining was whether nations would agree to a 
decrease in individual freedom of action in order to avoid another world war. An earlier 
article asked a sim ilar question and concluded that, “if the desire for selfish profit and 
advantage should still be a ruling force, it will be difficult to set up a power to which all must 
bow.”253 
 
In common with the New York Times and the Washington Post, a great deal of attention in the 
Los Angeles Times was paid to the issue of sovereignty versus international regulation or 
enforcement of peace. Discussion of these conflicting interests operated alongside discussion 
of whether the United States should follow a policy of isolationism or internationalism. In an 
interesting foretaste of current American use of “most favored nation status” to reward and 
punish other states for their human rights records, the architect of the British proposal for an 
international labor commission “Asked as to what power the commission would have back of 
it to enforce its rulings,... replied in substance that if any nation refused to play the game she 
might be brought to reason by depriving her of trade privileges with sister states.”254 
 
Three main issues dominated discussion in the Los Angeles Times of the conflict between 
sovereign interests and international enforcement of agreements made at the peace 
conference. The primary issue was that of maintenance of peace and how aggression by 
nation-states could be checked. The compromise reached at the conference was that “a 
distinction must be realized between justiciable [sic] disputes and nonjusticiable [sic] 
disputes and that each state must be the final judge whether or not a dispute is justiciable 
[sic].
255” A primary concern of the Americans was that participation in a league of nations 
would mean becoming embroiled in Old World disputes in attempts to maintain peace. As 
will be seen in discussion of Congressional documents, Wilson’s support of participation in 
the league again raised heated discussion of the isolationism versus internationalism debate. 
One side of the debate argued that “Americans will not stand again idly by ... America is 
ready to assume her full responsibility for guaranteeing the maintenance of a peace founded 
on justice.”256 The other side, led by Senator Albert Cummins, “would have this country 
reassume a position of splendid isolation, avoiding alliances that might embroil us in a 
dispute among European states... he thinks our country should act strictly in an admonitory 
capacity.”257 
 
Two other issues were encompassed by the sovereignty debate — regulation of labor and 
suffrage. There was intense concern that cooperation with the proposed international labor 
commission would lead to interference in American industry by a league comprised of 
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nations with competing business interests. Readers of the Los Angeles Times were assured 
that “The international labor commission, or bureau, will not deal with purely internal 
problems of the nations. Capital and labor will still work out their local differences, as 
before.”258 President Wilson saw these labor issues as similar to the problem of international 
adjudication of demands for women’s suffrage. While supporting women’s right “to take 
their full share of the political life of the nations to which they belong,” he also argued that 
the issue: 
 
is necessarily a domestic question for the several nations. A conference of peace 
settling the relations of nations with each other would be regarded as going very much 
outside its province if it undertook to dictate to the several states what their internal 
policy should be. At the same time these considerations apply also to the conditions of 
labor...
259
 
 
While dashing hopes that he would support international enforcement of women’s suffrage, 
he still raised hopes by placing the issue of women’s suffrage on a par with labor issues — a 
significant step. 
 
Human Rights and American Identity in the Print Media 
Texts were examined to see if statements about human rights as defined above were linked to 
U.S. ideals and identity and, if so, how this was done. It is clear from presidential rhetoric 
that Wilson saw a clear linkage between American identity and proposed participation in the 
peace plan. Linkages are less clear in the newspaper discourse, although the New York Times 
linked events in Europe to the settlement of the American Civil War. An editorial argued, “In 
the present situation there is something which distinguishes it from previous occasions in 
which the Allies have enforced their wills in Europe, and which likens it to the settlement of 
our civil war. That was an unconditional surrender to written law in our Constitution.”260 
American altruism was expressed in the statement that “Interests are not the chief motive 
force of any league to which the United States is a party.”261 Not only was the United States 
portrayed as altruistic in its involvement, but, some people argued, American citizens in 
general were disinterested in any involvement expressed as the “general dislike here for the 
creation of a superstate to control the policies, interests, and conduct of individual 
sovereignties.”262 This disinterest can be tied to the argument by proponents of isolationism 
that the United States should not participate in the peace conference lest the country be 
sullied by the political machinations of the Old World. 
 
This perspective was also evident in the Washington Post. Very few linkages were portrayed 
between American ideals and involvement in the peace process other than negative linkages. 
That is, American identity required non-involvement rather than involvement. This is 
illustrated by the statement the “intimation that the representatives of the American people 
are demanding this league is regarded as entirely unjustified by the facts. In other words, the 
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enthusiasm ascribed to the American people in this regard simply does not exist.”263 Not only 
is a lack of enthusiasm by the American people argued to exist, but participation in the league 
is seen as a personal crusade of President Wilson -- who is portrayed as a dangerous idealist 
lacking the “robust common sense” of former President Theodore Roosevelt.264 
 
The Los Angeles Times offered the widest range of linkages between American identity and 
statements about human rights. One of the clearest linkages was that the United States could 
teach the world about democracy because of its own experiences.
265
 Not only did the United 
States have experience with democracy but she also was portrayed  as pure and untouched by 
the events in Europe.
266
 Thus, the United States is portrayed as being able to share her ideals 
with the world because of her history and unblemished record. Senator Hitchcock of Nevada 
was reported as saying that “America, with ‘her idealistic principles, will stand at the head 
and the iredescent [sic] dreams of the past, will become the facts of the future.’267” These 
idealistic principles were compared with those of physicians, and Wilson was portrayed as 
being in Europe to “help cure the world of its fever.”268 This medical metaphor was continued 
in the conclusion that “We Americans must watch through the night and we must pray. We 
shall be glad that we have done what we could. When the fever is spent and the sick world 
arises again in health and happiness we shall rejoice that our hands were reached out to 
cure.”269 
 
American principles were portrayed as being the central factor in her involvement in the 
peace conference, and in fact as driving American foreign policy in general. The United 
States was represented as being “actuated by ideals of humanity and not by selfish 
interest.”270 In addition to ideals, a reason given for the involvement of the United States was 
sympathy for the difficulties experienced by those in Europe, especially the French.
271
 Wilson 
told the French, “‘We have followed your sufferings with a feeling that we were witnessing 
one of the most heroic, and ... at the same time, satisfactory things in the world — satisfaction 
because it showed the strength of the human spirit.’”272 In spite of the image of the United 
States as witness to the events in Europe, an implicit connection between American identity 
and definitions of human rights is offered by the representation of the United States as 
located at the center of events — as the driving force behind peace and associated ideas about 
human rights. Wilson is represented as a central figure at the conference -- “surrounding the 
figure of the President of the United States are the statesmen of Europe.”273 
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Coverage of the peace conference in the New Orleans Times - Picayune was again heavily 
dependent on British sources of news. The British press connected American identity and 
human rights ideals by referring to the Declaration of Independence. The ideals deriving from 
the Declaration of Independence were seen to be driving American involvement in the peace 
efforts. An ironic twist is offered by the London Daily News, which credits Britain for 
American involvement, saying: 
 
[W]e must go back to the Declaration of Independence. That declaration was only the 
expression in new and larger terms, of the ideals of liberty which the English people 
had given to die world, and we may legitimately claim that inspiration which comes 
from America today, since it springs from the same fountain. Indeed, the bread we 
cast upon the waters in the seventeenth century has come back to us after many 
days.
274
 
 
The Times' own writers portrayed the involvement of the United States in the peace 
conference as deriving not from “fear of its safety, but [was] the result of humanitarian 
ideals.”275 
 
Domains of Human Rights in the Print Media 
After describing specific definitions of human rights and linkages between human rights and 
foreign policy created in the use of these definitions, as well as human rights and American 
identity, it is useful to think about the domains of discourse in which the print media placed 
human rights. Domains of discourse means such subject categories as political, social, 
economic, religious, general morality, legal or other. For example, a phrase such as 
“unalterable lines of principles” would be classified as general morality whereas reference to 
Biblical principles would be classified as within the domain of religion. Thus, references to 
conscience or right are classified as general morality even though they may originate from 
religious beliefs. Explicit mention of God, the Bible, prayer or other religious phrases means 
the discourse was categorized as religion. References to civilization, humanity, progress and 
development of ideas were categorized as in the social domain. The economic domain 
encompassed ideas about economic development, industrialization, labor issues and general 
economic rights. Discourse classified as political contained references to government, 
democracy, sovereignty and issues of nation, among others. 
 
The discourse of human rights in the print media examined was categorized overwhelmingly 
in the political, social and general morality domains. Each newspaper studied contained 
statements about human rights within these three domains. In addition, New York Times 
statements about human rights were classified in the legal domain if they contained such 
references as “world law,” “unwritten law,” an “international law and order committee,” the 
“league to enforce law by the sword, the world’s first” and the “law of right,” among 
others.
276
 The Washington Post, Los Angeles Times and New Orleans Times - Picayune 
contained statements about human rights that were classified within the economic domain. 
These statements were overwhelmingly about labor, trade and industrial issues. However, the 
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Washington Post also contained statements about standards of living. The Los Angeles Times 
was the only newspaper with human rights statements that were classified in the religious 
domain. A statement illustrating this was the editorial declaration that “no nation that has 
insulated itself in selfishness ever produced a race of men worthy to be called the sons of 
God.”277 In addition, the editorial referred to Americans praying on “bended knee” for 
“succor and for help” and the need to “thank the Living God for the blessings we enjoy.”278 
 
Symbols of Human Rights Discourse in the Print Media 
An important part of studying discourse is examination of the way discourse is itself 
constructed. Both overt and implicit definitions are important as are the domains of discourse 
within which these definitions are placed. Symbols and metaphors are also an important part 
of the construction of discourse -- they can be called the building blocks. Much of the 
coverage in the newspapers studied described human rights in terms of symbolic oppositions 
— contrasting provision of human rights with their absence. This was particularly noticeable 
in the language of Washington Post articles but was also evident in the language of the New 
Orleans Times - Picayune. Washington Post coverage identified several dichotomies, 
including contrasts of the old and the new; idealism versus reality; freedom, versus anarchy; 
and sovereignty versus international regulation. Ideas about liberty, order and freedom were 
positioned as the opposite of slavery, anarchy and disorder. This dichotomy was symbolized 
by the image of democracy confronting Bolshevism.
279
 Closely tied to this image were 
images of national sovereignty versus international regulation — independence of thought 
and national decision-making versus forced adherence to international regulations and the 
intervention of possibly hostile nations in domestic affairs. 
 
New Orleans Times - Picayune writers contrasted civilization with anarchy; peace with 
aggression; new world with the old world; and isolation with cooperation. Civilization and 
sanity were compared with the brutality and devastation of the war — what British Prime 
Minister Lloyd George described as “beautiful things of the world disfigured beyond 
repair.”280 The Old World and its system of the balance of power worked out through 
aggression between isolated nations was contrasted with a new world of cooperation and 
peace symbolized by the United States and the American model of democracy.
281
 
 
Writers for the New York Times depended heavily on the use of metaphors in their coverage 
of the peace conference and its potential outcomes rather than setting up descriptive 
dichotomies. The metaphors used can be divided into several general categories: metaphors 
of the body; textiles; games; architecture; religion and vigilantism. Metaphors of the body 
included such phrases as the “heart of humanity/’ “pulse of the world” and the “eye of 
nations.”282 The world and the attempt to create peace were described in terms of weaving a 
fabric. This idea of creating a new world and new way of doing things was echoed in 
architectural metaphors, such as “fountains of enthusiasm” and references to justice as 
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“keystone of the arch.”283 Game metaphors were used both to describe the “old way of doing 
things,” where people were seen as “pawns in a game,” and the “new way,” where national 
leaders were called “champions of this cause” of peace.284 International relations were also 
described in the Los Angeles Times coverage as a game in a reference to any nation that 
“refused to play the game.” 285 
 
In some cases religious metaphors were used in the New York Times to say the cause of 
justice required “parting of the raiment of the sinners.”286 Justice and peace were also 
portrayed as requiring a “vigilance committee of good citizens, extemporized for the  
occasion.” 287 Other metaphors of vigilantism included such phrases as an “international law 
and order committee” and “law by the sword.”288 
 
Aside from this heavy use of metaphors, the two symbols that dominated New York Times 
coverage of the peace conference were democracy and civilization. These two concepts were 
presented as going hand-in-hand in the creation of the peace and a new way of conducting 
international relations. The proposed League of Nations was portrayed as an organization of 
civilized nations united in the causes of civilization, democracy and self-determination for 
nations. Coverage in the Los Angeles Times also emphasized civilization and positioned it 
opposite images of the war, using such phrases as “organized savagery,” “Hun atrocities,” 
“monster,” and “calamity.” 289 Contrasted with these phrases were images of reason, 
civilization, “idealistic principles” and progress — “We have passed through the greatest 
crisis in the history of civilization.”290 Images of progress included suggestions that the world 
had “passed into a new era” and that “the era when international right was the right of the 
strongest is definitely closed.”291 Surviving the war era is depicted through mixed metaphors 
of progress and travel with the suggestion that “Humanity has passed through four years of 
strife and bloodshed ... as through a tunnel to emerge into a new country.”292 This new 
territory brought into existence by peace is described using metaphors of light. Light is 
especially associated with the new industrialization in such declarations as “the star of 
conquest has set; its light is forever dimmed and the people of the world are now guided by 
the light of industry.” 293 
 
Language related to such ideas as nobility, moral virtue, sacrifice and selflessness from 
within the domain of general morality also appeared conspicuously in Washington Post 
coverage. The new way of conducting international affairs at the peace conference was 
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represented as “emancipation from the old system” and tearing up the “old foundations.”294 
However great the need for escape from the old system, many proposals at the peace talks, 
including the proposal for a league of nations, were labeled as idealistic and divorced from 
reality. Wilson’s idealism was depicted as “abstract principle” that excluded “more important 
practical and vital subjects at issue.”295 Furthermore, it was argued that “the practical plans of 
the French would clash with some of the President’s principles and ideals.”296 The same 
article went on to refer to the proposed league as an “international quilting circle.”297 
 
Articles in the Los Angeles Times contained the widest range of symbolic language. Of all the 
newspapers studied. In addition to the symbols already discussed, the most elaborate 
symbolic language appeared in an editorial, entitled “The Fever Passes” that used an 
extended medical metaphor to describe both the war and the peace negotiation. In this 
metaphor disease and poison were positioned opposite health, happiness and remedies.  
European nations were portrayed as “weak and sick from their own wild excesses”; as “sick 
lands” and as having a “fever of unrest in [their] bones.” Delegates to the peace conference 
were depicted as “the world’s earnest physicians ... cooling the fever in the world’s blood.” 
Their task was to “remove the very cause of the disease,” and they were “step by step ... 
bringing the sick lands out of the fevers that bum them.”298 
 
Attribution of Agency in Foreign Policy in the Print Media 
Who/what was viewed as having agency in news articles was determined by studying who or 
what was portrayed as making decisions or being involved in the foreign policy process. This 
participation could be formal, such as that of the president and congress, or informal, such as 
reports of delegations presenting petitions to the president or congress. Each newspaper in the 
sample attributed agency in foreign policy to the president In the articles examined, only the 
Washington Post and Los Angeles Times attributed agency to congress. The Washington Post 
reported extensively on the lack of support within congress for President Wilson’s plans, 
saying: 
 
It is incontestable that the enthusiasm which the President feels for his ideals at the 
peace conference and for his league of nations is not reflected by public opinion in the 
United States. No one in the Senate or the House understands what the President’s 
particular reasons are for advocating so-called internationalization, and necessarily 
there is no support for the idea...
299
 
 
In an article specifically examining congressional opposition to Wilson’s plans, the Los 
Angeles Times called attention to the role of congress in foreign policy, saying, “A number of 
Senators have expressed themselves in advance as opposed to the President’s policies and it 
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must not be forgotten that these treaties must be approved by a two-thirds vote ‘ of the 
Senators present’ - not of the Senate - when the treaties are offered for ratification.”300 
 
Articles in both the New York Times and the Washington Post attributed agency to public 
opinion and the general public. They did so through reports on President Wilson’s statement 
that: 
 
We are associated under very peculiar conditions of world opinion. I may say, without 
straining the point, that we are not the representatives of Governments, but 
representatives of the peoples ... For these [our fellow citizens] are a body that 
constitute a great democracy. They expect their leaders to speak; their representatives 
to be their servants ...We have no choice but to obey their mandate.
301
 
 
In addition to the president, congress and public opinion, coverage in the Washington Post 
attributed agency to an abstract concept — “facts and the reasoning that is based on them.”302 
Similarly, coverage in the Los Angeles Times attributed agency to the U.S. Constitution, 
warning that, although important, the Constitution should not be relied on as the sole 
authority because, “If the American Constitution were not subject to amendment, it would 
have long ago been discarded.”303 The Los Angeles Times was the only newspaper of the four 
in which agency in foreign policy was specifically attributed to the U.S. State Department. 
This came through reports on actions and statements of both the department in general and of 
the Secretary of State.
304
 The New Orleans Times - Picayune alone assigned agency to the 
five Great Powers and their leaders. 
 
When attribution of agency is examined with regard to the incorporation of human rights in 
foreign policy, some interesting ideas emerge. The New York Times writers considered 
concerns about human rights ideas to be the domain of national governments and peoples in 
general. The Washington Post writers attributed agency to the president, public opinion — 
“the public mind over all the world”305 — leaders of other “Great Powers” and, with regard to 
trade and labor issues, to trade unionists. The Los Angeles Times writers presented the same 
list of parties, including the League of Nations itself and such associated organizations as the 
international Committee on Labor Regulation, the U.S. State Department and interest groups 
in general. These interest groups included trade unionists, employer groups, suffragettes and 
“Physicians ... watchers ... saints” who had an interest in reforming the world.306 The New 
Orleans Times - Picayune writers named only the general public, President Wilson and the 
military as having an interest in incorporating ideas of human rights into foreign policy. The 
inclusion of the military appeared in an article quoting British Prime Minster David Lloyd 
George as saying that the proposed league and associated plans for peace were the result of 
“an irresistible appeal made to me by civil rulers and military staffs.”307 
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Human Rights in Congress, 1919 
Human rights were not listed as a subject category in the Congressional Record of 1919. 
Ideas identified for this dissertation as related to human rights were encompassed within 
discussions of general war issues. Thus, the period January 1 to 30, 1919, was selected for 
study. This time period covers the entire time that President Wilson was in Paris and 
contained the bulk of discussions about proposals for a League of Nations as w ell as war 
issues related to human rights. 
 
Congressional Definitions of Human Rights 
Definitions of human rights that included ideas about the rights of people to peace and 
security, to freedom from wrongful interference, as well as the notion of self-determination, 
dominated congressional debate during January 1919. Other definitions used by members of 
congress encompassed democracy, justice, law, cultural, speech and press rights, right to food 
and general, or undefined, rights. The most prevalent models of human rights outside those 
outlined by the UDHR referred to rights in terms of civilization, Christianity and morality. In 
addition, rights were discussed in terms of progress, service, duty, humanitarianism — and 
with reference to the American Constitution. 
 
The idea that peace and security could be seen as a right is illustrated by such declarations as: 
“what we demand in this war... is that the world be fit and safe to live in.”308 Such statements 
imply a certain standard of safety in which people are entitled to live. This standard of peace 
and security was violated by the war, which left: 
 
a yearning for peace ... in the hearts of the civil populations of the world, who have 
seen their loved ones wounded and bleeding and dying on the battle fields, who have 
seen their homes destroyed and their lands desolated, and who have seen their women 
violated and their innocent children tortured and crucified.
309
 
 
The carnage of war was portrayed in congressional discourse as one of the greatest violations 
of the rights of individuals. Senators used such language as “atrocity,” “murdered... without 
cause,” “pillage,” “shocking brutality,” and the “most horrible war and devastating outrage 
upon humanity.”310 The Germans, and specifically the Kaiser, were portrayed as having 
stepped outside the boundaries of acceptable behavior. Senator Henry Myers depicted the 
Kaiser as having: 
 
launched a vile criminal war... and that he waged war in a way which violated every 
principle of international law, civilized warfare, humanity, civilization, Christianity, 
and common decency... He waged war in a way which brought the blush of shame to 
everybody who has any respect for international right, civilized warfare, or common 
decency, in a way that brought agony to the hearts of women and palled the souls of 
men. He bombed hospitals and undefended towns; he murdered thousands of innocent 
women and children, mangled and maimed little school children at their desks, while 
pursuing the innocent pastimes of childhood; he cut the hands off of little boys, 
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ravished women and girls, murdered thousands of noncombatants, and carried other 
thousands into captivity and slavery.
311
 (Italics added) 
 
It is sometimes difficult to separate ideas about self-determination from ideas about freedom 
of individuals. It is not always clear that the speakers themselves make such a differentiation. 
In general, self-determination refers to the right of nations and national groups to determine 
their own allegiances and government This definition is illustrated by such statements as “we 
should accrue to each nation, notwithstanding its intellectual inferiority, its just and 
inalienable rights, the right to live and work out its own destiny” 312 and ‘The right to 
preserve its racial character, its customs, ideals, institutions, and a form of government that 
conforms to that character, is the most sacred, as well as the most vital, right of every real 
nation.”313 However, other statements tend to conflate the notions of self-determination and 
freedom, such as the declaration that the United States needs to make: “a single declaration... 
that she stands for the maintenance of life and liberty and independence of all the civilized 
nations of the world, hating none and sympathetic with all.”314 Perhaps the clearest statement 
of how individual rights were defined in congressional dialogue is that by Senator William 
Kirby that the goal was “peace to the world and fair treatment to the weak and small and 
subject peoples of the earth and protection from exploitation by the strong and powerful...”315 
 
Democracy was defined not only as a right but as a goal and as a standard to be reached. It 
was presented as a standard that the United States embodies and that other nations wish to 
achieve, or should wish to achieve. Members of congress referred to the goal of the peace 
negotiations as being “a freer and more democratic world” and argued that “the new spirit of 
democracy... is engulfing autocratic and arbitrary power all over the world.”316 President 
Wilson was portrayed as “lifting high before the peoples of the world the standards of a 
virtuous democracy.”317 
 
Justice and law were often discussed in tandem as goals of the peace process. Senator Myers 
argued that justice was needed before any other rights could be guaranteed or peace obtained: 
 
[T]his world can not be satisfactorily conducted upon any other plane other than that 
of justice. I believe justice is one of the greatest things in the world. If justice is not to 
prevail in the world the world can not be safe for democracy or safe for any other 
virtue that goes to make it a fit place to live. Justice should be the first consideration. 
We should be just before we are generous.
318
 
 
Justice, or what was called “fair dealing,” was linked with humanity and was to be achieved 
through the establishment of codes of international law. 
 
Senator Myers’ reference to the need to place justice before generosity is tied to one of the 
greatest debates of the postwar period — the type and amount of aid that should be given to 
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war-torn Europe. This same debate was echoed in congressional debates following the 
Second World War, but it had roots in discussions of how best to aid Europe in this earlier 
time. Some members of congress saw the role of the United States as being ‘T o take from 
our store and feed the world’s hungry, to alleviate distress and want, to succor those who 
were suffering, and generally to be the good Samaritan to all on earth.”319 Other members 
considered that welfare should begin at home before non- Americans would be considered. 
However, the key point here is that freedom from hunger was implicitly considered to be a 
right Senator Henry Hollis supported this perspective, saying, “I do not believe it is ever 
excusable to allow anyone to starve in the United States of America; and I hope the time will 
come when no one ever will be permitted to starve anywhere in the world, friend or 
enemy.”320 
 
Other rights covered in congressional debate included cultural rights and the freedom of 
speech and press. The freedom of speech and press was portrayed in congressional debate as 
one of the central rights of humankind, or at the very least, of Americans. One House 
member declared that “Every citizen has the right to think and speak.”321 These tights were 
also implicitly referred to by a debate over censorship of information from Europe, which 
talked about the “evils of that sort of suppression of information.”322 A league of victorious 
allies was portrayed as essential to “respect the rights, the religion, and the aspirations of 
other and smaller peoples, encourage education, the development of arts, sciences and all the 
peaceful pursuits of man.”323 This league also represented “mutual sympathies... mutual 
struggle... mutual ideals in the cause of free government and the rights of humanity.”324 These 
undefined rights included those discussed above as well as a whole range of more ephemeral, 
or more-difficult-to-define, rights. 
 
In many cases, the ideas of justice and law discussed above were associated with Biblical law 
and the tenets of Christian morality. In one case, justice was talked about in the context of 
“justice in the immutable laws of God.”325 Another orator talked about peace in the context of 
the “era of a peace that could be had through Christianity of men and justice of nations.”326  
Senator William Pollock explicitly identified peace and rights with Christianity with 
reference to peace as the ‘‘plans of God.” Arguing for participation of the United States in the 
peace process, he said, “They have an opportunity, this whole body has an opportunity, the 
Nation, the world, has an opportunity that was never afforded before to hasten the coming of 
the kingdom of God on earth.” 327 
 
Though morality was most often associated with Christianity in congressional discourse, a 
general morality that guided behavior and by which rights could be defined was also 
identified. Reference was made to an “international conscience” and the “conscience of the 
world,” and the war effort was for “the supremacy of the moral forces of the world.”328 The 
notion of moral forces encompassed ideas about humanitarianism and duty with reference to 
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“widest humanitarianism and the greatest liberty for all” and “definite, independent human 
responsibility.”329156 While not themselves rights, these are seen as foundations on which 
rights could be built and through which such rights as freedom could be provided. The 
American constitution was seen as a further foundation for rights as illustrated in such 
statements as the “just principles of the rights of humanity as set forth in our Declaration of 
Independence.”330 
 
Human rights were further implicitly defined in terms of civilization and progress. Not only 
was the war portrayed as having been fought for the defense of civilization, but civilization 
was pictured as the end result of progress. This perspective is illustrated by Senator Pollock’s 
statement: “There was a time when individuals settled their differences by might, regardless 
of right; likewise families and neighborhoods and clans settled their differences; but the 
human race has advanced, civilization has progressed, and law and order has evolved out of 
brute force.”331 This progression allowed a “new code of international relations and conduct” 
that emphasized “human justice and human liberty and human progress.”332  
 
Congressional Linkage of Human Rights and Foreign Policy 
Perhaps because the idea that notions of rights had a place in foreign policy was fairly new, 
extensive and wide-ranging debate took place in congress over the connection between 
human rights and foreign policy. These connections were identified as being that community 
or participation in world affairs was important. This idea was contrasted with concerns over 
potential loss of sovereignty by cooperation with other nations and the argument that non-
intervention in world affairs was the ideal model of foreign affairs. Other connections 
between human rights and foreign policy were encompassed in debates over morality versus 
self-interest and the role of morality itself in foreign policy; idealism versus pragmatism; 
immediate versus long-term goals and the argument that international relations should be 
similar to personal relations. 
 
The idea of community as important in world affairs comes through very clearly in 
congressional debate at the time. The notion that nations were connected through interests 
and that actions of one nation affected others created an awareness that foreign policy 
decisions were important This discourse of community had two strands. One was that the 
affairs of nations were interconnected. The other was a sense of solidarity that had grown out 
of the United States fighting alongside other nations and sharing a common task. This sense 
of solidarity was illustrated by such declarations as “[W]e have defended together the same 
sacred cause; we have together saved mankind; we are friends forever.”333 The mote 
important strand in this discourse was that of the belief that the United States was part of a 
world community. This belief demonstrated in congressional discourse echoed the conviction 
of President Wilson that “unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us.”334 A 
statement by Representative John Rogers of Massachusetts illustrates this belief as well as the 
belief that the United States had reached a position of responsibility as a world leader. He 
said that: 
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it is perhaps not too much to say that we are to-day the great world power. Hitherto 
we have, as a Nation, thought and dealt in terms of a continent. Henceforward we 
must inevitably think and deal in terms of a planet... The basis of our future world life 
must be a constant and an accurate store of information concerning our copartners in 
world trade, world thought, and world enterprise. Only as we possess this information 
can we advance intelligently and build wisely.
335
 
 
Similar ideas were expressed by Senator Pollock who, argued that:  
 
conditions have changed, our situation has been altered, distance has been destroyed, 
and time has been annihilated; we do not longer occupy a position of aloofness and 
isolation from the balance of the world; we to-day have reached that position in our 
upward march that we are not only a great country and a wonderful Nation, but we are 
to-day a very large and important part of the whole world and of the whole human 
race.
336
 
 
In marked contrast to the linkage of human rights and foreign policy through membership in 
a world community was the fear that cooperation would lead to loss of sovereignty. The most 
vocal opponent of membership in the proposed league was Senator William Borah, who 
quoted H.G. Wells in saying, “No man can join a partnership and remain an absolutely free 
man.”337 It is worth quoting Senator Borah at length because his argument neatly ties together 
ideas about potential loss of sovereignty, American fear of entanglement in European affairs, 
the isolationist position and an American ideology of individualism and moral superiority. 
Borah asserts: 
 
I want America, disenthralled and disentangled, by precept and example, through 
influence and counsel, to continue her lead in the grand march of civilization — in the 
world struggle for free government... give us something that is our very own, which 
we may love and for the preservation of which men are willing to die, and you will 
have an America, a United States, which will exert far more influence and dispense 
greater happiness and lead more certainly to world contentment than an America 
shorn of her individuality and embarrassed in her free movements by alliances or 
sickened and enfeebled by the international virus. I beg you to believe that there is 
nothing to take the place of this old-time Americanism ... I do know that there was 
brought into being on this western continent nearly 150 years ago an experiment in 
government which has weathered every storm, which was baptized with the wisdom 
of the greatest leader of this or any other age, which has excited the emulation and 
inspired the efforts of people in every quarter of the globe, which has given freedom 
and prosperity to the people at home and precept and example and inspiration to the 
world abroad.
338
 (Italics added) 
 
This disinclination to become involved in the affairs of the world ultimately led to the United 
States declining membership in the League of Nations. 
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Among the many arguments for isolationism, two in particular dominated discourse in 
congress. One was that the United States could provide better leadership by maintaining 
distance from the rest of the world. This perspective is illustrated both by the passionate 
declaration above of Senator Borah and by such statements as those of Senator Miles 
Poindexter that the “United States can do more for Poland and for the world by preserving 
our liberties, our peculiar ideals and traditions upon this continent, affording a refuge in the 
future as we have in the past... than we can by involving ourselves in a perpetual war in the 
name of peace.” 339 The second argument was based on fear that once the United States 
intervened and provided aid to other countries, those countries would become dependent on 
American assistance. In the words of Senator Myers, the United States was: 
 
about to assume the role of- being the big rich uncle to all the remainder  of the world; 
that we are going to be a big rich uncle to all of Europe, friend and foe alike; and that 
if anyone needs help over there or gets into trouble, they will turn to Uncle Sam, their 
big rich uncle, for assistance ... it will encourage the unstable, restless, dissatisfied 
peoples of the remainder of the world to engage in revolution, in uprisings, in civil 
strife, in internecine warfare; to bum and destroy; to leave their vocations and destroy 
each other’s crops and products; to neglect the cultivation of the soil; and to spend 
their time in Bolshevism and revolution and contentions among one another.
340
 
 
In congressional debate during January 1919 the role of morality in foreign policy was a 
major issue. This issue was composed of several strands: the competing interests of morality 
and self-interest; the demands of idealism versus pragmatism; and whether morality had any 
part to play in foreign policy making. These strands were not always cleanly separated. Even 
President Wilson blurred the lines between idealism and pragmatism by arguing that 
humanitarian aid to Europe would have the practical side-effect of limiting the spread of 
Bolshevism. In this belief, he was in tune with the beliefs of Senator Poindexter, who argued 
that “there is no idealism ... that is worthy of the admiration of mankind that is not based on a 
sound material foundation.”341 Senator Warren Harding, however, dissented, saying that 
“every experiment of that kind which has ever been made calls for the renewal of the shower; 
and you can not [sic] reach practical results through an avenue of dreams.”342 
 
Senator Harding vigorously opposed what he again called a “maze of dreams” in foreign 
policy and argued: “I would not want a republic without impelling and inspiring ideals, but I 
should like for a little while to see the American Republic following the lines of common-
sense practicality.”343 While those opposed to American involvement in European affairs 
presented the debate as being between idealism and pragmatism, as mentioned earlier, those 
in favor of the league and giving humanitarian aid to Europe argued that idealism was in fact 
pragmatism. Senator Irvine Lenroot of Wisconsin summed up the former argument by this 
statement: 
 
I expect to vote for this bill not as a charity, because I do not believe that Congress 
has any constitutional right to vote money for pure charity. I shall vote for it because I 
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believe that the appropriation of this money will bring a resulting benefit to the people 
of the United States commensurate at least with the money that is involved.
344
 
 
Congressional consensus emerged only in the belief that the United States had not entered the 
war in defense of democracy or “any other high-sounding platitudinal reason” but purely to 
“vindicate American honor and to establish American rights.”345 Senator Harding argued that 
the only reason for cloaking American involvement in the language of idealism was so as not 
to offend the American-German voting bloc.
346
 
 
As to whether morality had any role to play in foreign policy, consensus was impossible. One 
side of the debate argued firmly for a league “to make all nations of the world do what is 
right,” saying there existed “an ever-growing sense of international honor and integrity in the 
world ... and a deeper world sense of abhorrence against international bad faith.”347 The other 
side, led most vocally by Senator Borah, argued that these dreams were just dreams. He 
caustically remarked: 
 
If you think you can do what the living God has not been able to do, standardize the 
human family; If you feel you can undo what He in His inscrutable wisdom did when 
He planted race prejudice in the hearts and stamped color upon the faces of men, then 
give us your prospectus. We will be glad to look it over.
348
 
 
Two further themes addressed the links between human rights and foreign policy. One 
argument said that such long-term goals as the league had no place in a world seeking an 
immediate peace and dealing with the ravages of war. This argument was illustrated by such 
comments as “Our first duty is to act in the living present, to bring peace to the world in the 
year 1919, before we undertake to make a peaceful world in the year 2000.”349 The second 
theme was that relationships between nations should be on the same bases as relationships 
between individuals. If morality and responsibility guided relations between individuals, 
these same principles, some argued, apply also to relations at the international level. Senator 
Porter McCumber argued that moral laws, such as the Golden Rule, that guide individual 
behavior should govern relations between nations, “which are but collections of 
individuals.”350 Along the same lines Representative Andrew Montague, asked: 
 
Why, for example, should individual homicide be crime and collective homicide 
directed by the state be innocence? Why should not crimes committed by a state be 
the concern of all of the family of nations as much so as a crime by the person is the 
concern of every individual of the State? Why should criminal law apply to the crimes 
of persons and the civil law, the law of property and of contracts, apply to the crimes 
of nations? May not a league of nations afford the medium by which a rational and 
moral reclassification of the law of nations may be made to fit the crimes of the 
state?
351
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Congressional Allocation of Agency in Foreign Policy 
One of the great debates in congress during this time was over the issue of agency in foreign 
policy. It was not a simple dispute between the president and congress; rather it was a 
complicated discussion of who had authority for foreign policy under the constitution and in 
practice. Henry Cabot Lodge was vocal in his disapproval of President Wilson’s 
independence in foreign policy ~ condemning the fact that Wilson was not supplying 
congress with all the details of the negotiations in Paris. The debate was further complicated 
by the fact that it was not simply about who had authority over foreign policy but about who 
at what point had authority. Senator James Lewis argued that when the president needed 
advice, congress could offer counsel, but until that time, “Congress should not project itself 
upon his foreign negotiations.”352 Furthermore, he said that congress should comment only on 
a finished treaty, not on the negotiations leading up to the treaty — “the Constitution invests 
in this body the privilege to advise and consent to a finished thing — the treaty.”353 Others 
said that both the Senate and the House should be kept fully informed of what proposals 
Wilson was submitting to the peace conference. Senator Thomas Sterling, while saying the 
president could have consulted more fully with congress, conceded that the president was 
under “no moral or legal obligation to consult the Senate” and that the Senate has “no right, 
legal or moral, to ask the President to disclose to the Senate his purposes or views.”354 
However, he argued that in such a serious case with significant circumstances, “harmony of 
thought and action between the President and Senate with the resulting public benefit would 
flow from some exchange of views.”355 Taking the center ground, Senator Charles Thomas 
presented the division of authority as thus: 
 
The President originates; the Senate accepts, changes, or rejects it. The President is 
the author; the Senate the reviewer. The President erects the structure; the Senate 
takes it over with the power to alter the plan as it may desire or throw it into the 
discard if preferred. With the utmost respect for opposing opinions, I affirm that 
dissent from this view springs from an undue regard for senatorial authority or a 
reluctance to clothe the Executive with unlimited control over foreign affairs.
356
 
 
Opposition to President Wilson’s independence came largely out of a view that congress was 
being slighted by the president and his entourage. Senator Hiram Johnson of California 
complained that: 
 
We here, a part of the treaty-making power, with ... before us, the solemn assurance 
given to the world, accepted by every power on earth, that there should be ‘open 
covenants of peace, openly arrived at,’ are today told, when they are dealing with the 
very blood and hope of this Republic, ‘that satisfactory arrangements yesterday were 
made.’ There ought to be some means by which there would be some information 
authentically brought to this body. I do not know how it can be accomplished. We are 
dependent upon the newspaper correspondents, and I hesitate to comment upon much 
that they say; but nevertheless, we are left in confusion and in doubt and without the 
facts. We do not know what is transpiring, when to all the world we have said that not 
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only the world but we ourselves should know just exactly what was occurring from 
minute to minute and from day to day.
357
 
 
While the congress and the president debated who had treaty-making authority based on 
differing interpretations of the constitution, agency in foreign policy was assigned to the 
general public. Interest groups such as the League to Enforce Peace and other petitioners 
were mentioned as part of this public but, in general, public opinion was referred to in much 
less specific terms — in many cases, as an independent entity. Reference was made to the 
“tribunal of public opinion in the United States” and to the fact that “public opinion must 
approve any treaty to make it valuable to the world.”358 Representative William Mason 
concluded that after all the debate over authority to make treaties and conduct foreign policy, 
“back of us are the people themselves, who make and unmake Presidents and Congresses.”359 
 
The American Discourse of Human Rights in 1919 
Although it has been argued that human rights did not exist as a major topic of international 
relations in the early part of the twentieth century, it is clear that the concept of human rights 
was very much part of the media and congressional discourse of 1919. The threads which 
were woven together in this human rights discourse were those of security, justice, peace, 
equality (of all people and in terms of gender) and the rule of law; morality, conscience, 
common interest and humanity; self-determination and the democracy associated with it; and 
civilization and order. Congressional definitions of human rights were both more specific 
than in the media (for example, discussions of specific freedoms, such as those of press and 
speech) and more overtly related to notions of Christianity and morality. As will be seen in 
the later case studies, the way that human rights were talked about in 1919 bears strong 
resemblance to the ways in which human rights are talked about in 1945, 1976 and 1989. W 
hat will emerge from the case studies is a twentieth-century American discourse of human 
rights — a reasonably continuous narrative with remarkably few digressions. 
 
The history of the United States played a large role in the crafting of the discourse of the war 
and the peace. American satisfaction was evident that the United States had successfully 
created a nation based on moral principles and free of the taint of the secret power-politics of 
Europe — referred to by Wilson as the “little groups of ambitious men who were accustomed 
to use their fellow men as pawns and tools.”360 Thus, media coverage and congressional 
discussions portrayed the war and post-war devastation in Europe as the result of an “old way 
of doing things” that could be changed by following the example of American history. 
Americans were portrayed as having a special role to play in the creation of a “new order7’ 
because they could teach the world about democracy from their own experience and could 
thus “cure” the world. 
 
Linkages between human rights and foreign policy were evident in media coverage of the 
Paris Peace Conference, congressional discussions about peace proposals and President 
Wilson’s public statements. This is significant because it is a much earlier linkage than many 
historians suggest. Foreign policy was clearly linked to ideals and values emerging from the 
American historical experience and to ideas of world community and responsibility of nations 
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towards each other. Many of these ideas are developed more fully in human rights discourse 
of 1945 (and later years), but they existed at this much earlier date. To many, the United 
Nations is synonymous with human rights; thus, the following chapter treats the discourse of 
human rights emerging from the San Francisco conference of 1945. Again, congressional and 
presidential discussions of foreign policy are discussed, as is media coverage of the 
conference. 
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Chapter Four 
 
The United Nations and the San Francisco Conference, 1945: 
Case Study II 
 
The story of human rights in the print media in 1945 included specific rights, such as freedom 
from wrongful interference and security of person, religion, equality and antidiscrimination, 
property, nationality, migration. It was also a more general story of peace, law, justice, 
equality and undefined human rights. Values such as freedom, unselfishness, generosity, 
truth, morality, religion, community, cooperation, service, civilization and humanity were 
important components of the story. Political rights were the main focus of the narrative, but 
social, cultural and economic rights were also included. Congressional stories of human 
rights focused attention on a narrative of political rights related to peace, justice, law, 
freedom, democracy, equality, self-determination, freedom of speech and individual rights. 
Economic, social and cultural rights were included as sub-narratives related to the provision 
of rights as a guarantee against the recurrence of war and as a bulwark against totalitarianism. 
Again, values were an important part of congressional stories of human rights, including 
general moral values and specifically Christian values, as well as idealistic values related to 
progress, humanity and civilization. 
 
In 1945 the print media were unanimous in telling the foreign policy story through the voice 
of the president of the United States and through the voices of leaders of other nations — that 
is, the story of foreign policy was told through elite narrators. The voice of congress was 
heard more strongly in narrating the human rights story than in narration of general foreign 
policy. State and local government and general public opinion were presented as minor 
narrators of foreign policy. Important narrators of human rights stories were a broad range of 
interest groups bringing specific stories to the conference and international conference 
delegates who also brought distinctive human rights narratives to the overall story of human 
rights in 1945. Again members of congress presented the only narrators of foreign policy and 
human rights stories as themselves and the president —with debate over whose voice was to 
be heard at which time. Although the print media and congress both assigned a great measure 
of agency to the president in telling the human rights story, the president was remarkably 
absent from the conference’s human rights narrative. Other than opening the conference, the 
president seemed to have a very small role to play. However, his administration played a 
large role through the extensive involvement of the U.S. State Department in both the San 
Francisco conference and the preceding Dumbarton Oaks conference. 
 
The San Francisco Conference 
The San Francisco conference was organized by the victorious allies of World War Two to 
discuss the establishment of a world security organization to replace what was then 
considered an obsolete League of Nations. Many details of the peace and post-war 
settlements had been decided at the Yalta conference of February 1945 and the earlier 
Dumbarton Oaks conference in Washington D.C. August 21 to October 7, 1944. Economic 
issues were to be discussed at the Bretton Woods conference in July 1945, and the 
International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
were to be established there. Some of the issues brought to the San Francisco conference had 
already been extensively discussed at Dumbarton Oaks. Thus, the San Francisco conference 
was designed to decide the framework of the post-war era and the creation of an organization 
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rather than sort out specific details of war settlements and reparations and the economics of 
the new world organization. 
 
It was difficult for some members of congress to accept that the “international security 
organization” outlined in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals was any different from the League 
of Nations. Senator Arthur Vandenberg asked Benjamin Gerig at the U.S. State Department 
to explain the difference in purpose of these two organizations. Gerig’s reply in a memo dated 
January 24, 1945, in part said, “The Proposals specifically provide that the Organization 
should promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. No such general 
provision was contained in the League Covenant.”361 
 
This focus on human rights and fundamental freedoms in the drafting of the United Nations 
Charter and later the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is what makes the San 
Francisco conference so important in any examination of the development of ideas of, and 
ways of talking about, human rights. As mentioned in chapter one, many scholars date 
international discussions of human rights from this period. 
 
The Preamble to the United Nations Charter 
A preamble, designed as an introduction to a document, often outlines the central ideas and 
goals of that document- It is useful here then to briefly examine some proposals put forward 
for the preamble to the charter of the United Nations because they reveal some central 
concerns of the document relevant to a study of the language of human rights. Assistant 
Secretary of State Archibald MacLeish was particularly concerned about the preamble. 
Addressing Secretary of State Edward Stettinius and sending copies of the letter to Leo 
Pasvolsky and Alger Hiss, MacLeish wrote: 
 
When I arrived in San Francisco, Dean Gildersleeve asked me if I would take a crack 
at the Preamble. The Preamble was said to be in a bad way. 
 
“Bad way” puts it mildly, in my opinion. I have never seen a more complete literary 
and intellectual abortion. 
 
I also agree that it is extremely important that the Preamble should be something more 
than a piece of drafting. It should move men’s minds. To do so, it should be written - 
not constructed like a crossword puzzle out of political and academic odds and ends. 
 
It is impossible, I think to over estimate the importance of the Preamble. The 
sentences of the Declaration of Independence, which have influenced history, are the 
sentences of the first few paragraphs - not the long indictment or the announcement of 
action ... for God’s sake, let’s do something and do something fast about the present 
dreadful text.
362
 
 
This “present dreadful text” was the result of several years of discussion by various officials 
within the U.S. State Department as well as proposals from outside sources, such as other 
delegations to the conference. Durward Sandifer, assistant chief of the Division of Political 
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Studies in the State Department, Benjamin Cohen of the Office of War Mobilization, and 
Benjamin Gerig, exchanged ideas on a number of proposals. A June 1943 proposal suggested 
for the preamble: 
 
The High Contracting Parties: 
determined that war as the greatest scourge of civilization shall be banished 
from the earth; 
convinced that the rule of law shall be firmly established as the inviolable 
mode of conduct among governments; 
dedicated to the attainment of that human dignity and freedom for which 
millions have made the supreme sacrifice; 
resolved to devote their energies and resources to attain that better life which 
science and modem knowledge has made possible for all peoples.
363
 
 
Benjamin Cohen’s proposal used similar language, referring to the “scourge of war among 
nations” and outlining the role of the United Nations to “establish the rule of law” with the 
goal of “peace, security, welfare, dignity and freedom of all peoples.”364 A later draft by 
Benjamin Gerig initially suggested that the task of the new organization be “freeing all 
people everywhere from the tyranny of fear and want”365 This suggestion was scratched out 
in pencil and replaced by a list of goals: 
 
to rid the world of war, 
to remedy conditions that imperil peace, 
to uphold the principles of justice, 
to ensure the rule of law among nations, and 
to advance the liberty and well-being of all peoples.
366
 
 
As time passed and numerous drafts of the preamble were written, attention came to focus 
more and more upon the ideas about law, liberty and well-being. MacLeish’s draft suggested 
the idea of nations living as “good neighbors in a common belief in the dignity and worth of 
man” and identified the goal of the organization as being to ‘improve the lot and condition of 
mankind.”367 A draft preamble submitted by the president of the First Commission mentioned 
human rights for the first time by identifying the goal as being “to reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights 
of men and women and of nations large and small... to promote social progress and better 
standards of life in larger freedom.”368 The Netherlands delegation to the San Francisco 
conference suggested that the goal was “to maintain international peace and security in 
conformity with the elementary principles of morality and justice and on the basis of due 
regard for international law.”369 
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The final version of the charter incorporated many of the above ideas and reads as follows: 
 
We the peoples of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations 
from the scourge of war... and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the 
dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of 
nations large and small, and ... to promote social progress and better standards of life 
in larger freedom, and for these ends to practice tolerance and live together in peace 
with one another as good neighbors... to employ international machinery for the 
promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples...
370
 
 
The language of such an official document is of necessity both grandiose and general. Even 
the American proposals rarely identified specific rights when talking about human rights. 
Human rights or general ideas about rights are mentioned in many of the drafts, but the 
specifics of human rights did not seem to be of great concern at the time. Of greater concern 
to people in the U.S. State Department were the details of international settlement and law 
related to strategic and economic security. In the hundreds of pages of State Department 
documents examined in the papers of Pasvolsky and Gerig, only in one place were the State 
Department’s definitions of human rights found outlined. A declassified internal paper dated 
October 4,1944, outlining the responsibilities of the Special Subcommittee on Legal 
Problems of the President’s Advisory Committee, identified the following “principal groups 
of rights”: 
 
(1) personal rights, such as freedom of speech, religion, and education, and 
equality before the law; (2) property rights, defined as equality before the law 
with respect to property; (3) social rights, including the right to work and to 
enjoy minimum standards of economic, social, and cultural well-being, the right 
to form associations, and freedom from discrimination; (4) political rights, such 
as the right of assembly and petition and the right to citizenship; and (5) 
procedural rights, including the right to a fair speedy, and public trial, and 
freedom from punishment except in accordance with pre-existing law.
371
 
 
The Legal Subcommittee stated an assumption that the “recognition and guarantee of basic 
human rights would be conducive to the development of conditions favorable to the 
maintenance of international peace.”372 A secondary assumption operating in this assumption, 
was that whatever human rights were identified, any so-called international bill of rights 
would have be designed in a way that “could be adopted in some form by all states as an 
international guarantee of the rights stated.”373 Thus, it was clear that the contents of a bill of 
rights would have to be negotiated to be agreeable to all parties — that is, that it would have 
to be less a statement of universality in ideals than one of pragmatism. 
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In a lecture delivered at the University of Michigan on July 14, 1947, Yuen-li Liang said that 
the United States and other members of the United Nations were initially interested more in 
security than in creating laws to protect individual citizens of member nations. A copy of this 
lecture was sent to Leo Pasvolsky. In it Liang argues: 
 
Security was set above justice and the establishment or restoration of order and peace 
was to preceded the reign of law. In fact, it was thought that the introduction of legal 
standards or criteria in connection with the maintenance of peace might even hamper 
those preventative and enforcement measures which the proposed organization was 
authorized to take when a threat to international peace and security arose.
374
 
 
Liang’s view was that it was only through pressure from lawyers, statesmen and politicians in 
the United States and other countries in the period between the Dumbarton Oaks talks and the 
San Francisco conference that international law as a means of guaranteeing individual rights 
and security was brought to the forefront of discussion. It was subsequently included in the 
preamble of the United Nations charter. 
 
Human Rights in the Newspapers of 1945 
The New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times and the New Orleans Times - 
Picayune were studied from April 25 to May 1, 1945. This period was selected to encompass 
the opening week of the San Francisco conference. 
 
Defining Human Rights in the Print Media 
On the basis of the UDHR definition, human rights were discussed in the New York Times 
coverage in terms of freedom from wrongful interference and security of person, general 
freedom, religion, equality and anti-discrimination, property, nationality, migration and 
undefined human rights. Other ways of defining and identifying human rights were in terms 
of individual rights as well as an international bill of rights; ideas associated with values, such 
as unselfishness, generosity and troth; morality and religion; and civilization and humanity. 
 
Human rights in the Washington Post coverage were defined largely in relation to 
establishing peace. Thus discussion centered on ideas about law, justice, freedom from 
wrongful interference and equality. Other discussions included ideas about economic and 
social rights, rights relating to sovereignty of nations, and undefined human rights. 
Definitions of human rights outside those of the UDHR included discussions of punishment, 
conscience and right versus wrong as well as definition of human rights in terms of progress 
towards creation of a “better world.” Notions of community, cooperation, service and society 
also played a part in these discussions. 
 
The human rights discourse in the Los Angeles Times coverage was very similar to that of the 
other newspapers in this study for this period. Human rights were defined in terms of justice, 
law, peace and freedom. In addition, rights related to the state and migration were included. 
When rights were talked about on a more general basis, definitions of human rights included 
discussion of principles, morality and right — encompassing the related areas of humanity, 
unselfishness, ideals, dignity, responsibility, unity and cooperation, religious belief and the 
notion of progress and world improvement. 
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Peace, freedom, justice and international law were the primary definitions of human rights in 
the New Orleans Times - Picayune. Educational and cultural rights were included in 
discussions of human rights, as were undefined general rights and human rights — that is, use 
of the phrases without additional definition. Other ways of talking about human rights 
included ideas about cooperation and community, hope, progress and civilization, duty and 
moral law, as well in the context of a dichotomy between domination and freedom. 
 
Security. Freedom from Wrongful Interference and Equality 
The central problem driving human rights concerns immediately after World War Two was 
Nazi treatment of the Jewish people. Not only were the Allies concerned with the protection 
of and restitution for Jews and guaranteeing equal rights for all people, the debate over the 
establishment of an international bill of rights was being driven by members of the American 
and British Jewish communities, concerned to prevent any repeat of the atrocities of the war. 
While many rights discussed in the print media were understood to be rights shared equally 
by all people, discussions were often couched as relating specifically to the treatment of 
Jewish people and ways of preventing a recurrence of the Holocaust. The president of the 
American Jewish Committee, Mr. Proskauer, referred to freedom from wrongful interference 
generally in terms of “security and contentment for citizens of every nation” as well as 
specifically referring to the six million “victims of Nazi aggression.”375 A statement issued by 
the American Jewish Committee outlined the fundamental principle underlying Jewish 
concerns as being that “all people are morally entitled to defend their rights to survival and 
self-fulfillment.”376 However, Proskauer related the two concerns by saying that “the ultimate 
safety of the Jewish populations of Europe will rest upon the international enforcement of 
justice and equality of treatment to men ofevery race and creed.”377 
 
This idea of equality was a central concern of Proskauer and the American Jewish 
Committee. Proskauer made reference to “fundamental freedoms, religious liberty and racial 
equality” and focused attention in his speeches to delegates at the conference on what he saw 
as the basic principle of “non-discrimination between racial religious and ethnic groups.”378 
Non-discrimination and security of person were discussed in terms of rights to choice of 
religion, property, nationality and freedom of migration. All these rights were vital concerns 
for Jewish communities after the war. Not only were there thousands of people without 
homes in Europe, but many were also without nationality — displaced by war and by the 
creation of new boundaries between nations. With reference to this concern, Proskauer 
proclaimed that “every human being is entitled to live under his own vine and fig tree in his 
own country.”379 While this statement acknowledged the rights of all humans, the concern of 
the American Jewish Committee was the Zionist goal of “opening of the doors of Palestine 
for unrestricted Jewish immigration, and its reconstitution as a free and democratic Jewish 
commonwealth.”380 
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The Washington Post coverage also positioned discussions incorporating definitions of rights 
as freedom from wrongful interference in relation to Nazi treatment of Jews and other 
minorities. References were made to the “perpetrator of atrocities,” “recent Nazi atrocities,” 
“Nazi torturers,” and “Nazi atrocity camps.”381 The House Foreign Relations Committee 
defined these atrocities as “oppression, or pillage by political, military or economic 
means.”382 Freedom from wrongful interference was seen as important not only for the sake 
of individual security, but also for the sake of civilization. President Harry S. Truman argued 
that, “With ever increasing brutality and destruction, modem warfare, if unchecked, would 
ultimately crush all civilization.”383 
 
The perceived connection between the right of the individual to security and larger issues is 
clearly illustrated by New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey’s statement that “The large and 
powerful nations must acknowledge the principle that as all individuals are equal before the 
law of their state, all nations are equal before the law of nations.”384 While the notion of 
equality of all before the law was strongly endorsed by delegates to the conference and in 
media coverage, this idea of nations being subject to an international law was troubling to 
many because of continued definition of national sovereignty as a fundamental right An 
editorial in the Washington Post argued that the “sovereignty of the national state still lives, 
in individuals as well as governments, as an idol to worship and protect In places the state 
continues to be God walking on earth.”385 The San Francisco conference proposed to replace 
this idol with the concept of a community of nations — referred to as the “community of 
mankind,” as an “organized society... embracing all nations,” as a “lasting community” and 
as “voluntary cooperation of all peaceful nations, large and small.”386 President Truman 
cautioned the delegates: ‘If we do not want to die together in war, we must learn to live 
together in peace.”387 However, making it clear that sovereignty was a concern that could not 
simply be ignored, the terms of this cooperation could only be those of “full respect for the 
equal sovereignty of each.”388 
 
Justice. Law and Peace 
Justice and human rights were clearly linked in an editorial in the Washington Post 
commenting on President Truman’s address to the conference: “Mr. Truman made it 
abundantly plain that he expects the world organization to be built on a foundation of 
justice...His sincere appeal to the conference to give Right the force of Might in the world is 
ample indication that the United States has not changed its policy.”389Justice was not merely 
depicted as the concern of the Americans. The Chinese delegation reportedly was queried on 
the basis of the argument that justice is always relative — “For answer the Chinese snatched 
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a handkerchief out of his questioner’s pocket ‘Is that justice?’ he queried blandly and the 
delegate had to admit that there is an absolute yardstick for justice.”390 
 
The related ideas of justice and law were prominent in the Los Angeles Times coverage of the 
San Francisco conference. An editorial outlined the purpose of the conference this way: 
“Both the great and the small nations are confronted with the basic question of whether they 
prefer world affairs to be governed by the rule of uncurbed force or by the rule of law and 
order supported by peace-loving nations willing to act in concert.”391 The idea of 
relationships among countries operating under the rule of law, combined with principles of 
justice was strongly endorsed by editorial commentary. Another editorial argued that: 
 
a peace based wholly on brute force, with no consideration of justice and law, would 
be at best an uneasy truce. Sometime and somewhere, repressed injustice would burst 
the bonds...if everyone at the conference realizes that the world cannot afford another 
great war, but, even more, cannot afford the perpetuation of injustice, it will reach 
agreement.
392
 
 
Justice was explicitly linked with human rights by such comments as the statement that the 
United States leadership wanted all members of the new organization to “settle disputes in 
accordance with justice and fundamental human rights.”393 
 
This emphasis on the idea of justice was connected to definition of peace as a right Not only 
was peace talked about as a concept in itself; discussions about peace in the Los Angeles 
Times were presented in the context of war being unjust This way of talking about peace was 
most clearly illustrated in President Truman’s speech to the delegates when he said that the 
delegates “speak for the people who have endured the most savage and devastating war ever 
inflicted upon innocent men, women and children... We can no longer permit any nation, or 
group of nations, to attempt to settle their arguments with bombs and bayonets.”394 Similar 
ideas were expressed in an editorial that referred to the war as “a background of carnage and 
human degradation unequaled in the history of the long struggle of man to become civilized” 
and that referred to the potential for further battle as the “hideous specter of war, possibly on 
an even larger and more bestial scale.”395 A concern for human lives affected by war was the 
central notion in such conceptions of justice and peace. 
 
Peace is defined as a right when it is presented as something to which all people are entitled. 
Use of such phrases as a “just and lasting peace,” or linkage of peace with justice, underline 
this definition of peace as a right.
396
 Secretary of State Stettinius outlined the task of the 
conference as being a step “toward 'sure and just peace - peace that man can trus.t’”397 
Similarly, the New Orleans Times - Picayune identified the conference purpose as to erect a 
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“world peace structure” that would “establish and maintain a just and durable peace.”398 
Reference was made to Truman’s promise that “humanity is to achieve a just and lasting 
peace.”399 
 
Peace, justice and law were extensively intertwined in this newspaper’s coverage of the peace 
conference. In a report on a regional meeting of the Catholic Association for International 
Peace, the views of Reverend Charles C. Chapman, S J., were presented: “[O]ur first 
objective is not peace, it is the establishment of justice in international affairs through the co-
operation and active participation of all nations” -- the goal was “rectifying mistakes and 
eliminating injustices which may from time to time arise.”400 Injustices were to be eliminated 
and peace attained through the “rules and principles of international law” and “with due 
regard for the principles of justice and international law.”401 Above all, this task of 
establishing an organization for peace was at the behest of the people of the world who 
“crave peace and international justice.”402 British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden gave 
another reason for pursuing this goal; “Either we must find some means of ordering our 
relations with justice and fair dealing while allowing nations great and small full opportunity 
to develop their free and independent life, or we shall soon head for another world conflict 
which this time must bring the utter destruction of civilization.”403 
 
Freedoms 
The concept of freedom was also important in definitions of rights. The New Orleans Times - 
Picayune cited Reverend Chapman’s references to “free men and free nations secured under 
law.”404 This goal was to be obtained through “cooperation and active participation of all 
nations, large and small whose peoples in heart and in mind are dedicated to the elimination 
of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance.” 405 Such specific reference to rights was 
balanced by general references to the rights of people, such as those earlier made by 
Chapman to the “natural rights” of citizens and the need to guarantee people the “full 
enjoyment of their rights.”406 A similar reference was made by Secretary of State Stettinius, 
who talked generally about the need to “foster respect for basic human rights” without any 
clarification of these rights.
407
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In a speech quoted in the New Orleans Times - Picayune, President Truman made clear his 
conception of freedom of thought as a right, saying, ‘In recent years, our enemies have 
clearly demonstrated the disaster which follows when freedom of thought is no longer 
tolerated. Honest minds cannot long be regimented without protest.”408 A number of other 
rights were identified in an article covering the presentation to the conference by the 
American Jewish Committee. Rights included in the proposal — which was printed in full by 
the newspaper — were rights to a state, freedom to immigrate and outlawing of 
discrimination (specifically anti-Semitism).
409
 
 
Values. Common Interest and Morality 
Discussion of rights in the New York Times coverage was firmly in the realm of morality and 
religion as in the discourse of civilization and humanity. An article covering the mass held to 
commemorate the opening of the conference clearly related any discussion of rights to 
religion, saying, “[T]here will go up to God a constant prayer for an enduring peace upon 
earth, based upon a recognition of God, the supremacy of the moral law, the inalienable rights 
of the individual, the sovereignty of each nation and the unity of the human race.”410 This 
notion of unity was linked with ideas about the concomitant need for unselfishness and 
generosity: the “primacy of power” was replaced by the “primacy of unselfishness.”411 The 
view was presented that only through acts of unselfishness could civilization continue and 
unity be maintained. 
 
Many definitions in Los Angeles Times coverage existed in the domain of morality. Language 
included reference to ideas like principle, right, decency, ideals, dignity and right, among 
others. The goal of the conference was presented as being to “express the principles which 
shall guide the nations in their relations with each other.”412 These principles included 
unselfishness — portrayed as rising “above personal interests”; decency — with the task of 
the conference being to answer the “hopes of all decent people”; dignity — a new world was 
to be created “in which the eternal dignity of man is respected” ; responsibility — both in 
international rejection of force as a weapon and in taking responsibility for setting things 
right for Jews who survived the Holocaust; and cooperation — where human rights are a 
“platform on which all men ought to agree.”413 
 
Morality and right were explicitly linked in the Los Angeles Times coverage with human 
rights by references to the “everlasting moral force of justice” and “those lofty principles 
which benefit all mankind.
414” Often these ideals and principles were tied to religious belief 
and conviction. Truman’s speech had strong religious overtones, with references sprinkled 
throughout to “Divine guidance,” “firm faith in our hearts” and God’s “own righteous path of 
peace.”415 The task of the conference was guaranteed success in the statement that “none of 
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us doubt that with divine guidance, friendly cooperation, and hard work, we shall find an 
adequate answer to the problem history has put before all of us.”416 
 
The concept of community and cooperation was tied in Washington Post articles to ideas of 
neighborliness and world inter-reliance. Governor Earl Warren of California in welcoming 
delegates to San Francisco illustrated this, saying, “We recognize that our future is linked 
with a world future in which the term ‘good neighbor’ has become a global consideration. We 
have learned that understanding of one another’s problems is the greatest assurance of peace 
and that true understanding comes only as the product of free consultation.
417” Acting 
Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew was quoted as saying that Americans had realized “that 
never again can we or any other people find security in isolation” and that a “true parliament 
of man” must be created through the new peace and security organization.418 
 
Cooperation and community were also important notions in defining human rights in the New 
Orleans Times - Picayune. In addition to the notion of “cultural cooperation” previously 
discussed, other references included such ideas as the “interests of harmony,” “common 
interests,” “common grounds on which to build” and “co-operation and active participation of 
all nations.”419 These notions of community, unity and cooperation arose out of concerns with 
moral law, duty and the idea of hope for the future. President Truman proclaimed, “Other 
voices were raised in expressions of confidence and hope — the hope of a world scourged for 
years by burning steel — that delegates from many lands will weld their polyglot tongues 
into the mighty voice for enduring tranquillity among nations.”420 The Times discussed the 
“enormous duty” resting on these delegates and quoted Stettinius’ statement that no one 
could afford failure because “[e]ach of them knows too well what the consequences of failure 
would be.”421 These hopes and ideas of duty came out of dedication to a international “moral 
law.”422 
 
Economic and Social Rights 
Economic and social rights were presented in Washington Post coverage as essential in any 
discussion of human rights. Secretary of State Stettinius outlined the task of the new 
organization as being: 
 
to solve these common problems upon which the security and the economic and social 
advancement of their peoples so largely depend. There can be no end to the tyranny of 
fear and want unless the proposed world organization commands the allegiance of 
both the mind and the conscience of mankind.
423
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This idea that security could come as much from meeting economic and social needs of 
people as from traditional emphasis on security and strategic issues became a central notion 
in the UDHR. The Economic and Social Council of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations was given the specific task of “planning to raise the social and economic level of the 
nations of the world” and “promoting education and other forms of cultural cooperation.”424 
 
The New Orleans Times - Picayune coverage of the conference also referred to cultural rights 
in a discussion of the responsibilities of the proposed economic and social council of the 
United Nations. Specific cultural rights discussed included those of education, economic 
development and more generally, “social issues” and “cultural cooperation.”425 Stettinius also 
referred to economic and cultural rights when he voiced his concern to “solve those common 
problems upon which the security and the economic and social advancement of their peoples 
so largely depend.”426 
 
Punishment and International Standards 
A central notion related to expressions of repugnance at Nazi treatment of individuals was 
that of punishment. Herman K. Pell, former U.S. representative on the United Nations War 
Crimes Commission, was described in the Washington Post as having presented the task of 
the Allies as being to “punish perpetrators of atrocities and members of the Gestapo.”427 A 
Gallop Poll found that the American public strongly favored punishment of Nazis determined 
to be war criminals.
428
 Thus, one task of the Allies and the new United Nations would be to 
foster acceptance of the idea that “no perpetrator of atrocities be permitted to find sanctuary 
behind neutral borders.”429 
 
In discussions of punishment and justice, an idea was increasingly becoming central in the 
discourse of human rights — that an absolute definition of right and wrong existed by which 
international behavior should be governed. This perspective was illustrated in the Washington 
Post presentation of the Dutch delegation’s argument that “there is a canon of right and 
wrong which mankind recognizes and which should be written into any charter which 
professes to set up a society of nations ... a society... established on common standards of 
behavior, with appeal to a common law in the event of a departure from those standards.”430 
President Truman’s comments implied existence of standards of behavior with reference to 
the “lofty principles which benefit all mankind” and to what he called God’s “own righteous 
path of peace.”431 Governor Dewey referred to establishment of the World Court as the 
“conscience of mankind determining under principles of justice, the disputes which would 
otherwise bring down on us another holocaust.”432 
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Progress and Civilization 
The ideas of progress and of changing society for the better were both a motivation for the 
talks and a way of talking about human rights. President Truman emphasized that the 
sacrifices of the war needed to be justified by changes in society and in the way that nations 
interacted.
433
 Joseph Grew referred to the new organization as “permitting mankind to live 
and progress in confidence, security and peace.”434 Interaction among nations was to be based 
on the ideas of community and cooperation outlined above, as well as ideas of service — 
what Truman referred to in his address to congress as the “responsibility of the great states ... 
to serve and not dominate the peoples of the world.”435 
 
The Los Angeles Times coverage talked about human rights in terms of improving the world, 
or solving the problems of the world, and as progress — creating a new way of doing things 
out of the ruins of the Old World. An article referred to the conference as creating a 
“framework which may be able to solve some of the world’s difficulties.”436 Truman 
identified the task of the conference as being: “We must build a new world — a far better 
world” and he called the delegates the “architects of [this] better world.”437 This task was not 
merely presented as an exercise in problem-solving; in the words of one Los Angeles Times 
writer “The stakes are too high — nothing less than the future of humanity.”438 
 
The New Orleans Times - Picayune coverage of the conference also associated human rights 
with progress and civilization — Truman’s “better world” where “differences are adjusted 
through reason and mutual understanding,” rather than the picture painted by Eden of the 
annihilation of civilization.
439
 Writers also established a dichotomy between the old way of 
doing things — “imperialist policies and the exercise of arbitrary power by the Big Three for 
the domination of other nations” — and the new model of “sovereign states co-operating” for 
the mutual benefit of all nations and people.
440
 
 
Undefined Rights 
In contrast to the specificity of Jewish concerns about nationality, statehood, property, 
reparations for damages and losses and guarantees of security of person and freedom, other 
discourse about rights in the print media tended to generalities and to the non-specific. 
References were made to such notions as the “inalienable rights of individuals” without 
explanation of the specifics of these rights.
441
 Rights were identified as the “patent truth” and 
as related to “moral issues” without extensive discussion of what they included.442 
 
                                                          
433
 April 26, 1945, ‘Speaking For Humanity’, Washington Post, p.10. 
434
 April 30, 1945, ‘No Security in Isolation, Grew Declares’, Washington Post, p.4. 
435
 April 26, 1945, ‘Speaking For Humanity’, Washington Post, p.10. 
436
 April 25, 1945, ‘“Parley Must Not Fail,” Is Spirit of Delegates’, Los Angeles Times, p.2. 
437
 April 26, 1945, ‘Text of Truman Address to Security Conference’, Los Angeles Times, p.2. 
438
 April 25, 1945, ‘“Parley Must Not Fail,” Is Spirit of Delegates’, Los Angeles Times, p.2. 
439
 April 26,1945, ‘Parley Is Dedicated To Permanent Peace: President Truman, Opening Sessions, Stresses 
Challenging Opportunity’, New Orleans Times - Picayune, p.1 and April 26,1945, ‘Parley Is Dedicated To 
Permanent Peace: President Truman, Opening Sessions, Stresses Challenging Opportunity’, New Orleans Times 
- Picayune, p.1. 
440
 April 25, 1945, ‘Federation of the World’, New Orleans Times - Picayune, p.8 and April 29, 1945, ‘Justice 
Urged in World Affairs: Objective Is Stressed by Catholic Group’, New Orleans Times - Picayune, p.12. 
441
 April 30, 1945, ‘Mass for Parley Attended by 10,000’, New York Times, p.10. 
442
 April 30, 1945, ‘Jewish Group Asks World Rights Bill’, New York Times, p.11. 
80 
 
Linkages Between Human Rights and Foreign Policy in the Print Media 
 
All of the newspapers studied presented several connections between human rights and 
foreign policy. The Washington Post's coverage of the San Francisco conference contained 
the broadest range of perceived linkages between human rights and foreign policy of the four 
newspapers examined. The Los Angeles Times and New York Times coverage linked human 
rights and foreign policy in a narrower range of ways, as did the New Orleans Times - 
Picayune. All of the newspapers presented the idea that morality and idealism were valid 
components of foreign policy. The New York Times coverage perspective was that ideas 
about God and the existence of moral laws were compatible with the process of international 
relations. In an article covering the mass held for the opening of the conference, this 
perspective was illustrated by the description of prayers for enduring peace to be achieved 
through the application of moral laws to relations between nations.
443
 
 
A central idea in coverage in the Washington Post was also that idealism either does or 
should play a role in foreign policy. Underlying this notion in the coverage was the belief that 
international standards of behavior or moral norms existed and should guide policy choices. 
This belief was discussed above in connection with definitions of human rights as “common 
standards of behavior" and in relation to “common laws.444” Idealism was discussed many 
different ways. One editorial argued that without idealism, any plans made at the conference 
would fail because “it is the spirit that counts,” and “no matter what new model is promised 
at San Francisco, this new model will fail just as decisively as the League failed if there is no 
improvement in the spirit behind it.”445 Another article discussed the need for idealism, 
saying “preservation of a high aim is nonetheless important.”446 Other discussions of idealism 
positioned it opposite pragmatism. Idealism was portrayed as a “society embracing all 
nations,” with pragmatism as the old model of alliances of the “big powers” while lesser 
nations merely lent their stamp of approval.
447
 An editorial called this new model a “holy 
alliance of power-holding nations ... the wolves looking after the sheep.”448 The implied fear 
was that this new society would bind the United States to involvement in affairs from which 
she would rather remain aloof. 
 
The response to this fear of involvement as identified in articles in the Washington Post was 
that policies of isolation had failed and that cooperation between nations was a requirement 
of this new world. Governor Warren of California referred to the concepts of neighborliness 
and globalism wherein the fate of all nations was intertwined.
449
 Truman talked about living 
together in peace rather than dying together in war.
450
 Stettinius argued that cooperation 
would result in material benefit —that solving “these common problems” and the “tyranny of 
fear and want” through the “voluntary cooperation of all peaceful nations” was the only 
solution to prevent war.
451
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Articles in the New Orleans Times - Picayune portrayed the keystone of the organization 
proposed at the San Francisco conference, and indeed of international relations, as moral law 
— justice, equality and rights. Secretary of State Stettinius’ concern that only a focus on 
human rights would meet the “high purpose” of the conference was quoted, along with full 
coverage of the call by the Catholic Association for International Peace for “elimination of 
tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance.”452 However central the concern for human 
rights, a final issue raised was that human rights considerations had to be balanced by 
sovereign concerns — that nations should cooperate but should also “develop their free and 
independent life”; and participation in the world organization had to be balanced with what 
Stettinius called “full respect for the equal sovereignty of each.”453 
 
As a result of the incorporation of human rights in foreign policy, the idea emerged in media 
coverage that nations needed to take care of human rights concerns in order to create a New 
World and a new way of conducting international relations. The New World Order that 
would provide security and contentment for all needed to guarantee such basics as human 
rights.
454
 This argument was similar to that made after World W ar I, except that the United 
Nations was presented as a better guarantor of human rights than the League of Nations. 
 
The proposed world organization was presented in Los Angeles Times articles as a solution to 
the problems faced by the modem world — especially the problem of war and its “carnage 
and degradation.”455 An editorial discussing this attempt to solve these problems stated that 
“If the San Francisco conference measures up to the hopes of all decent people, the answer to 
that question will not be long in doubt and 25 years from now the nations will not be forced 
into another world war.”456 Truman presented the options as between the “continuation of 
international chaos — or the establishment of a world organization for the enforcement of 
peace.”457 
 
This organization to bring about peace was also portrayed as doing so through the application 
of justice — as already discussed extensively above. Justice as an element of foreign policy 
was part of the discourse in two ways. First, the concepts of justice and ideals were presented 
as being appropriate considerations in the making of foreign policy. Truman declared of the 
war-dead: "They died to insure justice. We must work and live to guarantee justice — for 
all.”458 Truman also referred to the “ideals this conference is called upon to perpetuate.”459 
The second way in which justice was part of the discourse was the perspective that peace 
would result if justice was served. An editorial in the Los Angeles Times argued that 
“repressed injustice would burst the bonds” if the cause of peace became submerged in the 
everyday pragmatics of international relations.
460
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Two further linkages were identified between human rights and foreign policy in the Los 
Angeles Times. One, discussed above, was that of responsibility and duty — all countries had 
a responsibility to help the cause of peace and to ensure the rights of individuals rather than 
simply to attempt to gain the most from each other through war and political manoeuvering. 
Truman also argued that the delegates to the conference had a responsibility towards future 
generations, saying, ‘If we should pay merely lip service to inspiring ideals, and, later do 
violence to simple justice, we would draw down upon us the bitter wrath of generations yet 
unborn.”461 The other connection, emphasized by Truman in his speech to the delegates, was 
the need for cooperation rather than each nation existing and operating in isolation. He 
portrayed the situation as being that “we dare not become isolated in peace” and, “for lasting 
security, men of goodwill must unite and organize.”462 
 
This idea of responsibility was found in all the newspapers studied. Coverage in the New 
York Times articulated this idea by suggesting that looking after one group of people, in this 
case specifically European Jews, would lead to security for all. Proskauer, president of the 
American Jewish Conference, argued this point most clearly, saying that the universal 
guarantee of human rights would result from “attention to the wrongs which have especially 
been inflicted on the stricken Jews of Europe by the holocaust of war and the bestiality of 
Hitler.”463 
 
The Washington Post coverage suggested that powerful nations have responsibilities in world 
affairs and that foreign policy decisions can be held responsible for violations of human 
rights. President Truman’s opening speech at the conference clearly delineated what he saw 
as the responsibility of the “victors in this great conflict” and the “great states” to create a 
“system through which world peace can be assured.”464 In a similar vein, Secretary of State 
Stettinius argued that “those peace-loving nations which have the military and industrial 
strength required to prevent or suppress aggression must agree and act together against 
aggression.”465 Herman K. Pell, former United States representative on the United Nations 
War Crimes Commission, outlined how he saw American foreign policy decisions as 
responsible for human rights violations by the Nazis.  His views were described in an article 
as being that: 
 
the State Department’s legal advisers are largely responsible for the recent Nazi 
atrocities because they failed to act on die commission’s proposal to punish Nazi 
torturers as war criminals. ’The legal advisers don’t want the responsibility of making 
a decision,’ Pell said in a press conference. ‘Therefore they have sidetracked 
proposals to punish perpetrators of atrocities and members of the Gestapo.’... Pell also 
blamed the British Foreign Office for not acting on proposals made 10 months ago. 
He said the committee’s recommendations never reached high ranking United States 
or British officials.
466
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In making such claims, Pell not only was saying that policy decisions could, and should, be 
held responsible for atrocities; he was also implicitly saying that the United States had a 
responsibility to act to protect human rights around the world. 
 
Similarly, articles in the New Orleans Times - Picayune suggested that the more powerful 
nations in the world had a responsibility to take the lead in world affairs: “More and more 
nations are swinging to the thought that perfecting an instrument for peace depends in large 
measure on unity among the Big Three, on statesmanship and guidance from the powers with 
the big guns and big industries.”467 To fulfil these responsibilities, a world organization was 
required to “establish and maintain a just and durable peace.”468 The governor of California 
said that this new organization needed to “develop a sound pattern of world affairs with a 
new measure of security for all nations.”469 
 
Another connection between human rights and foreign policy made in media coverage was 
that special conditions of injustice existed that demanded integration of human rights 
concerns into foreign policy. This perspective was most evident in discussions of Nazi 
treatment of Jews and the imperative of prevention of further such atrocities. Jewish groups 
argued that it was “elementary justice that the voice of the Jewish  people, first victims of the 
Nazi aggression should be heard at the world conference.”470 In a statement from the 
American Jewish Congress and the World Jewish Congress, these special conditions of 
injustice were acknowledged. The statement conceded that the: 
 
conference agenda had to be limited to drafting the charter of the new world 
conference, which conference officials had given as a reason for not taking up the 
Jewish problem...Nevertheless, as the leaders of the United Nations come together, we 
believe they should consider the tragic plight and future position of the Jewish people 
in the last twelve years which have brought death to 6,000,000 of their number.
471
 
 
Articles in the Washington Post raised two additional important ideas relevant to any study of 
linkages between human rights and foreign policy. These ideas were that human rights 
concerns overrode diplomatic norms and that issues of human rights overrode traditional 
classifications of sovereign concerns. The former idea was raised in relation to public calls 
for the United States to “ignore treaties if necessary” and to “cross neutral borders if 
necessary... ‘irrespective of the limitations of any treaties of extradition”’ in order to pursue 
accused Nazi war criminals.
472
 The latter idea was connected to the notion of pursuing and 
punishing war criminals -- no actions deemed as violations of human rights could be 
classified as “acts of state” and thus the perpetrators escape punishment.473 
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Finally, a number of other ideas linked human rights and foreign policy in the Washington 
Post. One idea was that economic and social concerns had a role in international deliberations 
-- that concern for economic, social and cultural needs was important in the creation of peace 
and international cooperation.
474
 Another was the notion that peace was impossible without 
law and justice -- that efforts to create a court of international justice were what Governor 
Dewey (New York) called the ‘“heart and soul of all our efforts’ for peace.’”475 Finally, 
human rights and foreign policy were linked through the idea that progress in civilization and 
for humanity could only come through outlawing violent force and basing international 
relations on the moral laws discussed above.
476
 
 
Human Rights and American Identity in the Print Media 
Press coverage of the San Francisco conference was examined to see if statements about 
human rights were linked to United States ideals and identity, and, if so, how this linkage was 
made. In general, very few such linkages were found. The New York Times coverage 
emphasized that “all people of good will everywhere” supported the work of the conference 
and linked human rights concerns to a “New World order” and issues of world security.477 
The Washington Post coverage focused on Stettinius’ arguments that the United States was 
only one of the nations needed to work for creating the new world.
478
 Such general terms as 
the “hopes of suffering humanity” and “millions of hopeful people the world over” were also 
used.
479
 However, some implicit linkages were found. An editorial made a connection 
between the peace process and American history, saying, “[I]f we mean to create a real 
society, power must be used not only to keep the peace but also in defense of justice, as 
administered by courts of law. That is how the frontier was made safe for peaceful living.” 
(italics added)
480
 Extensive coverage of President Truman’s speech and American leadership 
in the peace process also implicitly suggested linkages between American ideals and human 
rights policies. Truman himself said that “we hold a powerful mandate from our people” and 
referred to “our desire to work with other nations” and “our friendly policies.”481 However, 
one article suggested that this move towards support for internationalism rather than isolation 
in foreign policy came only out of a “reluctant realization” that Americans needed to 
participate in world affairs.
482
 Americans in general were portrayed as not only supporting the 
process to create a new organization for peace but also as supporting punishment for Nazi 
war criminals. An article about the results of a Gallup Poll on the subject contained the 
statement: “The American public, as might be expected, shows little willingness to be lenient 
on Hitler... As for minor officials in the party, they too need not look for sympathy in the 
United States.” 483 
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In general, the Los Angeles Times coverage painted a picture of the world as a whole moving 
towards incorporation of human rights ideals in policy decisions through the new world 
organization. An editorial stated that there was general American support for peace but that 
“only about one-third of the persons who had heard or read of the conference appeared to 
have a reasonably correct idea of what its objectives are.”484 The same editorial went on to 
say that: 
 
While the man in the street may find it difficult to follow some of the arguments over 
proposed amendments, there can be little doubt as to his desire and hope that a 
workable plan for an effective beginning of world co-operation to insure peace be 
adopted at San Francisco.
485
 
 
As in the language of Stettinius, the metaphor of early American pioneers appeared in the 
coverage to describe the task of the conference: “Both had faced great difficulties but the 
American pioneers who reached the great western ocean had believed all things were possible 
and the task of creating an effective peace organization must be met in the same spirit.”486 
Use of such metaphorical language makes an implicit linkage between American ideals and 
experiences and human rights. Further implicit linkages were made through language 
comparing “them” and “us,” such as Truman’s statements that “our enemies have clearly 
demonstrated the disaster which follows when freedom of thought is no longer tolerated” and 
references to the “fundamental philosophy of our enemies, namely that ‘might makes 
right.’”487 Truman, in paying tribute to Franklin D. Roosevelt also made an implicit linkage 
in saying, “[T]his conference owes its existence in a large part to the vision and foresight and 
determination of Franklin Roosevelt.” 488 Finally, an article on internal disputes at the 
conference attributed the inclusion of “justice and fundamental human rights” in the charter 
to the work of the United States.
489
 
 
The New Orleans Times - Picayune credited the work of the United States for inclusion of 
human rights in the conference agenda. An article about the opening evening of the 
conference stated, “It was Stettinius ... who told reporters of the United States’ delegation 
stand on specifying ‘justice’ in settling disputes” and “The American delegate, Senator 
Vandenberg, Republican, Michigan, also had been hammering for a pronouncement 
specifically embracing the word ‘justice’.”490 However, the remainder of its coverage of the 
opening week of the conference portrayed the inclusion of human rights on the agenda as the 
objective of all participants. 
 
Domains of Human Rights in the Print Media 
Across the four newspapers studied, discussions of human rights appeared most frequently in 
the domains of political discourse and general morality. Other common domains of discourse 
were religious and legal. The domains of society and economics were included in some 
discussions of rights but to a lesser extent Social and economic issues were most often 
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discussed in relation to the plight of European Jews, who were referred to in the New York 
Tunes as “displaced men and women” who experienced migration and statelessness as a 
result of “economic and social upheaval.”491 Economic and social issues included 
indemnification and reparations for damages, and “relief, rehabilitation, resettlement.”492 In 
the New York Times coverage, discussions of human rights were overwhelmingly in the 
political and general morality domains, with a nod to the social and economic concerns of 
post-war Europe, while the news and editorial stance also identified human rights as a prime 
concern for religious bodies of various creeds. Coverage referred to “moral law,” but 
application of this law to issues of foreign policy was clearly ascribed to religious interest 
groups. 
 
In the Washington Post coverage of the conference, discussions of human rights were 
overwhelmingly in the political domain with emphasis on issues of security of person, 
freedom from wrongful interference, oppression, law and justice, ideas about nation and 
sovereignty and discussions of the anti-militarism and anti-isolationism movements. 
However, the social domain of human rights was also extensively explored with discussions 
of ideas about community, cooperation, society, common benefit, neighborliness, duty, 
service, progress and civilization. The domain of general morality was included through use 
of such value terms as atrocities, criminals, treachery, right and conscience as well as by 
discussions of the existence of canons of “right and wrong,” “international conduct” and 
“common standards of behavior.”493 The religious domain was included only through 
coverage of President Truman’s references to God and the “righteous path of peace.”494  
Human rights appeared also in the economic domain through reference to the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council and to material well-being as a right.
495
 
 
Most discussions of human rights in coverage of the conference in the Los Angeles Times 
appeared in the domains of general morality and politics. of all the newspapers examined, the 
Los Angeles Times coverage laid the greatest emphasis on notions of general morality, 
including ideas about decency, ideals, unselfishness, humanity, right, and “considered 
judgment”496 Discussion of human rights within the political domain included discourses of 
peace, security, prevention of war, freedom from wrongful interference, immigration, and 
statelessness. Discourse within the legal domain encompassed issues related to punishment of 
Nazi war criminals and the establishment of an international bill of rights. Economic and 
social rights were covered only briefly in discussions of indemnification, relief, rehabilitation 
and resettlement. 
 
The New Orleans Times - Picayune coverage focused attention on human rights in the 
political and general morality domains. Issues of peace, justice, domination, “arbitrary 
power,” security and freedom were the terrain of the political domain.497 The domain of 
general morality encompassed ideas about a “better world,” hope, progress, reason, 
innocence, duty, “suffering humanity,” “deepest hope and highest purpose of all mankind,” 
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“mutual understanding,” civilization, cooperation, moral law and “natural rights.”498 The 
domains of social and economic rights were included through discussion of education and 
cultural cooperation and establishment of an economic council. Again, the inclusion of 
human rights in the general discourse was implicitly ascribed to religious groups in coverage 
of various petitions presented to the delegates by “31 religious leaders of various 
denominations.”499 
 
Symbols of Human Rights Discourse in the Print Media 
In general, the New York Times coverage had little symbolic or metaphorical language. A 
limited number of metaphors and images was used to describe the conference and its purpose. 
One image was that of the world standing at a crossroads and needing to turn in the right 
direction — ‘Today we stand at the crossroads of history. We need God’s guidance to direct 
us along the path of peace.”500 A second metaphor was of competition. The old way of doing 
things was presented as competition for “primacy of power” and the new way as needing 
competition for “primacy of unselfishness.”501 Other language equated human rights with 
security and equality, repeatedly using these terms in conjunction with each other. Articles in 
the New Orleans Times - Picayune also described human rights in the language of equality. 
Writers presented moral law and natural rights as closely tied to the notion of equality. 
Equality was used as a special symbol of the way in which the new world and way of 
conducting international relations would operate. Equality was presented in terms of nations 
where “[n]o preferred status should be granted to any nation or group of nations, no special 
privileges should be requested. Sovereign equality... demands that each nation be free in its 
internal government... and that its judicial personality be recognized in its international 
relations.” 502 It was also presented in terms of individuals where all people possessed natural 
rights to which they were entitled “full enjoyment.”503 
 
The final imagery in New York Times coverage was of the horror of war, with war portrayed 
as a “holocaust” and as “bestiality.”504 The Los Angeles Times coverage also depended on 
images of war to symbolize the need for human rights. Images of the suffering and tribulation 
of individuals during the war and the horrors of war itself were contrasted with ideas of 
civilization and improvement in the world. The suffering was presented in descriptive 
language, such as “tribulations heaped upon them” and suffering “overwhelming” the Jewish 
people and as being too much for individuals to bear.
505
 In the aftermath of the brutality, 
chaos and destruction of the war, the new organization was portrayed in terms of establishing 
machinery or a framework for peace. Thus, the emotional language describing the destruction 
of war was replaced with tidy images of machinery and construction. Truman referred to the 
conference as creating the “structure” and providing the “machinery” for the “essential 
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organization.” 506 He also suggested that the task of the conference was to build a “permanent 
monument to those who gave their lives that this might come.”507 In a similar vein, the San 
Francisco mayor talked about an “obligation to succeed for the veterans of the two wars.”508 
Stettinius talked about how the nations could not “afford anything less than the success of 
this endeavor,” while an editorial echoed this language, saying that the world could not 
sustain further exposure to war.
509
 
 
In striking contrast to the language in the New York Times, the language in the Washington 
Post coverage of the conference was heavily symbolic and metaphoric. A wide range of 
metaphors and images described the war, the purpose of the conference and the ideals of 
human rights. Language related to crime and punishment was used to describe the need to 
deal with Hitler and his officials in the aftermath of the war. References were made to 
“criminals,” “perpetrators” and “war crimes.”510 In addition, the metaphor of police was used 
to describe some options for a new world organization with the statement that “a community 
would rather be at the mercy of a posse of police than of individual policemen who were not 
in agreement about their roles. But the choice is of the Hobson variety... Most of the 
delegates want a society of nations, not an alliance of three policemen.”511 
 
Language related to ideas of responsibility also figured heavily in Washington Post 
discussions about human rights, especially through such related ideas as sacrifice and 
paternalism. Paternalistic language emerged through discussions of the responsibilities of 
great states and war victors. The peace process was described also in terms of needing to 
make a great effort, to make sacrifices and as paying “too high a price” if the process 
failed.
512
 Other language associated with this notion of responsibility included symbols and 
metaphors of cooperation, community and unity — the so-called “higher community of 
interests and purpose.”513 Cooperation was not only at the individual level but also at the 
world level — the “World Rule of Law” and the “world organization.”514 
 
The notion of progress permeated the language in the Washington Post. Progress was 
portrayed as coming through inclusion of ideals in politics as well as in the move from chaos 
and “brutality” to law and order.515 Several dichotomies were established to illustrate the 
progress to be achieved through the conference. Not only were social order and civilization 
positioned opposite chaos and brutality; so were justice and law versus destruction, and 
civilization and justice versus injustice and aggression. The language of progress included 
references to “starting down the true road,” reaching the goal and  “progress away from 
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international rule by force alone.”516 Other language referred to growth as a metaphor for 
progress, with discussion of the “seeds of peace” and of the conference as “creating the social 
and political climate congenial to their growth.”517 
 
Similar language in the Los Angeles Times represented progress. The steps taken at the 
conference were portrayed as a beginning — as the “first step on a long and difficult road.”518 
The metaphor of a road was linked with metaphors of progress and the historical metaphor of 
the American pioneers and the pioneering spirit. Progress was portrayed as “this new world 
of which such glorious potentialities in the advancement of science and the improvement of 
the material welfare of mankind are being heralded.”519 Both Truman and Stettinius 
compared the task facing the conference to that of the pioneers exploring the West. Stettinius 
linked the metaphors of the pioneers and a road by saying, “We are pioneers on a new 
road.”520 
 
Writers in the New Orleans Times - Picayune connected language about progress with 
language of building. Progress was depicted as a goal in itself and as advancing toward goals. 
It was described as the “advancement of their peoples” and as moral advancement toward a 
“high purpose.”521 It was also referred to in terms of a “march to an objective sought by all 
the peoples represented.”522 The objectives of the conference were described again in terms 
of dichotomies between organization and chaos; tyranny and slavery, oppression and 
intolerance versus “order and justice” and “free men and free nations” ; and moral law and 
natural rights versus temporal law of “government... of men 
or of nations.”523 
 
Metaphors of building in the New Orleans Times - Picayune included an article in which 
images related to building or construction occurred continuously, with quotes from Truman 
referring to the “task of forging” the new organization” and the “labors at the conference”; 
quotes from Governor Earl Warren citing the need to “develop a sound pattern of world 
affairs” ; quotes from Mayor Lapham referring to “creating the framework of a world security 
organization... built not on the shifting sands of distrust but on the rock of mutual 
understanding”; and the writer’s own references to the construction of “delicate machinery” 
and welding of “polyglot tongues into a mighty voice.”524 In other places the conference was 
referred to as an instrument of peace, as fashioning peace and as erecting a structure for 
peace.
525
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The difficult task before the conference also generated language in the Washington Post 
related to work, with references to the “job of planning” and “tasks” as well as the need for a 
“combination of hard work and faith.”526 Other work-related language included images of 
planning, drafting rooms, structures, weaving, the “creation of a system” and reference to 
conference delegates as “architects of a better world.” 527 Hard work was linked with 
pragmatism and contrasted with proposals portrayed as “idealist, unpractical, even 
harebrained.”528 This notion of the need for faith was echoed in a number of religious 
metaphors. An editorial talked about the “idols” of international politics that were 
worshipped and protected above all else, as well as the need to “consecrate an alliance,” the  
“new holy alliance” and a description of the state as “God walking on earth.”529 The final set 
of metaphors in the Washington Post coverage of the conference used geographical language. 
References were made to “strategic frontiers,” “vast distance,” the “face of the earth” and 
“future tidal waves of militarism.”530 
 
Attribution of Agency in Foreign Policy in the Print Media 
Ascribing agency in foreign policy was remarkably similar across the four newspapers 
examined. In all cases agency was assigned to the president of the United States and his 
administration, specifically to the U.S. State Department The Los Angeles Times coverage 
also specifically mentioned Truman and F.D. Roosevelt “whose hopes and labors had done 
much to bring about the United Nations conference at this time and place.”531 Again, in all 
cases, the leaders of other nations and their foreign ministers were assigned agency, but more 
power was granted to leaders of the Allied nations — the Big Powers. Interestingly, one 
difference was who these big powers were seen to be. Writers for the New Orleans Times - 
Picayune referred to the Big Three (United States, Britain and Russia) while those for the Los 
Angeles Times referred to the Big Four (United States, Britain, Russia and China — the 
sponsors of the conference).
532
 The Washington Post coverage broke the powers into two 
groups: the Big Five (United States, Britain, Russia, France and China) and the inner-core 
Big Three (United States, Britain and Russia).
533
 The New York Times articles generally used 
the term “Allied governments” to refer to this group without specifying membership.534 
 
Coverage in each of the newspapers assigned agency to conference delegates, although that in 
the New York Times and the Washington Post emphasized the contributions of American 
delegates over other delegates.
535
 Writers for the New Orleans Times - Picayune assigned 
agency to congress only through inclusion of individual senators on the American delegation. 
In contrast, the Los Angeles Times coverage not only assigned agency to members of 
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congress in the American delegation, but also to individual members of congress, such as 
Senator Vandenberg of Michigan.
536
 Congress itself is assigned power through portrayal of 
the need of the president to present his views to its members before presenting the views to 
the conference in San Francisco.
537
 
 
All of the newspapers portrayed the United Nations as having power in foreign policy, but 
only the Washington Post included state and local government and public opinion as having a 
role in the foreign policy process. State and local government were portrayed as having only 
a peripheral role, through comments by the mayor of San Francisco and the governors of 
California and New York. The role of public opinion was portrayed as giving the leaders a 
“powerful mandate” and also through statements about the American public demanding 
peace.
538
 
 
Concerning the question about what parties were treated as having a role in the incorporation 
of human rights in foreign policy, all those named above were included — plus a broad range 
of other groups. The New York Times coverage assigned agency to interest groups and 
religious organizations, including the American Jewish Conference, the World Jewish 
Congress, the Board of Deputies of British Jews, B’nai Brith, the Jewish Agency for 
Palestine, the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America,  “representative Catholic 
organizations,” “other official international organizations already dealing with this subject” 
and “forty-two consultants designated by national organizations at the invitation of the State 
Department”539 Individuals and the general public were portrayed as having power through 
comments about prayers in “every church, chapel, school and home of the archdiocese” and 
“signatures of some 1,300 Americans of all races and creeds,” respectively.540 God was also 
ascribed a role in the peace process by a reference to His directing “us along the path of 
peace.”541 
 
The Washington Post coverage, most overtly of the four newspapers, assigned power to 
congress in the incorporation of human rights into foreign policy. Congress had power both 
through being needed to approve the resolution to pursue war criminals and through 
promoting the need to pursue these criminals “after a group of congress members went to 
Europe to inspect Nazi atrocity camps.”542 Even though the newspaper coverage had 
emphasized the role of American delegates to the conference in helping to create foreign 
policy, agency was also assigned to other delegates, such as the Chinese delegates (who 
joined with the Americans in proposing an amendment dealing with justice, international law, 
and social and economic concerns) and delegates from smaller nations — such as the 
Netherlands whose delegates brought concerns about equality and rights to the conference 
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table.
543
 References were also made to the contributions to policy discussions by the United 
Nations War Crimes Commission; state government through the efforts of people like New 
York Gov. Thomas E. Dewy, who addressed the 48th annual banquet of the American-Irish 
Historical Society on the subject of the conference and human rights; religious groups, such 
as the Federation of Churches; and public opinion and the “community of mankind,” whose 
conscience and yearning for peace were depicted as driving the conference.
544
 
 
The Los Angeles Times coverage ascribed agency for the incorporation of human rights into 
foreign policy to all of the groups involved in general foreign policy-making as well as to “all 
mankind,” who gave delegates their mandate, and God — portrayed as inspiring the ideals 
driving the conference.
545
 Similarly the New Orleans Times - Picayune coverage assigned 
agency to the groups discussed above, in addition to all the “peace-loving peoples” who 
“crave peace and international justice,” as well as to religious organizations, such as the 
Catholic Association for International Peace.
546
 
 
Human Rights in Congress, 1945 
In common with the congress of 1919, the Congressional Record of 1945 did not separate the 
subject of human rights from the general category of war issues. Thus, a time period was 
selected for inclusion in this study. For this case study the first session of congress for 1945 
was examined — that is June and July 1945. Although this is not the exact period studied for 
the print media (which reported events in San Francisco as they occurred), congressional 
debate focused intensely on the events of the San Francisco conference with conference 
delegates reporting the details of the conference to congress. Thus, the subject matter remains 
the same for the print media and congressional records studied. 
 
Congressional Definitions of Human Rights 
Definitions of human rights in congressional records examined centered on a core of values 
comprising ideas about peace, justice, law, freedom, democracy, equality, self-determination, 
freedom of speech and individual rights. Economic, social and cultural rights comprised part 
of the discourse related to prevention of war and the fight against totalitarianism. This theme 
of anti-totalitarianism and anti-fascism was central in understanding definitions of human 
rights outside the UDHR. Other definitions outside those of the declaration could be divided 
into two value-related sub-themes. One encompassed ideas about progress, humanity, 
civilization and ideals. The other encompassed ideas related to the notion of right and wrong, 
morality in general, Christianity, cooperation and duty. 
 
Peace and justice were presented in congressional discourse as essential for a “better, happier, 
and safer world” -- essentially the goal pursued by advocates of human rights.547 
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Representative Charles Eaton of New Jersey saw the goal of the conference as the “final 
banishment of brute force, and the enthronement of justice in all human relations.”548 Senator 
Burton Wheeler argued for a peace treaty that would “bring about justice and peace and 
decency throughout the world,” and Senator Joseph Hill announced the goal as being the 
creation of “a world where all peoples may live in peace, under law and justice.”549 
 
The idea of a world operating under rules of law rather than anarchy is one of the important 
ways in which members of congress seem to have understood human rights. Senator 
Vandenberg referred to the rule of law as “substituting orderly justice for the jungle-creed 
that might makes right.” 550 Representative Eaton talked about the concept of  “fair dealing” 
rather than “brute force.” 551 Senator Homer Ferguson portrayed the rule of law as the main 
contribution that the United States could make to any peace, because he said, “[W]e survived 
because we built on the firm foundation of ‘equal justice under law”’; and this creed was 
needed as an “international as well as a national institution.”552 
 
Understanding how “peace and decency” were defined was one of the tasks of the research 
here. One simple answer is that these ideas were closely tied to F.D. Roosevelt’s concept of 
the Four Freedoms — “freedom from fear, freedom from want, freedom of the press and 
freedom of religion.”553 One central notion was that security of person was essential to a 
happier and safer world. Although all wars tend to the horrific, World War Two was treated 
as notable due to the widespread horror and disgust engendered by Nazi concentration camps. 
This horror was expressed through phrases such as “human slavery and savagery,” 
“senseless, savage destruction of life and property,” and what Senator Vandenberg of 
Michigan called the “cruel science of mass murder.”554 He went on to say that, “if World War 
III ever unhappily arrives, it will open new laboratories of death too horrible to 
contemplate.”555  Representative Eaton succincty outlined the purpose of guaranteeing 
security of person as being to fulfil the “passionate longings of men and women everywhere 
for a life free from tyranny and fear in which by their own efforts they can achieve for 
themselves and their posterity a worthwhile life.”556 
 
A cluster of freedoms made up congressional definitions of human rights. Equality and self-
determination for nations and their citizens were seen as an important part of freedom. There 
were calls for “respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” and 
for the “rights of self-government which peoples all over the world cherish and desire.”557 
The notion of freedom was presented as a quintessentially American right Senator Ferguson 
of Michigan declared that the United States was “founded on the inalienable right of man to 
enjoy freedom exceeded nowhere in the world.”558 Representative Sol Bloom argued that 
“America’s chief contribution to the Charter is the inclusion of an international bill of rights, 
so that the individual, no matter of what race or creed shall be protected anywhere and 
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everywhere on earth.”559 Senator Wheeler expressed concern that the United Nations Charter 
did not make “one single clear specific provision for the protection of the individual human 
personality of which the society of nations is ultimately composed ... not one single reference 
even to the worth and dignity of the human person, much less any specific provisions for the 
protection of his inalienable rights.”560 
 
Not only was there a concern for individual freedoms and a fear that such freedoms might not 
be guaranteed by the new international organization, but undefined freedoms also figured 
prominently in congressional discourse. The phrase “fundamental freedoms” was frequently 
reiterated, usually in conjunction with the phrase “human rights.” For example, Senator Hill 
cited the importance of “human rights and basic freedoms” and argued that the United 
Nations Charter was notable for its emphasis on these.
561
 Senator Wheeler emphasized the 
“basic liberties and rights and dignity of human character” and wanted these highlighted in 
the United Nations Charter.
562
 An ardent supporter of the fledgling United Nations, Senator 
Vandenberg argued that whatever form the peace treaties might take, the “protections for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms inherent in the San Francisco Charter will inevitable 
make a better, a wiser, and a safer job of it in its ultimate impacts upon humankind.”563 
 
Two basic freedoms were identified as democracy and freedom of speech. Senator Alben 
Barkley expressed a hope that the result of the Allied victory in the war might be that 
“democracy might not only flourish wherever it now is, but that it may extend its boundaries 
throughout the world.”564 Senator Wheeler was concerned about the stifling effect of tyranny 
on democracy in Eastern Europe combined with the lack of freedom of speech. He 
challenged the people in the United States who admired Russia to go to Eastern Europe, and 
“there see what would happen to them if they dated to criticize in the slightest degree either 
the government or any of the officials of the government.”565 Wheeler was also concerned 
that the postwar anarchy in Europe would damage prospects for democracy. He asked, “Does 
anyone imagine that the chaos, famine, disease, immorality, suffering and the stinking desert 
of conflict that has been made of Europe and that is fast being spread over the Orient, is 
fertile ground in which the roots of democracy can flourish?”566 
 
Social, economic and cultural rights were considered in two ways. One approach was to view 
provision of these rights as protection against war. The other was to view them as rights in 
themselves — inherently belonging to humans rather than as preventative measures against 
war. The former approach was exemplified by the declaration of Senator Hill that “Economic 
injustice, hunger, want, misery, exploitation, the denial of economic opportunity, make fertile 
the soil for the seeds of war.”567 A senator from Kansas, Barkley, outlined a similar 
perspective, saying, “We know from history that in the years gone by economic conditions 
have contributed largely to warfare, and to the unhappiness of men, women, and children 
because of their desire to expand and get out of life something which they could enjoy.”568 
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The latter position presented the task of the United Nations as being in the very words of the 
charter to ‘“ achieve international cooperation in the solution of international problems of an 
economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character and promotion and encouragement of 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, 
language, religion or sex.”569 The middle ground was represented in the statement of Senator 
Ferguson: 
 
We seek to substitute economic cooperation for economic welfare between nations in 
the hope of removing some of the basic causes of war; and with the further aim of 
promoting the welfare of all the peoples of the world... to promote... the educational, 
social, and cultural relations between peoples of the world in the effort to bring about 
better understand and genuine good neighborliness among nations.
570
 
 
As mentioned above, three themes were evident in other definitions and ways of talking 
about human rights. One was the idea that totalitarianism and fascism were inherently anti-
human right and anti-individual rights. Thus, to resist totalitarianism was to strike a blow for 
human rights. Senator Wheeler of Montana, particularly concerned about the effect of 
totalitarianism on human rights, said: “The threat of a rampant totalitarian tyranny 
everywhere raises its ugly head. The resurgence of a brutal and fanatical fascism lurks.”571 
Not only was totalitarianism linked with tyranny and violations of individual security; it was 
also seen as a threat to standards of living. Aid to Europe was thus portrayed by those in 
favor of it as a means of resisting totalitarianism, and more specifically, Soviet Communism. 
 
A second set of definitions of human rights emerged under the umbrella of ideas related to 
progress, humanity, civilization and ideals. The San Francisco conference was portrayed as 
refusing to “accept a static world in which yesterday’s inequalities are frozen in a strait 
jacket,” and the United Nations Charter was a “new emancipation proclamation for the 
world.”572 The notion of progress was explicitly part of the discourse, as evident in such 
declarations as “The United Nations Charter offers to the world an absolutely new political 
and social organism for insuring the steady progress of civilized mankind through security 
and peace... It has, in effect, tremendous potentialities to help make this world a better place 
to live in for all human beings.”573 The charter was even called the “new magna carta of 
peace and security for mankind.”574 In a similar vein, Senator Barkley referred to the 
“progress of international moral and spiritual values” and the “advancement and elevation of 
mankind.”575 Senator Hill used the metaphor of pioneers, saying that the conference led 
“mankind forward and upward over a new frontier and into a new era.”576 
 
This new era was one in which an organization existed “for the purpose of protecting us 
against ourselves and against the hates and angers of mankind” and where there existed a 
“new world civilization.”577 The motivations for this progress in civilization were portrayed 
as “high and noble ideals,” the “legitimate hopes of men, women and children,” the “hopes 
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and aspirations of peoples,” the “hopes of humankind,” “precious values” and the “aspiration 
of all mankind.”578 
 
The final set of definitions existed in the domain of morality and religion are related to ideas 
about values and responsibilities. Responsibilities identified included those of “trusteeship or 
guardianship of weak and backwards peoples,”579 as well as the need to “work together in 
amity.”580 The notion of working together included ideas of unity, cooperation, community, 
neighborliness and good will. Senator Hill neatly summed up the idea of cooperation and 
community through the medium of the United Nations as: 
 
Without compulsion on any nation, here will be the opportunity for all the nations to 
work together as good neighbors, to elevate the worth and dignity of the individual, to 
raise standards of living and advance social progress, to help men to obtain the fruit of 
their toil and to enjoy a better deal, to carry education, enlightenment, and cultural 
development into all lands and to promote human welfare and human happiness.
581
 
 
These responsibilities were to be taken on either because of notions of right and morality — 
the “willingness to be guided by principles of right conduct in human association” and the 
“moral sense and trained intelligence of the whole people”— or because of religious 
conviction based on “Sacred Writ” and the “spiritual forces of this earth.”582 Senator Hill 
argued that the single greatest contribution of the United Nations was: “Here on the stage of 
the world in broad daylight will be considered in free and open debate the affairs that concern 
the men and women of this earth. Here truth may turn its shining light into the dark places 
and challenge the hearts and consciences of men.”583 Thus, notions of progress were equated 
with morality and religious conviction and ultimately with human rights. 
 
Congressional Linkage of Human Rights and Foreign Policy 
Members of congress saw a number of connections between human rights and foreign policy. 
Some connections related to the idea that it was appropriate to consider morality in foreign 
policy and that some moral imperatives guided, or should guide, foreign policy. Other ideas 
were connected with the notion of world leadership and the responsibilities of reducing the 
anarchy and chaos of war. Finally, a number of issues were debated, such as whether the 
United States should become involved in world affairs; the role of cooperation and ideas of 
community; national self-interest versus international responsibilities and the role of idealism 
versus pragmatism in world politics. 
 
The main role morality was seen to play in foreign policy was through the United States and 
others taking a moral stance in order to influence the behavior of other countries. Senator 
Vandenberg referred to this as invoking the “moral pressures of the organized conscience of 
the world” and said the result would be that the “aggressor of tomorrow who breaks this 
contract will stand in naked infamy before the embattled conscience of an outraged world.”584 
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Senator Wheeler made an even stronger plea for including moral values in foreign policy, 
saying: 
 
if we as a nation are to revert to the pagan faith of tyrants that truth cannot and will 
not triumph in free conflict, the hope for moral leadership among the nations and the 
peoples of the earth will perish for long years to come ... the world of the future will 
degenerate into a vast intellectual, moral and spiritual concentration camp.
585
 
 
Not only was morality seen as an appropriate consideration in foreign policy, but some 
members of congress argued that a moral imperative existed: American values and the 
sacrifice of American lives in the war demanded an attempt to improve the world. One 
member said the options were “either...final failure and self-imposed extinction; or ... a 
golden age of freedom, justice, peace and social well-being.”586 In a similar tone, the warning 
was issued that “failure to reduce international anarchy to law and order threatens the whole 
structure of law and order which mankind has painfully built up through the centuries.”587 
Senator Vandenberg highlighted the moral imperative, saying, “[I]f the effort fails, we can at 
least face the consequences with clean hands.”588 
 
This moral imperative was seen to derive in part from the special experiences of the United 
States, and the question was asked: “What other power on earth is going to sacrifice itself to 
guarantee the strengthening and perpetuation of our way of life if not America?”589 Members 
of congress clearly saw the United States as having values and experiences that could benefit 
the rest of the world. Senator Ferguson of Michigan asked rhetorically: 
 
Examine the history of the whole world and tell me what other nation emerged 
victorious from two great wars asking nothing for itself except that which would bring 
peace, law, and order in the relations between nations. It is more than chance... that 
Bretton Woods, Hot Springs, Dumbarton Oaks, and San Francisco are American place 
names; and that from them come the outlines of a new era in world organization. So I 
say, without in any way minimizing the great contributions of other nations, that 
political innovation — the power of organization — is the genius of the American 
people.
590
 
 
Backing the notion that the United States had much to offer the rest of the world were 
arguments that no single nation was “more interested in humanity on an international basis 
than the United States of America. We have rushed to the relief of the stricken everywhere”; 
“we are the richest, the most powerful and freest nation that not only now exists but that ever 
existed”; and “We built up on this continent the greatest country on the face of the globe, 
where there is greater prosperity, greater freedom, and greater liberty and more real religion 
than there ever was in any other country in the face of the globe.”591 This last comment was 
made in connection with an argument that the United States should keep to itself and not 
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meddle in international affairs, because such “meddling” could jeopardize all that the United 
States had achieved. 
 
The debate between those who wanted the United States to take an active role in world affairs 
and those who took a more isolationist position was one of the dominant themes found in 
examining connections between human rights and foreign policy. The idea of the existence of 
human rights and the international standards thereof, presupposes involvement in world 
affairs -- making difficult the argument for human rights while opposing participation in a 
world community. Senator Vandenberg held to the position that participation in world affairs 
would not diminish American interests, saying, “[W]e sacrifice none of our essential 
American sovereignty and none of our essential American rights when, exercising intelligent 
self-interest, we join ourselves in this international enterprise to seek a peace and a security 
which are as essential to our welfare as the air we breathe.”592 He went on to say that 
“America has everything to gain and nothing to lose... everything to lose and nothing to gain 
by declining this continued fraternity with the United Nations in behalf of the dearest dream 
of mankind.”593 In fact, he presented the alternative to participation as being “physical and 
moral chaos in many weary places of the world.”594 In marked contrast were the views of 
senators such as Wheeler, who argued that: 
 
again having learned nothing from the past, America is being used to build up a new 
world struggle between two great imperialistic nations, a struggle for world trade, 
world markets, world resources, world power, and world domination, in which again 
we shall be called to pour out what is left of our once vast storehouses of treasure, raw 
materialists [sic] and of blood.
595
 
 
Senator Hill made the strongest plea for world cooperation instead of American isolation. In 
fact he argued that the United States could not maintain an isolationist position because the 
“airplane and the radio, rapid transportation and instantaneous communication have made the 
world one common neighborhood. Whether we like it or not, we are forced to realize that 
every word that comes through the air, every ship that sails the sea, every battle that is fought, 
affects the future of america.”596 He went on to argue that as part of a community America 
could wage a battle against “intolerance, repression, exploitation, injustice, and economic 
want as the common perils of the future” — which could not be waged alone.597 
 
A related debate in congress was over the role of what was perceived as idealism in political 
affairs. Many members of congress called notions of morality, community and human rights 
unduly idealistic in the hard realities of international relations. Senator Harlen Bushfield 
sweepingly described the idealists as the “dreamers who would remake the governments of 
earth into one world in which all the human characteristics of mankind are merged into a 
civilization of light and sweetness.” He continued on to say that “we must not be swept away 
from practical, hard-headed common sense.”598 In contrast, Senator Ferguson declared, “I 
think we can keep our heads in the clouds of idealism and also plant our feet squarely on the 
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ground of realism.”599 His reasoning was that the founding of the United States showed how 
idealism could be incorporated into the “practical world,” and, thus, a similar process could 
take place in foreign policy. 
 
A further argument made by those in favor of international involvement and the incorporation 
of ideals into foreign policy was that, as a world leader, the United States had certain 
responsibilities. Vandenberg argued that, “If America is to assume the moral leadership of a 
better world in which we have fought our way to glorious eminence, we can scarcely be 
content to be among the last who care or dare to speak when this United Nations’ roll is 
called.”600 Representative Eaton suggested that the earliest possible ratification of the United 
Nations charter would “confirm the position of our great and free country in its 
acknowledged place of leadership in the supreme task of reconstructing a shattered 
civilization, and establishing permanent peace and security, throughout the world.”601 
 
One clear way in which human rights and foreign policy were connected in congressional 
discourse was the identification of the reduction of anarchy as a goal of foreign policy. 
Senator Ferguson argued that anarchy over time had been reduced by the “substitution of 
principles of right, equality, and justice for the unbridled passions of men.”602 The reduction 
of anarchy was clearly linked with human rights and foreign policy by his argument that, 
through “appropriate “agencies and courts” and “by the introduction of law, equity, and order 
commensurate with the dignity of man ..., freedom, peace and justice [can] be attained. 
Freedom must precede peace, for peace with slavery is not desirable and must never be 
permitted.”603 Similar linkages were made by Senator Barkley’s argument, that if as much 
money had been spent on “education, hospitalization, improvement of our highways, and all 
the things that make for a higher standard of life and the enjoyment of life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness” as was spent on the war, the “cause of civilization” and the “standard of 
life” in the United States and around the world would have benefited.604 
 
Congressional Attribution of Agency in Foreign Policy 
Discussions in congress of who had agency in the making of American foreign policy mainly 
took place in the realm of questions about specific assignment of power — that is, debates 
about who had authority to make decisions. The old debate between congress and the 
president over who had authority in foreign policy was brought to the forefront by 
discussions of potential ramifications of ratification of the United Nations charter on 
domestic decision-making. One specific fear was about who would have the power to declare 
war and send American troops to war. Related to this fear was the belief that American troops 
should be committed only to “protect American lives and property, and not the property or 
lives of some foreign nations or combination of nations.”605 Some senators argued that the 
constitution provided that only congress could declare war — while others said the president 
had the power to make executive agreements (such as treaties) though he “may have to go to 
congress for approval in order to obtain money to carry them out.”606 The middle ground in 
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this debate was occupied by such senators as Vandenberg, who took a placatory stance, 
saying, “It seems to me that the important thing to underscore and to underline is that we all 
agree that this cannot be done by executive agreement if it eliminates the voice of Congress 
or the voice of the Senate from the equation.”607 
 
The American Discourse of Human Rights in 1945 
The San Francisco conference of 1945, the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights are seen as the foundations of contemporary discussions about human rights. 
Yet it can be seen that the ways human rights were talked about in 1919 (the first case study) 
were remarkably similar to those of 1945. The four newspapers studied in 1919 talked about 
human rights in terms of security, peace and justice; equality; common interest and morality; 
democracy; trade, labor and economic development; national identity, internationalism and 
idealism; punishment and law; suffrage; the threat of Bolshevism; and progress and 
civilization. The same four newspapers in 1945 identified many of the same components, of 
human rights although these components were differently combined and emphasized. Human 
rights were defined in terms of security, freedom from wrongful interference and equality; 
justice, law and peace; freedoms in general; values, common interest and morality; economic 
and social rights; punishment and international standards; progress and civilization; and 
undefined rights. 
 
The emphasis on common interest in 1919 became an emphasis on community, although it is 
clear that the ideas are basically the same — cooperation between nations based on mutual 
interests. The idea of security in 1919 emphasized prevention of war and the establishment of 
rules governing how nations could conduct war (and peaceful relations). In 1945, emphasis 
was laid to a greater extent on the right of all individuals to freedom from wrongful 
interference — security at an individual rather than a national level. The notion of 
punishment for violation of international standards remained constant. In 1919, the criminals 
were seen as the Kaiser and his associates and in 1945, perpetrators of crimes were the Nazis 
and their allies. In both cases, the print media argued that certain acts against individuals and 
groups of people were not acceptable, even in the course of conducting war. 
 
Economic and social rights remained a small component of definitions of human rights. A 
much larger component in both case studies was definition of human rights in terms of 
progress and service to civilization. One of the most interesting differences between 
newspaper coverage of the Paris Peace conference and the San Francisco conference is that 
while human rights are talked about in terms of freedom in 1945, the concept of democracy is 
far more important in the ways newspapers in 1919 talked about human rights. In contrast, 
congressional definitions of human rights in both 1919 and 1945 emphasized democracy as 
essential to provision of freedom and rights. 
 
The congressional discourse of human rights was remarkably similar in the two case studies. 
Congress consistently defined human rights in terms of political and civil rights: peace, 
justice, law, freedoms of speech and press, self-determination and democracy. Congress in 
1919 portrayed provision of aid to European nations and efforts to guarantee basic human 
rights as part of the struggle against the influence of Bolshevism. Congress in 1945 discussed 
the role of provision of economic aid to Europe and supporting development of universal 
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standards of political and civil rights as weapons in the fight against totalitarianism — 
specifically, communism. 
 
The congresses of 1919 and 1945 both depicted human rights as intimately connected with 
the progress of society and civilization towards higher standards of morality. In both periods, 
the United States was presented in both print media sources and congressional discussions as 
having a special role to play -- that of moral leadership -- because of American historical 
experience (successful establishment of a democratic government undergirded by an 
idealistic constitution) and American influence in the world (as a result of involvement in two 
world wars). Congressional and media discourse also consistently exhibited a tension 
between the role of idealism and that of pragmatism in foreign policy. In both periods, 
idealism was tied to those individuals and organizations that supported United States 
involvement in a world community, and pragmatism was tied to those who supported a less 
interventionist foreign policy. 
 
The next two case studies allow comparison of human rights discourse in periods when the 
United States was not at war, or dealing with the immediate aftermath of war. Chapter Five 
discusses human rights and foreign policy during the 1976 presidential campaign — 
specifically, in the debate between presidential candidates Gerald Ford and James Carter. 
Chapter Six discusses American responses to the massacre of Chinese students in Tiananmen 
Square in 1989 by the army of the People's Republic of China. In such different situations 
definitions of human rights, perceptions of the purpose of foreign policy, attribution of 
agency in foreign policy and general ways of talking about human rights could be reasonably 
expected to differ from these two early case studies. If this is not the case, the outlines of a 
twentieth-century American discourse of human rights can be seen emerging from these case 
studies. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Human Rights in the 1976 Presidential Campaign: 
Case Study III 
 
The story of human rights told by the print media in 1976 was complex and often 
contradictory. The contradictions came largely from the different stories of human rights 
being told by President Gerald Ford and presidential candidate James (Jimmy) Carter. Ford’s 
narrative of human rights made freedom the central plot — articulated through notions of 
democracy, justice, peace and the freedoms of migration, speech and opinion. Carter’s 
narrative encompassed all of these concepts but also drew in ideas about the entitlement of all 
human beings to social security and food — so-called second-generation rights. Ideas about 
morality and peoples’ aspirations were also part of the narrative, whether couched in terms of 
political, social or economic rights. Anti-communism continued to be an important thread in 
the narrative of human rights, with Western democracy identified with the provision of 
human rights and communism tied to subjugation of peoples. Civil and political liberties were 
at the center of congressional narratives of human rights, with democracy as an essential 
component of the stories. However, women’s rights (though largely articulated as civil and 
political rights) and a small measure of social and economic rights were also part of the story. 
 
The print media in 1976 clearly saw the president and his administration as the prime 
narrators of foreign policy. Congress and public opinion were given smaller roles. Various 
divisions of the executive branch — such as the U.S. State Department and policy advisors 
— were seen as important narrators of foreign policy. In an election year, constituents and 
presidential candidates were portrayed as much more important narrators of foreign policy 
and human rights stories than would usually be the case. International agreements were also 
seen to play a role in the telling of human rights stories. Congress at this time saw itself as a 
much more important narrator of both foreign policy and human rights stories than in 
previous years, although congressional discourse showed an awareness of the balance 
between the voices of congress and the president in policymaking. 
 
The Presidential Debate 
On October 6, 1976, U.S. President Gerald Ford, the incumbent president and Republican 
candidate for re-election, met Governor James Carter of Georgia, the Democratic presidential 
candidate, in the Palace of Fine Arts theater in San Francisco for a debate on foreign policy 
and national defense issues. This was the second in a series of what were considered historic 
debates. A live audience and an estimated 100 million Americans watched the debate on 
television.
608
 Ford was in the difficult position of having to defend a foreign policy largely 
inherited from his predecessor, Richard Nixon. He had retained Nixon’s Secretary of State, 
Henry Kissinger, and continued many Nixon administration policies.
609
 However, Ford also 
had the incumbent advantage and the associated foreign policy experience. Carter, though 
having consulted extensively with foreign policy experts, had the disadvantage of 
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inexperience in foreign policy, but he had the advantage of being a challenger unblemished 
by any foreign policy missteps.
610
 
 
Ford’s campaign tried to use Carter’s pre-debate consultations as evidence that Carter was 
not qualified to lead the country. Republican Vice-Presidential candidate Robert Dole of 
Kansas, speaking to the American Bankers Association, according to a Los Angeles Times 
article, argued that the “pre-debate consultations and briefings of Carter by well-identified 
foreign policy and defense experts were ‘solely for the purpose of lending much needed 
credibility to his candidacy.’”611 The article also suggested that Ford’s strategy was to “show 
that he [Carter] is fuzzy, uncertain and undependable when it comes to dealing with other 
nations.”612 In turn, Carter sought to show Ford as tarnished by association with Kissinger’s 
“Realpolitik” and Nixon-era foreign policy and as given to secrecy. With reference to 
discussions over nuclear proliferation, Carter declared that “our President will not even come 
out of the White House to explain his proposal or be questioned on it.”613 Thus was the stage 
set for the 1976 debate on foreign policy in San Francisco. 
 
As to the winner of the debate, as usual in such cases, opinion was sharply divided. In a 
selection of responses printed in the Los Angeles Times, Dole was reported as having 
declared the president the winner because “Gov. Carter really didn’t come to debate. Instead 
of discussing foreign policy and defense, all he did was nitpick for 90 minutes.”614 Betty Ford 
concurred, saying that the debate was “like someone who knew how to dance and someone 
who was trying to learn how to dance”; and Republican Senate candidate S J . Hayakawa 
painted a picture of an ignorant Carter versus an experienced Ford, saying, “President Ford 
caught Carter with his facts down.”615 Senator John Tunney (D-Calif.) argued that “on 
substance Carter won. On debate points, it was a draw.”616 Opinion was unanimous however, 
that no matter how well Ford had performed, he had shot himself in the foot with his 
comment that ‘There is no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and there never will be under 
a Ford administration... Each of these countries is independent, autonomous. It has its own 
territorial integrity. And the United States does not concede that those countries are under the 
dominance of the Soviet Union.”617 After these words, Ford’s administration was placed on 
the defensive for the remaining weeks of the campaign. 
 
Human Rights in the Newspapers of 1976 
The New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times and the New Orleans Times - - 
Picayune were studied for the week of October 4 to 10, 1976. On the Wednesday of that 
week, Ford and Carter debated in San Francisco. Thus, the news coverage was examined for 
pre-debate discussions of foreign policy and human rights, coverage of the debate itself and 
post-debate analysis. 
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Defining Human Rights in the Print Media 
The print media in 1976 emphasized definition of human rights in terms of political 
freedoms. Other ways of defining human rights were found in the newspapers studied, but 
coverage of the debates in the print media was dominated by ideas encompassed by the 
notion of political freedom. Although, the New York Times coverage of the presidential 
campaign contained a range of definitions of human rights, the primary definition was that of 
freedom, which encompassed ideas about participation in government, justice, peace, and 
freedom of movement. Notions related to social security and the entitlement of human beings 
to food were also included, as were undefined or general rights. Definitions of human rights 
identified as outside those in the UDHR included ideas related to yearnings — people’s hopes 
and desires — and morality. 
 
The Washington Post coverage of the Ford-Carter debate differs significantly from that in the 
other newspapers. While coverage in the other newspapers couched the debate in terms of 
human rights and foreign policy, that in the Washington Post cast it almost entirely in terms 
of general foreign policy and specific issues, such as those of the Panama Canal, the Middle 
East peace settlement and the SALT Treaty.
618
 The one article that included discussion of 
human rights defined them in very general terms and in terms of freedom of speech and 
opinion, freedom from wrongful interference and migration. Another article in the sample 
week covered congressional concerns with general human rights and provided a narrow 
definition of human rights as freedom from wrongful interference. 
 
The Los Angeles Times coverage of the debate encompassed the widest range of definitions 
and ways of talking about human rights of all the newspapers studied. A long list of freedoms 
was identified as essential to human rights, including general freedom; political freedom; 
freedom to travel; emigrate and demonstrate; freedom of information and speech; freedom 
from discrimination and wrongful interference; and cultural, economic and individual 
freedoms. Human rights were also discussed in terms of economic aspirations, morality, and 
as anti-communism. 
 
The New Orleans Times - Picayune coverage of the Ford-Carter debate contained the 
narrowest set of definitions of human rights found among all the newspapers in this study. 
Human rights were simply defined in terms of freedom versus domination — that is, as 
political rights -- or used as a term in isolation without further definition. 
 
Political Freedom 
Terms like oppression, hegemony and domination were central to discussions about freedom 
in the New York Times coverage. Both Carter and Ford repeatedly referred to “Soviet 
domination.”619 Ford also talked about the “repressive measures” taken by South Korean 
President Park to maintain control.
620
 The primary idea used in defining freedom as a human 
right was political freedom — both in terms of democracy through participation in 
government and in terms of freedom from military and other oppression. Carter seems to 
have been especially keen to point out in the debate that Eastern European countries had little 
political freedom in contrast to Ford’s assertion that freedom existed in these countries. He 
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did so by saying “that the Soviet Union still had combat tank divisions in Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary, and troops in East Germany” and by asking, “’Did Mr. Ford not see those tanks 
when he visited Poland last year?’”621 The importance of freedom in any definition of human 
rights was emphasized in the coverage by extensive discussion of the difference of opinion 
between Carter and Ford about Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. Carter was reported as 
“calling Mr. Ford’s allusion to freedom in Western Europe ‘a cruel hoax upon millions’ in the 
region [millions] ‘who have lived under Soviet domination for their entire lives’ ... Mr. Carter 
accused the President of‘an affront to the people of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and 
East Germany who have strived so long for some small measure of freedom.’”622 Other 
comments by Carter on the subject of freedom received extensive coverage, including his 
challenge: “If the people there are free, let them tear down the wall and we will observe the 
exodus from East Germany.”623 
 
Articles in the New Orleans Times - Picayune also emphasized the notion of domination. It 
was talked about in terms of “control” and “subjugation” versus “autonomy and freedom.”624 
The role of the Soviet Union in the debated domination of Eastern Europe was extensively 
discussed, especially in connection with presenting Ford as “ignoring the human rights of 
millions of people under Communist rule.”625 References were also made to “dictatorships” 
and especially to Carter’s description of American “foreign policies that support foreign 
dictatorships and ignore human rights.”626 Prominence was given to the statement released by 
the Democratic National Committee’s Nationalities Unit that “slavery is the very opposite of 
freedom, not a verbal variation of it ”627 
 
Washington Post articles during this week presented both Carter and congress as considering 
the vital concern of human rights as freedom from wrongful interference and freedom of 
speech. Carter was reported as condemning “political persecution in Chile” and “repression 
in South Korea and other lands.”628 Representative Donald Fraser (D-Minn.) was reported as 
“distressed by reports of torture and other serious abuses in Argentina, some involving 
American citizens there.”629 Both Carter and Ford were reported as considering freedom of 
movement a human rights concern. Carter's “calls for greater efforts to convince Russians to 
permit emigration of Soviet Jews” was reported, along with reports that Ford “asked 
Brezhnev privately to advance emigration of Soviet Jews.”630 
 
Both Carter and Ford were portrayed by the Los Angeles Times as having presented concerns 
about political freedom around the world during the debate. In an attack mode, Carter argued 
that under “Kissinger, Ford and Nixon... we’ve espoused the purposes of dictators.”631 Ford’s 
response was to highlight American — and particularly his administration’s — support for 
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“black majority rule in Rhodesia, South-West Africa and South Africa.”632 On the subject of 
Eastern Europe, both Carter and Ford talked about political freedom in terms of Soviet 
domination of various countries, although Carter argued that Poland, Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary were under Soviet domination while Ford would not concede this point during the 
debate. He insisted instead that the “United States never has and never will concede to Soviet 
domination of Eastern Europe.”633 
 
Ford’s comments during the debate on Eastern Europe became the focus of intense 
controversy with Ford attempting in following days to clarify his comments and Carter using 
every opportunity to use Ford's perceived blunder as a campaign weapon against him. The 
Los Angeles Times devoted a great deal of coverage to the emerging controversy. 
Immediately following the debate, Brent Scowcroft, as head of the National Security Council, 
recast Ford's statements, explaining, “‘[W]hat the President was trying to say’ is that last year 
he visited Yugoslavia, Romania and Poland to ‘symbolize their independence and freedom 
(to) maneuver.’”634 Ford later further explained his comments as being that the “United States 
would never accede to Soviet domination over Eastern Europe and that it supported freedom 
in all the countries of the Soviet bloc.”635 Carter in turn focused attention on what he called 
the “Soviet’s bloody suppression of the Hungarian revolution ... Soviet tank divisions... in the 
heart of Poland” and Soviet domination in general.636 
 
Politics of personality aside, what is important here is definition of human rights as political 
freedom and — the notion central to this - of the right of individual citizens to “free choice of 
government.”637 Also important is the clear positioning of freedom as the opposite of 
domination;“free nation” versus “slave nation”; choice versus imposition of power; and 
freedom of political debate versus repression and suppression.
638
31 These definitions of 
human rights are clearly outlined in an editorial in the Los Angeles Times, which, in a satirical 
commentary on Ford’s politically incautious comments, suggested Ford should have said: 
 
Of course the Soviet Union dominates Eastern Europe and the deprivation of 
sovereign rights and civil liberties as a result of that domination is a tragedy of the 
modem world...we are deeply embarrassed that the Soviet Union has only marginally 
implemented the Helsinki agreements of last year, and has ignored the agreements 
designed to make the lives of the East Europeans and Russians more free...
639
 
 
Other Freedoms (Speech, Press, Migration, Cultural) 
The Helsinki agreements brought out several ways of talking about human rights in the 
newspaper coverage. The Los Angeles Times coverage described the Helsinki conference as 
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having “institutionalized the postwar balance of power between East and West in Europe in 
return for Soviet promises to ease restrictions on emigration, travel and the flow of 
information.”640 Carter drew attention during the debate to what he perceived as the Ford 
administration’s failures to implement the Helsinki agreements, specifically identifying the 
rights of “people to migrate, to join their families, to be free, to speak out”641 However, the 
New York Times coverage also identified President Ford’s definition of resolution of conflict 
and peace as human rights as well as his attention to issues of freedom of movement -- 
specifically the issue of Soviet reluctance to allow Soviet Jews to emigrate.
642
 
 
In addition to these freedoms, cultural, economic and individual freedoms were identified in 
Los Angeles Times coverage as important rights. Cultural and economic freedoms were 
discussed with reference to Soviet control of Eastern European countries’ cultural life and 
management of their economies -- that is, as important rights despite their absence in those 
countries.
643
 Individual freedoms were discussed in terms of political prisoners and the 
provision of civil liberties to individuals in other countries.
644
 Another definition of human 
rights mentioned in the debates that were included in Los Angeles Times coverage was that of 
discrimination against individuals on the basis of race: this emerged through discussion of 
Arab boycotts of Israeli companies and American companies with Israeli or Jewish ties.
645
 
 
Social Security and Food 
During the debate, Carter took the lead in discussions of human rights, clearly outlining his 
operating terms of “liberty,” “simple justice” and social issues, such as “caring for the poor'’ 
and “providing food, becoming the breadbasket of the world.”646 Carter emphasized welfare 
rights, the provision of food and social security through foreign policy instead of the United 
States being the “arms merchants” of the world.647 In contrast, Ford sought to identify peace 
as a right that his administration had been able to provide for American citizens and for other 
countries through its foreign policies.
648
 He also sought to counter Carter’s accusations with 
the statement that the “Ford Administration wants to eradicate hunger and disease in our 
undeveloped countries throughout the world.”649 
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Morality 
Whatever definitions of human rights were used, both candidates and the newspaper coverage 
presented human rights in terms of morality. An important article in the New York Times 
headlined as “Human-Rights and Morality Issue Runs Through Ford- Carter Debate,” 
referred to some instances of foreign policy as examples of“morality-inaction.”650 Ford 
emphasized his definition of human rights as peace and morality by rhetorically asking, 
“What is more moral than peace, and the United States is at peace with the world?651” Carter 
spoke more plainly about “doing what’s right” and the need to consider how governments of 
different nations “treat their own people.”652 Both candidates made liberal use of the terms 
“human rights” and “freedom” without providing specific definitions. 
 
The Los Angeles Times coverage also defined human rights in terms of morality, principles 
and right — what Carter called “commitment to principles” and “doing what is right” while 
he painted United States foreign policy as negligent in these aspects.
653
 In reply, Ford argued 
that the “foreign policy of the United States meets the highest standard of morality” and that 
“success was the answer to Carter’s charge that U.S. foreign policy did not meet standards of 
morality.”654 Ford’s measure of success here was the provision of peace, as discussed above. 
 
Economic Aspirations and Anti-Communism 
Articles in the Los Angeles Times on the debate talked about rights in terms of economic 
aspirations of countries less developed than the United States.
655
 Coverage also talked about 
communism and the Soviet Union as the antithesis of freedom and human rights.
656
 In 
addition, Carter spoke of human rights in terms of human desires - what he called 
“aspirations of human beings” and “yearning for freedom.”657 
 
Undefined Human Rights 
General discussions of human rights without specific definition dominated the Washington 
Post’s coverage during this period. During the debate, Carter and Ford were both reported as 
discussing human rights, “human rights abuses” and “injustices.”658 In the coverage of 
congressional demands for reports on human rights conditions in other countries references 
were made to human rights “conditions,” “practices,” “records,” “situations,” “cases,” 
“assessments” and “provisions.”659 Negative human rights practices were referred to in terms 
of “questionable human rights practices,” “a consistent pattern of gross violation of human 
rights,” a “country that violates human rights” and “violating human rights.”660 The clearest 
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definition of human rights was outlined in Representative Fraser’s statement that the key 
concern was the “way a government treats its own people.”661 
 
Linkages Between Human Rights and Foreign Policy in the Print Media 
Newspaper coverage of the debate identified numerous links between human rights and 
foreign policy — that is, human rights were accepted by the media as having a role to play in 
foreign policy decisions. The New York Times coverage of the debate and other human rights 
issues identified human rights concerns and idealism with political liberalism and interest in 
the practicalities of foreign policies as a concern of political conservatives. The Washington 
Post coverage of the debate also emphasized the differences between pragmatic and idealistic 
foreign policy goals. However, coverage also discussed the related issues of human rights 
concerns versus sovereignty — that is, intervention versus respect for national sovereignty; 
serious political issues versus frivolous concerns; and the role of morality in foreign policy. 
 
In addition to discussions of idealism versus pragmatism in the Los Angeles Times, a wide 
range of ways of talking about human rights appeared, along with the greatest number of 
linkages between human rights and foreign policy found among the newspapers studied. This 
range included the issue of sovereignty and the role of morality in foreign policy. Also 
discussed were: the importance of humanitarianism and international freedoms; human rights 
as an international pressure point; and consideration of human rights issues as important in 
getting the ethnic vote in the election. This last issue received the greatest amount of 
coverage, although this aspect was entirely absent from the other newspapers studied. 
 
Coverage of the presidential debate in the New Orleans Times - Picayune echoed the other 
newspapers in some of the ways it linked human rights and foreign policy — portraying the 
conflict between pragmatism and idealism and discussing the validity of including human 
rights in foreign policy. However, three other linkages were identified during research: the 
idea that foreign policy should be based on the human rights record of a country; the notion 
that improvement of human rights can be linked to contact of non- Western countries with the 
West; and the idea that human rights and foreign policy are linked symbolically rather than 
through concrete policy actions. 
 
As in previous case studies, concern with human rights was tied to an idealistic approach to 
policy-making while so-called “traditional” approaches to foreign policy (such as 
government-to-government diplomacy) were portrayed as the more pragmatic approach. 
These two stances were portrayed as exemplified by Carter and Ford during the debate. After 
identifying the “theme of human rights and morality in foreign policy,” an article in the New 
York Times said of the two men: 
 
Their two approaches embodied profoundly different philosophies of foreign policy 
and conflicting tendencies in American history ... Mr. Ford’s was the practical, 
power-politics approach - treat other countries according to their importance to the 
United States and not on how they treat their own people. Mr. Carter’s approach is 
based on the view that the United States must take a stand in the world for human 
rights to be a world leader and true to itself.
662
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The article further referred to the difference between the positions of the two men as a “trade-
off between security considerations and principle.”663 In discussing Ford’s perceived 
“blunder” on Eastern Europe, New York Times coverage portrayed Ford’s concerns as being 
the larger issue of United States-Soviet relations in the context of the Cold War where the 
administration was unwilling to “recognize Soviet hegemony over the so-called captive 
nations.”664 While decrying such a hard-nosed stance and illustrating Ford’s cynicism by 
reference to his refusal to receive Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn at the White House, Carter also 
sought during the debate to create a bridge that would allow for idealism and concrete 
achievements in foreign policy by linking world leadership with concern for human rights. 
However, in his statement that the United States was the “arms merchant of the world” rather 
than the “breadbasket,” he also linked concern for military strength with lack of concern for 
human rights.
665
 
 
Although human rights concerns were identified with liberalism and security concerns with 
conservatism in articles in the New York Times, both ends of the political spectrum in 
congress were shown to incorporate human rights concerns in foreign policy. Persons 
identified as “Congressional liberals” were reported as wanting to cut back on “American 
associations with military dictatorships” and to “stop all military aid to nations that show a 
‘pattern of gross violations of human rights.’”666 Congressional “conservatives” were 
portrayed as pressing for a law “withholding equal trading status from the Soviet Union until 
it permitted freer emigration of its citizens, particularly Jews.”667 These discussions illustrate 
the nineteen seventies as a period during which congress increasingly sought to use economic 
means to enforce foreign policy goals. 
 
Articles in the Washington Post portrayed idealistic foreign policy as overt linkage of policy 
decisions to human rights issues while the pragmatic approach to policy was “quiet 
diplomacy.”668 Congress was shown as preferring open linkages — that a “nation’s human 
rights record should be an important factor in determining U.S. relations with that 
country.”669 This preference for openness was connected to the idea that human rights 
concerns over-ride sovereign concerns — what Representative Fraser called the belief that 
the “way a government treated its own people is a legitimate concern of the international 
community.”670 Carter was presented as taking the middle ground in this discussion; he 
condemned political persecution in several countries and suggested the “U.S. should refrain 
from intervention in domestic politics of other countries while using unspecified ‘economic 
and political persuasion’ against injustices.”671 The stance of Ford and his administration was 
that “open U.S. action is less effective in human rights cases than quiet diplomacy.”672 Ford 
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further called the Jackson Amendment, which denied trade benefits to the Soviet Union 
because of its restrictions on emigration, “self-defeating and mistaken.”673 
 
One of the most important aspects of the linkage between foreign policy and human rights is 
that congressional moves and Carter’s political stance allowed open discussion of the idea 
that morality and idealism had a role in foreign policy. Even while Ford espoused quiet 
diplomacy, he implicitly acknowledged that human rights concerns, and therefore morality 
and idealism, had a part to play in foreign policy decisions. However, the stance in 
Washington Post coverage was clearly that these issues were not particularly pertinent to 
serious analysis of foreign policy. Citing issues as being addressed during the debate only in 
“simplistic, emotional and nationalistic terms,” an editorial said: 
 
At the level of serious discussion - rather than of theatrical performances in search of 
votes - the debate conveyed a picture of important issues barely recognizable to those 
here and abroad who must deal with them ... Considering the nature of some things 
that were said, it may be just as well that crucial issues were ignored.
674
 
 
The conflicting goals of idealism and pragmatism in foreign policy were highlighted in the 
Los Angeles Times coverage by identification of the Ford administration’s dilemma as being 
caught between “detente” and “support for Eastern European countries.”675 A further 
dilemma for the administration was the issue of sovereignty, given that the United States had 
signed the Helsinki agreement “codifying the postwar boundaries of Europe, pledging 
noninterference in internal affairs.”676 Exemplifying pragmatic politics was the socalled 
Sonnefeldt doctrine, by which the United States could acknowledge that the Soviet Union had 
a “special relationship” with Eastern Europe.677 An editorial suggesting what Ford should 
have said during the debate, said the appropriate pragmatic stance was that “[w]e have only 
reluctantly accepted the Soviet sphere of influence because the alternative risks nuclear 
war.”678 Another article described the tension between idealism and pragmatism as a 
balancing act between the “need to resist the idea of Soviet domination of half of Europe and 
the need to accept the fact of that domination.”679 
 
Carter’s idealistic stance was presented as suggesting that “U.S. foreign policy did not meet 
standards of morality”680 and thus change was needed. Carter’s approach to foreign policy 
was also portrayed as suggesting that notions of humanitarianism and sympathy for others 
should be considered in policy-making along with the notion of freedom — that the United 
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States “must not ignore the hope of freedom among those who have known too little of it in 
recent years.”681 
 
The so-called harsh realities of international politics was discussed through the idea that 
human rights are important to American foreign policy but are also an international pressure 
point — that is, that insistence on human rights will strain international relations. Carter used 
the notion to accuse Ford and his administration of “knuckling under to the Russians and 
Arabs.”682 An article about the history of the concept of “Captive Nations” supported this 
accusation by suggesting that “a succession of Presidents has proclaimed Captive Nations 
Week, mandated by congress, with an almost furtive air, annually and dutifully slipping the 
statement into the White House press room after business hours on Friday and otherwise 
trying to keep from straining U.S.-Soviet relations.”683 
 
The tension between pragmatism and idealism in foreign policy surfaced only briefly in New 
Orleans Times - Picayune coverage ofFord’s statements about Middle East policy. Ford 
pledged to “strengthen existing policy against the Arab boycott of Israel without jeopardizing 
our vital interests in the Middle East”684 Similarly, only brief attention was paid to the notion 
that human rights should be a consideration in foreign policy. This idea was presented largely 
through the implication that Ford had blundered by “ignoring the human rights of millions of 
people under Communist rule” and the suggestion by a member of the public that Secretary 
of State Kissinger be “sent to negotiate greater freedom for the East Bloc countries.”685 Much 
more attention was given to the idea that foreign policy should be based on a nation’s human 
rights record — particularly mentioned were Portugal (where Carter “said the United States 
tolerated the dictatorship... much longer than other nations”), the Middle East and the Soviet 
Union.
686
 
 
As discussed earlier, only the coverage in the Los Angeles Times suggested that incorporating 
human rights issues into discussion of foreign policy was a way to get ethnic votes — that 
this was simply a political gambit to gain votes. This suggestion was not subtle, as statements 
such as the following illustrate: 
 
The long discussion about the Eastern European situation and the Middle East was 
clearly directed at two constituencies ~ the descendants of the Catholic immigrants 
from Eastern Europe, and the Jewish voters, crucial in New York, Los Angeles, 
Chicago and a few other places.
687
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... with Carter scheduled to make stops this weekend in such great Catholic ethnic 
centers as Cleveland, South Bend (Ind.), Chicago and Milwaukee -- the democratic 
nominee can take crushing advantage of what Carter described as ‘a very serious 
blunder’ by Ford.688 
 
Indicating he considered one of his comments in Wednesday’s foreign policy debate 
potentially damaging. Ford moved with dispatch to deal with a problem that he feared 
could hurt him with ethnic voters... there were immediate signs that it could have 
significant repercussions, particularly in ethnic groups.
689
 
 
More sceptical members of the debate audience noted that Carter, in his rejoinder, 
primarily addressed Poles, Czechs and Hungarians who, by virtue of American 
citizenship, may have no direct voice in East European politics but certainly have a 
vote in November... For the last 20 years in the United States, the ‘captive nations’ 
issue has been potent to East European ethnics, as that voting bloc is now called, 
though the potency has ebbed and flowed.
690
 
 
Ford ... sought to calm ethnic groups across the United States by emphasizing his 
support of Polish ‘hopes and aspirations’ for freedom ... Ethnic Americans were bitter, 
and Carter, seeing a golden opportunity, stepped up his campaign rhetoric.
691
 
 
One further idea that received attention in the New Orleans Times - Picayune coverage of the 
debate was Ford’s suggestion that Eastern European nations would benefit if they became 
“less dependent on the Soviet Union” and had “closer contact with the West, and of course, 
the United States of America.”692 Implicit is the suggestion that good human rights records 
are a prerogative of the West Finally, by extensive coverage of Ford’s explanations for his 
comments on Eastern Europe, the proposition was put to readers that linkages between 
human rights and foreign policy were more a matter of symbolism and word choice on the 
part of the Ford administration than real concerns for human rights. Coverage charged that 
this was apparent in such statements as that the United States “would not accept Soviet 
domination of Eastern Europe”; ‘“never will concede’ Russian control of the region” and 
“has never conceded and never will concede their dominance by the Soviet Union.”693 
 
Human Rights and American Identity in the Print Media 
In the four newspapers examined, human rights tended to be only implicitly linked with 
American ideals and identity. Explicit linkages came through the identification of certain 
ideas and values as American, as well as through connecting human rights concerns with the 
interests of the immigrant and ethnic American communities. The New York Times coverage 
made both these explicit linkages. First the newspaper reported Carter’s comments after the 
debate about American “pride in our ethnic heritage” and the “yearning for freedom among 
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Eastern Europeans and émigrés from that area to the United States.”694 Carter’s references 
during the debate to “our people” and the need for the United States to “be true to itself” 
associated American identity with human rights values.
695
 However, Carter was also 
presented as chiding the United States for weakness in failing to do “what’s right.”696 More 
explicit linkages were made through allusions to the “ideals of the American people” and 
“longstanding American principles of independence and anticolonialism.”697 
 
The Washington Post coverage focused largely on coverage of the events rather than 
extensive commentary. Thus, linkages between human rights and American identity were 
sparse and implied. In an article on congressional moves to tie foreign aid to human rights 
records, the implication was that American values drove this move — that elected American 
representatives considered human rights an important issue.
698
 Similarly, a report on the 
presidential candidates’ foreign policy stances outlined one of Carter’s themes as being the 
need for “foreign policy to reflect ideals and morality of American people.”699 However, the 
article did not outline what these ideals were and how they could be reflected in foreign 
policy. 
 
Linkages between human rights and American identity were most evident in the Los Angeles 
Time coverage of the debate and its aftermath. In addition to general references to American 
values, — “traditional American humanitarian values”; “America as bastion of the free 
world”; the “character of the American people” — these values were specifically outlined in 
a number of articles as “freedom, independence and self-determination for all people” and the 
“desire for liberty and freedom.”700 Implicit linkages were also revealed through use of value 
judgements, such as “disgraced our country” and “disappointed,” to report the response of 
Carter and the general public, specifically the immigrant communities, to Ford’s “blunder.”701 
This connection between Eastern Europeans, the American immigrant community and calls 
for freedom in Eastern Europe was explained less in terms of specific concern for human 
rights than by “deep emotional attachments” that often resulted in great trauma when 
America disappointed. The connection was also made in the suggestion that “when no help 
came from the West... Moscow was able to put down a reform communist regime [in 
Czechoslovakia] without any Western interference.”702 
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The New Orleans - Picayune (Times) coverage similarly emphasized that the immigrant 
community’s calls for freedom in Eastern Europe were motivated as much by feelings about 
Soviet power as by general humanitarian ideals.
703
 The coverage also highlighted Carter’s 
accusation that Ford had disgraced America — “disgracing America,” “disgraced our 
country” and “a disgrace to our country”— thus implicitly linking human rights concerns to 
American values without explicit discussion of such linkages.
704
 
 
Domains of Human Rights in the Print Media 
Discussions of human rights in the print media largely fell into the domains of politics, 
general morality and society. Only coverage in the Los Angeles Times placed discussions of 
human rights in the economic and cultural domain. 
 
Discussion in the domain of general morality was in the context of societal norms of behavior 
and the desires of humankind for standards. These desires were expressed in New York Times 
coverage through such phrases as “human aspirations,” “yearning for freedom” and 
“aspirations of human beings.”705 Societal norms were articulated through value terms, such 
as “ridiculous” and “cruel hoax,” to describe Ford’s statements about human rights in Eastern 
Europe.
706
 A theme of morality and values was clear in the coverage of the debate through 
such terms as “morality-in-action,” “moral concerns,” right, principles and ideals.707 In 
Washington Post coverage, references to such notions as “ideals and morality” and 
“injustices” fit the domain of general morality.708 References to “humanitarian values,” 
“sympathy” and “moral commitments” clearly placed discussions of human rights in the Los 
Angeles Times coverage in the domain of general morality.
709
 Cultural norms of morality 
appeared in use of such value phrases as “deeply embarrassed” and “tragedy of the modem 
world” to describe violations of human rights and nonresponse of Western nations to these 
violations.
710
 Articles in the New Orleans Times - Picayune that relied on ideas about hopes 
and aspirations and societal values, such as disgrace, shame and insensitivity, placed the 
discourse of human rights in the domain of general morality, social values and norms. 
 
Discussions of human rights were placed by New York Times articles in the social domain by 
Carter’s references to the need for social and economic justice for poor people and nations — 
the “breadbasket” analogy. The Washington Post also placed issues related to emigration in 
the social domain. Discussions of welfare and social security and the “economic aspirations” 
of “Third World Nations” were identified by Los Angeles Times coverage as in the domain of 
economics.
711
 Discussions of freedom to travel and choice of emigration were placed within 
the domain of society. Culture was only referenced through discussions of political control of 
culture in Eastern Europe, thus mixing the political and cultural domains.
712
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The political domain was clearly demarcated in the Washington Post coverage through 
identification of human rights through the negative terms of torture, “serious abuses,” 
persecution and repression.
713
 The New York Times coverage also discussed human rights in 
the domain of politics. Usually discussions of human rights in the political domain refer to 
civil and political liberties, such as freedom of speech, the right to chose government, etc. 
However, in this case, the focus was the mechanics of political discourse — specifically 
Carter’s use of human rights as a weapon in his campaign for the presidency. Coverage was 
given to Carter’s claims that Ford’s blunder was the “product of isolation in the White 
House” and that Ford was inaccessible and ignorant about the “attitudes of ethnic 
Americans.” 714 An article also suggested that Carter had to use the issue of human rights 
because of the “President’s low-profile candidacy and the consequent absence of issues on 
which Ford might be vulnerable to attack.” 715 Human rights were also placed in the political 
domain through the notion that they were a valid concern in the making of foreign policy. In 
Los Angeles Times coverage of the debate, discussions of human rights using terms such as 
freedom, domination, peace, independence and liberty — what were called “sovereign rights 
and civil liberties” — were identified in research as in the political domain.716 In the New 
Orleans Times - Picayune coverage, such notions as freedom, domination, independence, 
autonomy, subjugation and slavery fit the political domain. 
 
Symbols of Human Rights Discourse in the Print Media 
Symbols and metaphors related to notions of freedom and captivity were prevalent in the 
print media. Through use of symbols such as the Berlin Wall and Biblical references to the 
exodus of people from an alien land, political repression was represented in the New York 
Times coverage as physical captivity.
717
 In contrast, support of values of political freedom 
were represented in heroic terms of taking a “stand in the world,” “conviction” and 
“cause.”718  Articles in the Washington Post used the same metaphor of the Berlin Wall and 
additional metaphors of the Iron Curtain and communism — and the ‘‘Soviet sphere of 
influence”719 -- to symbolically position free nations opposite “slave nation(s).”720 The Berlin 
Wall was again used in New Orleans Times - Picayune coverage as a symbol of domination 
and slavery.
721
 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn was also explicitly identified as a “symbol of 
freedom.”722 These symbols and metaphors were used in discussions of human rights to place 
notions of political freedom in opposition to political captivity. Communist domination and 
slavery were positioned opposite ideas of autonomy and freedom. 
 
In discussions of linkages between human rights and foreign policy in the New York Times 
coverage, metaphors of negotiation were used for different approaches to foreign policy. On 
one side were the “practical, power-politics approach” and “security considerations,” while 
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on the other side were taking a “stand in the world” and “principle.”723  Similarly, human 
rights were associated in the Los Angeles Times with the values of liberalism through 
discussions of the “relatively liberal U.S. economic policy toward poor nations” and 
descriptions of Carter’s proposed policies as “generally liberal.”724 
 
A wide range of other symbols and metaphors also appeared in Los Angeles Times 
representations of human rights. Human rights were also associated with a number of values 
and emotions, including character, sensitivity and hope. Failure to support human rights 
aspirations was associated with disgrace and embarrassment Additional metaphors in New 
York Times coverage described the debate over human rights in terms of weapons and battle, 
with Ford described as “under fire on the human-rights issues” and “on the defensive” and 
Carter “on the attack.”725 Congress was also described as wielding the “legislative club on 
human rights” with “their target deténte with the Soviet Union.”726 
 
The primary symbol of human rights in the Washington Post coverage came through the 
notion of violation of personal security. In an article on congressional calls for reports on 
international human rights, reference was made to “gross violation,” “violates,” “violating 
and “violations.”727 Human rights were also represented in terms of progress and 
advancement of society if attention were given to positive values and issues of injustice.
728
 
 
Attribution of Agency in Foreign Policy in the Print Media 
When general foreign policy issues were discussed in the New York Times, agency was 
assigned to the President and his administration, congress -- and to the American people 
through the influence of public opinion. Public opinion was represented as playing an 
important role in the incorporation of human rights concerns into foreign policy. Presidential 
candidates, such as Carter, placed human rights on the foreign policy agenda — as did 
congress through requiring certain standards of human rights to be met before allocation of 
foreign aid. 
 
The Washington Post coverage similarly assigned agency in foreign policy to both congress 
and the executive branch. However, the president and his administration were clearly 
assigned a greater proportion of power in the making of foreign policy than in general foreign 
policy. The U.S. State Department was portrayed as playing a role through such activities as 
the preparation of reports on human rights and other policy issues.
729
 Personal contacts 
between leaders, such as the meeting between Ford and Brezhnev, were portrayed as 
significant The newspaper reported on the Ford administration’s belief that quiet diplomacy 
between leaders was more important in foreign policy than loud protests, but coverage also 
acknowledged the role of presidential candidates such as Carter, in placing human rights on 
the foreign policy agenda. Congress was assigned agency in the incorporation of human 
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rights concerns into foreign policy because of actions to “cut foreign aid to countries 
violating human rights.”730  
 
The Los Angeles Times assigned agency in foreign policy to the same groups as found in the 
other newspapers (the executive branch and congress). However, agency was also assigned to 
experts, such as consultants in national security.
731
 Members of congress also had agency 
separately from congress through acting as advisors to the president and presidential 
candidates. Agency was also assigned to presidential candidates more explicitly than was 
found in the other newspapers. An analysis of the debate suggested that: 
 
In the months since Carter emerged as the front running Democratic candidate. Ford 
and Kissinger have moved to pre-empt some of the earlier Carter positions — 
especially on U.S. relations with its allies, U.S. policy toward Africa and the Third 
World, and U.S. policy on the spread of the nuclear weapons.
732
 
 
Concerning the question about the incorporation of human rights into foreign policy, it was 
found the coverage in the newspaper assigned agency to all the groups previously named, 
plus constituents — especially “ethnic voters,” including immigrants from Eastern Europe 
and “Catholic ethnic voters, to whom the issue appeals and from whom he [Ford] needs 
support”733 International agreements had also a small measure of influence in that the United 
Stales was portrayed as being bound by such agreements as the Helsinki accord.
734
 
 
When foreign policy is considered on its own, the New Orleans Times - Picayune coverage of 
the debate assigned agency to the executive branch and to congress. Carter’s concern that the 
general public was left out of the policy-making process was also extensively covered, as was 
Carter’s desire to “restore the involvement of Congress in foreign policy making.”735 The 
president and his administration, congress and the general public — especially ethnic voters, 
such as “Polish, Czech and German-Americans” -- were all assigned agency in the 
incorporation of human rights into foreign policy.
736
 Agency was also ascribed to presidential 
candidates — specifically Carter — and to the Democratic National Committee through its 
nationalities unit.
737
 
 
Human Rights in Congress, 1976 
The Congressional Record of 1976 classified discussions of human rights under the subject 
headings of human rights, civil rights and United Nations. Thus, any reference to human 
rights in congressional debate of1976 was included in this study. 
 
Congressional Definitions of Human Rights 
Congressional discussions of human rights during this period centered on definitions of 
human rights in terms of civil and political liberties. Human rights were defined as a number 
of freedoms, including those of assembly, protest, opposition to government and undefined 
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general freedoms. These undefined freedoms were interesting because, without specifying 
exactly what was meant, freedoms were still placed in such categories as civil and individual 
rights. Security of person was a specific human rights concern identified, specifically in the 
context of genocide and discussions of the genocide convention. Democracy was a central 
notion in defining human rights, as were ideas of equality, women’s rights and social and 
economic rights. 
 
Freedom was a central notion in much of congressional dialogue about human rights, whether 
explicitly or implicitly, such as through discussions of repression. Senator John B. Conlon of 
Arizona made one of the clearest statements regarding freedom when he declared that the: 
 
Declaration of Independence tells us that freedom is an inalienable right of man, yet 
very few of the 5 or 6 billion men and women who have inhabited the earth have 
enjoyed it ... History seems to be the record of the long struggle between people to 
gain freedom and the state, dominated by the stronger element to rule over them.
738
 
 
Less defined concepts of freedom and human rights included references to “human rights 
violations,” the “cause of human rights,” the “principle of human rights,” “basic human rights 
for all people of every nation,” and “human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”739 Rights and freedoms were defined in 
terms of “restrictions of civil liberties” and as limitation of “individual rights and 
responsibilities.”740 Discussions of freedom of assembly, protest and opposition to 
government were focused on the events in Chile following the military junta taking power. 
Senator Edward Kennedy expressed deep concern about “arrests and expulsions” after 
Chileans spoke with United States congressmen who visited the country. He identified human 
rights violations as coming from the fact that the “very act of talking to a U.S. Congressman 
was cause for arbitrary arrest, mistreatment, and expulsion.”741 Senator James Abourezk used 
a similar definition of human rights when he argued against “crime against individuals who 
do no more than speak their conscience and argue peacefully for change.”742 
 
As mentioned earlier, security of person and genocide in particular, was a major concern for 
congress at this time and thus a primary definition of human rights. Senator William 
Proxmire called the “right to survival” the “most fundamental human right” and argued that 
the Genocide Convention was the only way to guarantee this “right to survival to all national, 
racial, religious, and ethnic groups.”743 Proxmire further called the Genocide Convention 
America’s ‘‘Commitment to Human Rights,” thus clearly linking the two concepts.744 
Genocide was defined as the “destruction, in whole or in part, of a national, ethnical [sic], 
racial or religious group.”745 Other issues of security of person were related again to events in 
Chile, with Senator Kennedy presenting a list of rights violated by the junta, including 
“arbitrary arrest, arbitrary firing from jobs, exile within the country, and torture during 
interrogation.”746 
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The right to security of person was connected in congressional discourse to the notion of 
democracy as a right. Senator Abourezk made this connection explicit through his argument 
that “acts of violence are the ultimate attack against democracy and against legitimate 
democratic expression.”747 Senator Kennedy tied military power, banning of political parties 
and terror to a decline of democracy and therefore human rights in Chile.
748
 
 
The idea of equality as an essential right ran through all of the above discussions of human 
rights. Senator Proxmire asserted that the ideas central to American history and its foundation 
were those “self-evident troths that all men are created equal, and are endowed with certain 
inalienable rights.”749 Equal rights for women was raised as another notion central to human 
rights by Ambassador Barbara White, United States Representative to the United Nations.
750
 
In contrast, Senator Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota expressed concern about bringing the 
attention of congress to rights other than those expressed in standard discussions of human 
rights by listing rights proposed under a new bill of rights put forward by Vernon E. Jordan, 
Jr., then executive director of the National Urban League. These included the “right to 
education, the right to economic security, the right to health, the right to family stability, the 
right to representation, and the right to safe communities.”751 
 
Human rights were defined in three other ways outside definitions in the UDHR. These 
definitions included the idea of human rights as a mark of civilization, as illustrated by 
references to the “civilized world” and condemnation of Nazi atrocities by “every civilized 
nation.”752 Human rights were also discussed in terms of morality and capitalism. Senator 
John Conlon of Arizona presented a history lesson to the Senate on the development of moral 
values, the connection of these to Christianity and the interconnection of human rights, 
civilization, Christianity and capitalism. Starting his lecture from the pre-Biblical era, Conlon 
described how lawlessness ruled human interactions where the “strong... worked their will 
upon the weak” and slavery became rampant.753 He argued that “it is difficult to see how 
even a start toward civilization could be made until ethical and moral concepts were born in 
the minds of men.”754 This start was provided in his narrative by worship of God by Abraham 
and the establishment of the Ten Commandments by God. He suggested that “when men are 
governed by the spiritual ideals which we have come to call the moral law of God, there is 
self-discipline and self-restraint on the part of the strong, permitting the weak to enjoy 
freedom.”755 Having announced the principle that freedom can only exist with moral ideals, 
Conlon went on to outline his belief that human rights, Christianity and capitalism are 
intertwined and require each other for survival: 
 
freedom in the marketplace...results in the maximum satisfaction of human needs and 
wants... Any tampering with it, any form of government control... results in less 
human satisfaction... It [abundant production in the West] was made possible by the 
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free market philosophy operated by men who were loyal to the moral law of God ... if 
we now become disloyal to that law and cease to follow the discipline flowing from it, 
the free market philosophy will break down and society will return to 
authoritarianism.
756
 
 
His argument continued weaving together all these notions, suggesting that a decline in moral 
values had already led to the “decline of the market economy and the rise of statism, or the 
master and slave relationship we call communism, fascism, or a government managed 
economy.”757 
 
Congressional Linkage of Human Rights and Foreign Policy 
Human rights and foreign policy were explicitly linked in congressional dialogue during 1976 
in a number of ways. Some of these linkages are in the domain of values, as shown by 
references to American traditions and values, conscience, moral duty and the notion that 
moral considerations should play a role in foreign policy. Other connections between the two 
appear in discussions of the appropriate role of the United States in world affairs -- where the 
need for world leadership, involvement in a world community and obligation to international 
treaties is contrasted with ideas of sovereignty and reluctance to become enmeshed in the 
affairs of other nations. 
 
An American tradition of humanitarianism was particularly invoked in reference to 
discussions over ratification of the Genocide Convention. Senators of all political persuasions 
alluded to this tradition. Senator Kennedy cited a “long tradition of humanitarian 
concern...(for) the tragic excesses of war and civilian destruction.”758 Senator Jacob Javits 
expressed bewilderment as to why Americans would not want to support a “statement so in 
keeping with our national traditions and ideals... it is a very simple, strong declaration of 
principle to which I believe every American can assent.”759 Senator Proxmire talked about 
‘Tw o hundred years’ commitment to the principles of human rights,” America’s long history 
of “uncompromising leadership in support of basic human rights for all people of all nations” 
and the “ideals of our Founding Fathers.”760 And Senator Abourezk argued that the 
convention was “in keeping with the constitutional heritage and traditions of the United 
States.”761 
 
Throughout these discussions an implication remained clear that conscience, moral duty and 
moral considerations were seen to have a role to play in foreign policy decisions — what 
Senator Kennedy called the responsibility to reduce “this burden of strife which continues to 
strike at man’s conscience” and to create what Representative Philip Crane described as “a 
world in which all men and women enjoyed the same rights that Americans have secured for 
themselves.”762 A second clear implication here is that the United States was able to ensure 
human rights for its own citizens whereas other countries needed American guidance and 
support to achieve the same standards. American participation was presented as enabling the 
United States to “again assume the leadership role which it once maintained in the area of 
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human rights.”763 American leadership was suggested as important in order to “induce other 
nations to follow our lead and demonstrate their contempt for acts of genocide.”764 
 
The appropriate role for the United States in the world was a major topic of discussion by 
congress because an answer to this question would also answer the question of the role to be 
played by human rights concerns in foreign policy. Senator Proxmire said the United States 
must ratify the Genocide Convention in order to become part of the “world community.”765 
He also agreed with the U.S. Defense Department statement that ratification of the treaty was 
a “positive step in the national interest of our country.”766 Others argued that participation in 
international treaties would have a negative impact on domestic law and that other nations 
would use treaties, such as the Genocide Convention, to take action against the United States 
and individual American citizens in such cases as Vietnam prisoners of war and “our 
treatment of black Americans.”767 Senator Javits argued that these fears were unfounded and 
that “there is a note of fear behind most arguments — as if genocide were rampant in the 
United States and this Nation could not afford to have its actions examined by the 
international community.”768 
 
Once congress had decided that human rights did have a role to play in foreign policy, 
attention turned to discussions of how this role could function. One of the most common 
ways to incorporate human rights concerns into foreign policy was through the use of 
economic and military sanctions to punish violations. Senators Kennedy and Abourezk 
particularly sought to link American military and economic aid with the human rights records 
of nations, such as Chile. Kennedy argued that “to continue to ship arms to the junta is to 
accord U.S. aid and support to the repressive practices of the military junta that now rules 
Chile.”769 Abourezk, addressing the Senate on behalf of Senators Patrick Leahy, Jacob Javits, 
George McGovern, Floyd Haskell, John Tunney and Gary Hart, called strongly for 
prohibition of “assistance of any land which is provided, directly or indirectly, to or for the 
benefit of Chile, by any department, agency or instrumentality of the United States 
Government”770 
 
Congressional Attribution of Agency in Foreign Policy 
Congressional attribution of agency in foreign policy clearly reflected the complex 
relationship between the executive and congressional branches of government Congress 
allowed itself a great measure of agency in foreign policy — both by allusion to 
congressional power in general and by reference to specific powers of the House and Senate. 
Senator Proxmire’s passionate argument for ratification of the Genocide Convention outlined 
the need for world leadership, which had been “hindered too long by the inaction of the U.S. 
Senate.”771 Similarly, discussions about linking international economic and other aid with a 
nation’s human rights record was largely attributed to the work of members of the Senate and 
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House. Specific members, such as Minnesota Congressman Donald Fraser, received credit for 
“emphasizing the need to include human rights concerns in our foreign policy formations.”772 
 
However, acknowledgment was made of the advisory role of congress in formulating 
resolutions that the president could, but was not required to, take into account in policy-
making. The strong language of the resolution on terminating aid to Chile unless an 
improvement was seen in the human rights of the country was modified by the statement that 
the “United States should have no hesitancy in curtailing the amount of economic assistance 
we provide to that country” (italics added).773 Senator Kennedy also expressed frustration that 
senate statements on the issue “expressed four times in the past 2 years” were yet to become a 
law that the administration could not ignore.
774
167 Similarly the role of the president is 
shown to be curtailed by the requirement for congressional approval. This is exemplified by 
the statement that, “27 years after President Truman transmitted the Genocide Convention to 
the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, it remains before us as pending 
business.”775 
 
Thus, congressional discourse seems during this time to show an awareness of the boundaries 
and constraints of the system of checks and balances. The result of these checks and balances 
is constant negotiation of power in foreign policy between the executive and congressional 
branches. 
 
The American Discourse of Human Rights in 1976 
The print media in 1976 presented human rights in a narrower range of ways than did the 
newspapers in 1919 and 1945. Although a range of rights was discussed in the newspapers* 
coverage of the presidential debate, these rights could largely be classified as political rights, 
as those related to freedom (participation in government, individuals’ freedom from wrongful 
interference and from discrimination, freedom of movement, press and speech) and to notions 
of morality. In addition, Carter particularly drew attention to the rights of social security and 
food. Both presidential candidates talked about human rights as economic aspirations and 
discussed the provision of human rights as weapons in the right against communism. 
Definition of human rights in terms of progress and civilization was not pan of print media 
discussions at this time. However, these ideas remained prominent in congressional 
discussions of human rights, which also emphasized democracy as a specific way to provide 
political freedoms and civil liberties. Social and economic rights were specifically identified 
as being outside the normal range of human rights (in an argument suggesting that they 
should not be so). 
 
In the print media a discourse is emerging that defines human rights primarily in terms of 
political freedom. This discourse derives its inspiration and guidance from moral ideals — 
especially the notion of universal standards of right and wrong. Human rights are depicted 
not only as “things-in-themselves,” but also as a way of battling first Bolshevism, then 
communism. Print media in 1919 and 1945 portrayed the provision of second generation 
rights, such as rights to social security and food, as part of the fight against subversive ideas. 
However, in 1976, coverage of presidential candidate Carter’s arguments by newspapers 
presented the idea that second-generation rights were as universal as first-generation political 
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and civil rights. In doing so, media discourse differed from congressional discourse that 
portrayed second-generation rights as subordinate to first-generation rights. 
 
The discourse of congress that is emerging from the first three case studies is one that defines 
human rights as political and civil rights — ideally provided through establishment of 
democratic governments -- and in which provision of human rights is a mark of civilization 
and modernity. Human rights in congressional discourse are portrayed as the natural 
progression of history to a point of recognition of universal right -- an example of Stuart 
Hall’s argument regarding the naturalization of ideology. 
 
By 1976 it seemed largely accepted in newspaper coverage of foreign policy that human 
rights were appropriate considerations in foreign policy. Analysis of congressional 
discussions suggested that the role of human rights in foreign policy was still a matter for 
debate. It was found that ideas about values drove arguments for the inclusion of human 
rights in foreign policy. In common with the first two case studies, it was found that congress 
saw a tension existing between idealism and pragmatism in foreign policy and debated how 
best to negotiate the divergent requirements of idealism (defined as emphasis on the pre-
eminence of human rights concerns) and pragmatism (defined as the pre-eminence of national 
interest). These tensions were also articulated in media coverage of foreign policy issues. 
However, American history, a tradition of humanitarianism, and American values were 
portrayed by the print media as driving United States concern for human rights. Congress 
added moral duty and the need for United States leadership in the world to this list, but for 
some members of congress, the fear remained that involvement in world affairs (especially 
participation in international human rights treaties) would damage national interest and 
ultimately lead to loss of sovereignty. 
 
In 1989, fourteen years after the debate between presidential candidates Ford and Carter, 
President George Bush and congress faced the challenge of devising and articulating an 
appropriate response to the Chinese government’s attack on students in Tiananmen Square. 
Analysis of print media coverage and congressional debate, as well as Bush’s public 
responses to this event, will reveal developments in the American discourse of human rights 
and consistencies in this discourse studied across nearly one century of United States 
integration of human rights into foreign policy. 
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Chapter Six 
 
The United States and China - Tiananmen, 1989: 
Case Study IV 
 
“Pandas don’t shoot their young. ” 
State Department China Specialist, New York Times, June 10, 1989 
 
The human rights stones of 1989 centered on the notion of civil liberty and definition of 
human rights in terms of security of person — understandable in that press coverage and 
congressional commentary were in response to brutal violations of civil rights in China. The 
central components of these stories were freedom of person -- speech, expression and 
association — and freedom of society ~ press and democracy. In common with many of the 
earlier human rights stories, the narrative linked human rights with modernity, progress, 
capitalism and civilization and linked violations of human rights with communism. Morality 
was seldom an explicit component of the narrative and instead was replaced by the concept of 
international standards of behavior -- both personal and national — such as restraint, 
responsibility and respect. Emotions, such as shame, outrage and disappointment, also played 
an important part in the narrative. Congressional stories of human rights also were those of 
civil rights and liberties provided through democracy and economic liberalization, but denied 
through communism. Congressional stories of human rights were presented in the format of a 
morality tale that depicted indignation at a disorder that violated norms of civilization and 
progress — and of American values. 
 
In 1989 the president was seen by the press and by himself as a central narrator of foreign 
policy and human rights stories. The voice of congress was important but was overshadowed 
by that of the president and his administration. The print media drew narratives from a wide 
range of sources within the executive branch, but primarily from the U.S. Secretary of State 
and the U.S. State Department Even former members of the executive branch, such as Henry 
Kissinger, were seen as narrators of foreign policy and of the role of human rights in foreign 
policy. By placing pressure on congress and the executive branch to act against China, the 
general public were assigned roles in narrating human rights stories. Across the cases studied, 
the voice of the public was strongest and seen to be the most influential in policy-making, in 
1989. While congressional discourse portrayed congress as having an important role in the 
narratives of foreign policy and human rights, a significant proportion of the members 
actively argued for congress to assign greater agency to the executive branch and portrayed 
the prime narrator of foreign policy as being the president The reason given for this was to 
allow the United States to present a single foreign policy and human rights story to China. 
Many members of congress expressed support of this movement to create and present a single 
narrative to the general public and to a world audience. 
 
Tiananmen Square, June 4, 1989 
The events of June 4, 1989, called the Tiananmen Square Massacre by some and the 
Tiananmen Incident by others, and often referred to simply as Tiananmen, is one of those 
historic moments that reverberated around the world, more so than many events because it 
was a human rights spectacle carried live on television into living rooms around the world. 
Therefore, it is hard to separate facts from emotion in any description of it. The events at 
Tiananmen are to many in the world community as the assassination of President Kennedy is 
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to the American psyche — a shocking interruption to everyday life. At the end of a decade of 
increasing openness in China and amid hope around the world that the Cold War era was 
finally over, the Chinese military attack on protesters in the square was a harsh reminder of 
the past. Perhaps because of the power of television images of individual protesters facing the 
military, bloody victims rushed to hospitals on handcarts and the famous lone man facing a 
tank, the world response was immediate. Not only did governments respond with 
condemnation and sanctions, but citizens around the world turned out to protest the actions of 
the Chinese government. 
 
Exactly what did happen on that day has been debated by politicians, academics and 
members of the media. The debates have ranged from whom the exact perpetrators of the 
violence were to the number of deaths and even the reasons for the protests. Many Western 
media organizations had reporters in Beijing at the time or shortly thereafter, and a vast 
volume of reportage was generated — dramatic on-the-spot accounts based on observations 
and the flying rumors of a disaster zone. China historian Rafe de Crespigny concludes that: 
 
Much of what was said and written at the time has since been questioned, and the 
Chinese government has done its utmost to confuse matters with stories of innocent, 
peace-loving soldiers attacked by a few vicious hooligans, but most of the outside 
world has accepted that the leadership of the People’s Republic ordered its troops to 
open fire and crush an unarmed, albeit embarrassing, group of youthful protesters.
776
 
 
Research for this dissertation did not seek to examine the events in Tiananmen Square but the 
responses to those events — and specifically American responses to the reports of brutal 
killings of protesters in Beijing by the Chinese military. 
 
A further debate concerns the actual goals and intentions of the protests. As will be seen 
below in a discussion of discourse in U.S. newspapers and congress, the basic American 
assumption was that the protests were for democracy. This was implicit in the many 
references to “prodemocracy demonstrators.” China scholars at the time tried to explain that 
the protests in the main called for reform of the current system rather than democracy per se. 
However, many China scholars were presented by politicians and media as apologists for the 
Communist regime — something that few showed any sign of being. Historian W. J.F. Jenner 
argues that the problem is that: 
 
The perpetrators of the Peking massacre of 1989 are so obviously tyrants of a most 
repulsive kind that we tend to assume that those they crushed were not only on the 
side of the angels but also serious about representative government. The problem 
about such assumptions is that the rhetoric of democracy in protest groups within 
China in 1989, and outside China among political exiles since the slaughter is rarely 
matched by democratic behaviour.
777
 
 
Some confusion was generated for many Western observers by the fact that the protesters 
raised a replica Statue of Liberty as a symbol. However, de Crespigny argues that even with 
this: 
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it is questionable.. if the people who rallied around such a symbol had any clear idea 
what it was that they were seeking to emulate or introduce. Though they raised 
substantial questions, the symbols of democracy were really no more than a general 
expression of political protest, they were not accompanied by any coherent 
programme for national reform, and their supporters ... had no means to develop such 
a programme.
778
 
 
He goes on to conclude that the “affair at Tiananmen was simply a demonstration that went 
too far, and that the vast majority of those involved, despite good intentions, were primarily 
concerned with personal self-expression.”779 This is not to deny the tragedy of the events but 
merely to set the context within which American responses were formed. That is, the events 
in Tiananmen Square on June 4 and the following days were seen as the brutal crushing of 
popular protests for democracy by a totalitarian government It is in this context that the 
discourses of human rights detailed below took place. 
 
Human Rights in the Newspapers of 1989 
The New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times and the New Orleans Times - 
Picayune were studied from June 3 to 10, 1989. During this period the news of events in 
China was breaking in the United States. This week was selected for analysis because it 
encompassed most of the actual events in Tiananmen Square and the immediate aftermath. 
Large sections of major newspaper front pages and international news sections were devoted 
to China and to domestic and international responses to the events. Articles were selected on 
the basis of their primary focus on the United States response to the events rather than events. 
In general, the selected articles were analytical and editorial rather than descriptive. Due to 
the nature of the events in China, human rights were discussed in very concrete terms and 
usually in reference to civil and political rights rather than as abstract and general rights. 
 
Defining Human Rights in the Print Media 
Human rights were defined in the New York Times coverage almost entirely in terms of 
freedoms — of speech, expression, association and press — and of the right to security of 
person. These definitions encompassed discussions of democracy and unspecified civil and 
political rights. Other ways of talking about human rights outside the definitions in the 
UDHR included rights in the contexts of crime and the need for restraint and honesty on the 
part of a government. Human rights were also discussed in terms of modernity, capitalism 
and progress and contrasted with communism. 
 
In the Washington Post coverage of the events in China, a definition of human rights within 
the realms of civil and political rights stood out. These rights were encompassed within the 
territory of freedom — such as the right to security of person and freedom from wrongful 
interference, rights of demonstration, rights to political representation and democracy, 
assembly and freedoms of speech and press. General freedoms and individual rights also fall 
within this territory. A wide range of other ways of defining human rights was also found in 
the coverage. Ideas related to the presence of international standards made up one group of 
definitions — such as notions of crime, disorder, restraint and responsibility. Human rights 
were also treated in terms of reform, anti-communism and as hope and aspirations. 
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Human rights in the Los Angeles Times coverage of the events in Tiananmen Square were 
talked about entirely in terms of freedom — general freedoms, freedom of the press, 
assembly, security of person — and democracy and individual rights. In line with the 
newspaper coverage focus on democracy, other ways of talking about human rights 
positioned democracy as equaling peace, order, reform, progress and modernity and placed 
these opposite communism and disorder. Value definitions of human rights included ideas 
about hope, respect, restraint and the concept of shame for violating human rights. 
 
Coverage in the New Orleans Times - Picayune defined human rights very much as in the 
other newspapers examined. The idea of freedom dominated the way coverage talked about 
human rights -- freedom of assembly, individual rights, right to security of person and 
democracy. Other ways of defining rights included the legitimation of democracy and the 
positioning of stability, reform and progress opposite totalitarianism and disorder. Human 
rights were also talked about in negative terms of outrage and disappointment. 
 
Security of Person 
The right to security of person was identified as a primary human right by articles in the New 
York Times through representations of military actions in the Square as inappropriate, 
unjustified and deserving of international opprobrium. The central components of the 
violation of this right identified in the coverage were the use of force against protesters, the 
use of the military against a nation’s own citizens and the fact that the protesters were 
peaceful and unarmed. The first component was illustrated through use of terms such as 
“brutality”; “tanks used to attack pro-democracy demonstrators”; “bloodshed”; 
“slaughterers”; the “crackdown” and the “killings in Beijing”; “Overwhelming firepower and 
ruthlessness... stem savagery”; the “weekend of bloodshed”; a “violent and bloody attack on 
the demonstrators”; and “savage crackdown... bloody repression.”780 The use of the Chinese 
military against Chinese citizens was presented as an especially blatant violation of the right 
to security of person. Marlin Fitzwater, White House spokesman, presented the situation as 
being that the "Government has murdered many, many of its own citizens.”781 Other articles 
referred to the “army assault on the central square”; the notion that “Chinese should not kill 
Chinese”; a “murderous army assault on the demonstrating students” and what Secretary of 
State James Baker described as the “army of the people... used to suppress the people.”782 
 
The right to security of person and protection from wrongful interference was similarly one 
of the crucial rights identified in the Washington Post coverage of events in China. This right 
was also illustrated through the use of such negative words and phrases as “excessive force,” 
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“brutality,” “escalating violence,” “violent crackdown,” “the violence,” “wanton slaughter,” 
“loss of life,” “bloodshed,” “death, violence, killing,” “the crackdown and the slaughter,” 
“further repression and brutality,” the “massacre... in which hundreds of demonstrators were 
killed” and “murder.”783  
 
Similar to coverage in the New York Times, that in the Washington Post presented the 
violation of the right to security of person by one’s own government and military as a 
particularly egregious violation of human rights. In one article this aspect is highlighted 
through multiple references to “use of ‘excessive force’ by Chinese authorities”; “a country 
that is shooting its own people”; the “government’s ... use of force against the demonstrators” 
and the “violent crackdown by Chinese authorities.”784 Each article read about the events in 
China that week similarly repeatedly linked the notion of security of person with the 
responsibilities of the government and military. In an editorial headlined “Massacre in 
China,” this aspect of violation of rights by a government is shown to be of particular concern 
in the way human rights are identified and talked about. This is illustrated by the description 
of a “cynical and panicked Chinese leadership” responding “in a classic struggle of people 
against brute power'* and the conclusion that the events were “a massacre by a failed party 
reduced to ruling by force alone.”785 Another article reported President Bush’s concern with 
the “sensitive issue of whether the military should be used as an instrument of political 
repression.”786 
 
Definitions of human rights as security of person dominated discussions in the Los Angeles 
Times coverage. The most frequent term for the events in China and the denial of these rights 
was repression — repression of“political and economic reforms”; ’Violent repression of 
freedoms”; the headline “Bush Halts Arms Sales Over China Repression” over a description 
of a “brutal and repressive regime” ; “brutal repression” and Beijing’s “repression against the 
students.”787 Making it clear that human rights defined as security of person and freedom had 
been denied — indeed taken away — from Chinese citizens, an editorial concluded that: 
 
In the end, the old men who cling to power in China could think of no better way to 
deal with six weeks of popular clamor for change than by ordering the army to turn its 
machine guns and tanks against the protesters... A divided regime answered them first 
with patronizing equivocation, then with threats, finally with brutal repression ... For 
now, obviously the hardliners have carried the day, invoking vicious, relentless and 
shameful force in an effort to reassert unquestioned control.
788
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Similar to coverage in the New York Times and the Washington Post, the emphasis here was 
on the fact that the government and army had moved against their own citizens — and 
especially against students. This “turning its guns against the people” was portrayed as the 
ultimate repression — called the reaffirmation of “Mao Tse-tung’s dictum that power grows 
out of the barrel of a gun.”789 
 
Given the circumstances of the events in China, rights to security of person and the 
association of this with freedom of assembly were also central to definitions of human rights 
in the New Orleans Times - Picayune. Lack of security of person was illustrated by “Chinese 
troops storming the square in Beijing” and the “bloody suppression of prodemocracy 
demonstrators.”790 Emphasis was again on the role of the military in references to the army’s 
moves to “clear Tiananmen Square” and the statement that “Chinese troops swept through 
Beijing.”791 As in other newspapers, the protests were identified as for democracy — 
“students... agitating for democracy.”792 Individual rights were also included in definitions of 
rights, as shown by the statement of a professor at Louisiana State University that ‘1 have the 
right to urge our government to do something.”793 Greater emphasis than in the other 
newspapers was on local reactions to events in China through commentary from a number of 
locally based Chinese academics. 
 
Freedom (Speech, Association, Press) 
The notion of the freedoms of speech and assembly as a right were closely associated in New 
York Times coverage of this event with the right to security of person because all these rights 
were seen to be violated when the protests were crushed in Tiananmen Square. Dominating 
discussions of rights were the images of “unarmed, idealistic Chinese students,” “peaceful 
student demonstrators,” “innocent civilians” and “popular and peaceful demonstrations” — 
that is, citizens gathering to express opinions.
794
 More explicit identification of human rights 
as including speech and assembly came in such statements as George Bush’s declaration that 
the “demonstrators in Tiananmen Square were advocating basic human rights, including the 
freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom of association.”795 Bush’s statement 
regarding the “validity of the students’ aspirations” further implicitly identified speech and 
assembly as human rights.
796
 
 
Freedom of the press was identified as a basic human right in the New York Times coverage 
of events. In addition to Bush’s comments, freedom of the press was dealt with in the specific 
case of Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts to China. These broadcasts were portrayed as 
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important in transmitting accurate information to the Chinese military — what Richard 
Carson, VOA director called making “available to the Chinese military information about 
what is going on in China.”797 They were also presented as important because VOA Chinese-
language broadcasts had been jammed, and the “Chinese media have been very dishonest 
about the student demonstrations and the role of the military.”798 Thus, freedom of the press 
was not only identified as a right; American media sources were portrayed as involved in 
securing that right for the Chinese people. 
 
Implicit in descriptions of government brutality is definition of freedoms of speech and 
assembly as rights that were violated through failure to provide protection from wrongful 
interference. It is often difficult in news coverage to pull apart the different components of 
any definition of human rights. In this case, the rights to security of person, freedom from 
wrongful interference and freedoms of speech and assembly are intertwined in the ways the 
Washington Post reported on and editorialized about human rights. The notions of individual 
rights and freedom of the press — both rights specifically identified by President Bush in his 
public responses to the events in China -- are likewise interwoven throughout the 
discourse.
799
 In addition, phrases such as the “struggle for freedom,” identify freedom as a 
right without breaking it into its component parts.
800
 
 
General notions of freedom —that is, undefined uses of the term or uses of it without 
application to specific freedoms — appeared widely in the Los Angeles Times. These uses 
included such phrases as the “struggle for freedom,” “repression of freedoms” and “calls for a 
freer society.”801 More specific discussions of freedom referred to freedom of assembly and 
security of person as well as press freedom, although the former received more emphasis than 
the latter. Freedom of the press was mentioned only briefly, in a description of “calls for a 
freer press.”802 Likewise, individual rights received brief attention, mainly from reporting 
President Bush’s assertion that the rights of individuals must be recognized and his statement 
that “I view the life of every single student as important.”803 
 
Democracy 
In addition to describing protesters as unarmed and peaceful, the majority of news coverage 
and commentary in the New York Times referred to the demonstrators as “pro- democracy.” 
Thus democracy was clearly linked to other rights described as basic or essential. The 
demonstrations were described as “a peaceful statement in favor of democracy” and referred 
to as the “Chinese democracy movement.”804 President Bush linked “freedom, democracy, 
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respect, nonviolence” as essential rights and as ways for a government to treat its own 
people.
805
 
 
Democracy was seldom itself defined in Washington Post coverage, but the demonstrations 
in Tiananmen Square were inextricably tied to a perceived desire for democracy on the part 
of the Chinese and this was treated as a fundamental right of people. The words 
“demonstrators” and “prodemocracy’* appeared together many times, and other references 
included such phrases as a “hunger for democracy,” “students and workers asking for 
democracy” and the ‘Victims and their demands for democracy.”806 In no case was 
democracy identified as a human right, but the linkage was implicit that a desire for 
democracy was an universal value and that it was a right being denied to the citizens of 
China. 
 
Los Angeles Times articles referred to the “pro-democracy protesters,” “prodemocracy forces 
in China,” “pro-democracy demonstrators,” “pro-democracy movement,” the “student-led 
movement for democracy” and the “student democracy movement”807 President Bush in 
particular emphasized democracy as the goal of the protests with his calls to work for 
“restraint and for human rights and for democracy” and his assertion that the “forces of 
democracy are going to overcome these unfortunate events  in Tian An Men Square.”808 The 
editorial concluded that “[i]n China, now as before, there is no real political alternative to the 
party.”809 
 
Undefined Political and Civil Rights 
Unspecified civil and political rights were also part of the definitions of human rights used in 
the New York Times coverage of events in China. A spokesperson from Freedom House 
talked about ‘Violations of political rights and civil liberties” without elaboration.810 Senator 
Jesse Helms cited China’s “historic repression of human rights.”811 Both Helms and 
Representative Mickey Edwards of Oklahoma described Chinese citizens’ yearnings for what 
Edwards called the “same freedoms we in the West take for granted.”812 
 
Standards of Behavior 
The notion of violation of human rights as a crime against people and society was important 
in New York Times coverage of events in China. Identifying violation of rights as a crime 
implies that certain standards have been established that must be met by a society. Thus, what 
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is identified as having constituted criminal behavior is important in studying notions of 
human rights. As discussed above, one of the criminal behaviors identified in this newspaper 
was government use of violence against its own people. Under the headline “Deng Xiaoping 
Defiles His Legacy With Blood,” editorial comments clearly laid this crime at the feet of 
Deng Xiaoping.
813
 The same editorial also referred to the crimes of the Soviet Union and 
Nicaragua in violating human rights. 
 
One of the standards portrayed as transgressed by the Chinese government in New York 
Times coverage was restraint President Bush repeatedly urged a policy of restraint and 
“mutual restraint, nonviolence and dialogue” on the part of the government.814 At other times. 
Bush talked about the driver of a tank as having exercised restraint; having seen “some 
exercising restraint” on the part of the protesters; calling for the government and protesters to 
“continue to show the restraint that many of you have shown”; arguing that “the army did 
show restraint... and they showed restraint for a long time; and calling for people to “continue 
to work for restraint and for human rights and for democracy.”815 Bush’s emphasis on 
restraint was echoed in other New York Times coverage, including an article listing military 
units sympathetic to the students who refused to shoot at students and to units that obeyed 
orders.
816
 Affiliated with the idea of restraint was the notion that a government should be 
honest with its citizens, including not attempting to cover up violations of human rights.
817
 
 
The existence of international standards of behavior was an important concept to some of the 
other ways in which human rights were defined in the Washington Post coverage. Standards 
were outlined explicitly in the reporting of President Bush’s statements about “norms of 
behavior that are accepted internationally in terms of armed people don’t shoot down 
unarmed students.”818 An editorial also referred to the “reasonable standard” of nonviolence 
and restraint that the government failed to meet.
819
 Implicit acknowledgment of standards 
came through the use of value-laden terms, such as “outrage” and “unacceptable,” to describe 
the events in China.
820
45 Identification of the acts of the Chinese government as crimes also 
implicitly defined human rights as international standards or norms of behavior, as did 
discussions of disorder, responsibility and restraint — all terms from the domain of morality 
and therefore value-laden. Violations of human rights were linked with disorder — the “abyss 
of terror, spreading unrest or even incipient civil war,” or what was identified as “ugly and 
anachronistic” compared with “nonviolence and restraint”821 Human rights were additionally 
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associated with the notion of responsibility by discussions of “responsible elements” and the 
editorial statement that “a road back to responsibility remains open.”822 
 
Definitions of human rights in the Los Angeles Times coverage also appeared in value terms, 
using the concepts of shame, respect restraint and the idea of hope — ideas related to the 
existence of standards of behavior. Editorial and news articles presented the argument that the 
government in China ought to feel ashamed of its actions because of its use of “vicious, 
relentless and shameful force” in what was called a “morally odious action.”823 Other terms, 
such as “outrageous” and “appalled,” emphasized the notion of shame.824 The idea of shame 
was contrasted with the notion of respect — in phrases such as calls to “respect the rights of 
the student protesters,” “respecting the urge for democracy” and “respect for the rights of 
those who disagree.”825 Shame was also contrasted with the ideas of restraint — especially as 
emphasized in the public statements of President Bush — and of upholding the “hopes and 
aspirations” of citizens.826 
 
Violations of human rights were also discussed by the New Orleans Times - Picayune in 
terms of emotions — outrage (suggesting an agreed-upon standard of behavior), events 
“followed in horror by people around the world” and reports of President Bush’s 
disappointment in “the course of events since he visited China in February.”827 
 
Reform and Anti-Communism 
New York Times coverage linked support of human rights values with democracy and linked 
violations of human rights with Communism. Tied to this was the argument that human 
rights, and especially democracy, were inherently linked with the values of modernity, 
capitalism and progress. One editorial made this connection clearly, saying, “Economic 
opening brought increased contact with the outside world and nurtured yearnings for 
democratic reform as w ell... Mr. Deng has defiled his reputation and 10 years of leading the 
way to an educated, modernized China.”828 This same editorial argued that democracy was 
the “necessary political corollary of his [Deng’s] economic plans.”829 President Bush made a 
similar argument, saying that “as people have commercial incentive, whether it’s in China or 
in other totalitarian systems, the move toward democracy becomes more inexorable.”830 
 
This linkage of human rights with progress and modernity was pervasive. Representative 
Stephen Solarz described Deng as the “butcher of Beijing” in contrast to his previously 
expressed opinion of him as a leader “who might have gone down in history as a 
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modernizer.”831 Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney lamented that Deng had presided over the 
attacks on students, saying that Deng had “been the advocate of reform; the man who really 
was aggressively pursuing the modernization of China.”832 An unidentified analyst argued 
that “there will be change. The demands made on the system and its leaders cannot be met 
with an authoritarian regime. China will have to be put back together in a new way.”833 
Another article reported on banners carried by student protesters in New York that read 
“China [,] do not kill your future,” implying derailment of progress toward modernization.834 
 
The Washington Post coverage of events in China also identified human rights with reform 
and the nation’s move away from communism. George Bush talked about returning to the 
“path of political and economic reform and conditions of stability,” and this was echoed in an 
editorial describing pre-Tiananmen China as “edging from a generally successful, party-
directed economic reform into a careful and also party-directed experiment with mild 
political reform.”835 Senator Jesse Helms emphasized that the attacks were ordered by the 
“communist Government of China,” and Trade Representative Carla Hills voiced her opinion 
that “people have... tremendous doubts about their earlier stated opinions with respect to 
China’s forward momentum, its liberalization.”836 James Baker also talked about China’s 
“tragic step backward.”837 Human rights were also tied to the ideals and hopes of people 
aspiring to more freedom.
838
 
 
Alongside citing democracy as central to the definition of human rights, the Los Angeles 
Tunes coverage closely tied a number of other definitions of human rights to the notion of 
democracy. Democracy was equated with peace, order, reform, progress and modernity and 
positioned opposite communism and disorder. The terms democracy and human rights were 
often used as two sides of the same coin.
839
 In contrast, communism was portrayed as the 
opposite of the values and ideals of democracy. Senator Jesse Helms made the clearest 
distinction between the two sides, saying that there existed “division in this world, 
communism and freedom” and continuing, “You cannot deal with rattlesnakes, and you 
cannot deal with Communist governments.”840 
 
One example of the way democracy was tied to the notions mentioned above was the already 
mentioned identification of the protests with pursuit of democracy -- although one editorial 
conceded that it was “something of an overstatement to describe the Beijing protests as ‘pro-
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democracy.’ But unmistakably they were pro-freedom.”841 Coverage also identified popular 
calls for reform.
842
 Commentary in the newspaper further identified the purposes of the 
protests as being “only modest legal and political reform s... triggered by frustration and 
anger over economic and political conditions”; there were “calls for a freer press, for curbs on 
rampant official corruption and nepotism, for the regime to pay more attention to what the 
students and the masses want.”843 Thus, reform was implicitly tied to democracy in 
commentary on the events. More explicit linkages were made in an editorial that argued that 
“economic growth and modernization” were needed and that “economic subsistence is no 
longer accepted as enough, neither is a political and intellectual life limited by totalitarian 
proscriptions.”844 The opposite of growth and modernization was portrayed as “crippling state 
controls” of a “hard-line Communist government”845 
 
Violations of human rights were laid squarely at the feet of an “aging circle of communist 
imperialists,” by writers for the New Orleans Times - Picayune.846 Democracy was positioned 
opposite totalitarianism — called “terror-enforced ideology” and “tyranny” versus 
democracy, power-sharing, “sensitivity to the public” and other reforms.847 Similarly, 
stability, restraint and reform were positioned opposite a “chaotic situation.”848 
 
Linkages Between Human Rights and Foreign Policy in the Print Media 
All of the newspapers studied connected human rights to foreign policy in a number of ways. 
In all of the coverage, a tension was portrayed as existing between idealism and pragmatism 
in the incorporation of human rights into foreign policy. Discussions of this tension asked the 
question of where the line can be drawn between the idealism of human rights morality and 
the pragmatism of everyday international relations. However, a broad consensus existed in 
print media coverage of the events in Tiananmen Square that human rights concerns were a 
valid part of foreign policy; that governments (particularly the United States government) 
have a responsibility to respond to other countries’ violations of human rights — the world 
community needs to pay attention, and respond, to events taking place in other countries; that 
the United States relationship with other countries is, or needs to be, based on each nations’ 
adherence to standards of human rights; and that human rights are preeminent in international 
relations — and override concerns about sovereignty. 
 
New York Times coverage contained these notions under the overarching concept of 
responsibility. Firstly, the idea was presented that governments and their leaders have 
responsibilities to each other and to a world community to pay attention, and respond, to 
events taking place in other countries. This responsibility was manifested through 
condemning what were perceived as inappropriate actions on the part of another government. 
Basing policy decisions on the human rights record of a country was portrayed as another 
way this responsibility could be manifested — whether through traditional diplomatic actions 
or economic and military sanctions. This idea existed in The idea of sovereignty undermines 
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this idea of international responsibility while that of the existence  of international standards 
underlines it. 
 
Although the Washington Post coverage also stressed the tension between idealism and 
pragmatism in foreign policy, it focused much more on justification of the role of human 
rights in foreign policy. Three separate but related ideas were identified in the news coverage 
and editorial comments. One was that foreign policy should be made on the basis of the 
human rights record of a nation. Related to this was the idea that the United States’ 
relationship with a country should be dependent on that country’s human rights record. Also 
associated with these ideas was the notion that human rights should take precedence over 
discussion of other issues in international situations. 
 
The Los Angeles Times coverage of events in China emphasized three sets of linkages 
between human rights and foreign policy. The first was the same as found in other 
newspapers — tension between idealism and pragmatism in foreign policy. The second 
concerned the idea of international standards and individual nation’s responsibility to live up 
to and support those standards. The final set of ideas related to the notions that the 
relationship between the United States and China was based on adherence to certain 
standards of human rights and that American foreign policy should respond to violations of 
these rights. 
 
Attention in the New Orleans Times - Picayune coverage focused on the propositions that the 
Sino-American relationship was dependent on human rights standards; that foreign policy 
decisions should be made in response to human rights conditions in other countries and that 
tensions existed between idealism and pragmatism in the implementation of the previous two 
propositions. However, attention also focused on two further ideas — that human rights 
concerns override sovereignty and, linked with this, that a world community exists, the 
members of which have the responsibility to intervene in situations where human rights are 
being violated. 
 
Before discussing these ideas (which are all closely related to each other and in many cases 
difficult to separate), the tension between idealism and pragmatism in foreign policy needs 
attention. The tension emerged from establishment of the situation in China as requiring 
response — but a cautious rather than “precipitous” response.849 Differences existed in the 
New York Times coverage between perceptions of the goal of different American actions in 
response to the events in Tiananmen Square. President Bush and his administration saw the 
goal as being to “encourage” the Chinese government to exercise restraint in dealing with the 
students and “rebuking any use of force,” while congress saw the role of sanctions as being to 
“punish Beijing.”850 While there appeared to be consensus that international standards did 
exist and that morality had a role to play in foreign policy decisions, differences existed as to 
how to incorporate idealism into foreign policy and whether this served the best interests of 
the United States. An editorial outlined the role of morality in foreign policy, declaring that 
“America’s conscience cries out... It would unconscionably contort America’s principles to 
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continue business as usual with an unstable leadership which has so discredited and disabled 
itself.” The editorial added a description of American feelings as “revulsion.”851 
 
Among those who opposed excessive reliance on moral outrage in foreign policy was former 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger — the master of Realpolitik — whom the New York 
Times reported as having “warned that the President and Secretary  of State ‘cannot afford 
emotional outbursts’ in the present situation. The United States must be very careful about 
entering a diplomatic ‘antagonism’ with China that could give the Soviet Union a ‘free ride’ 
in influence in Asia.”852 An editorial gave similar advice, but for slightly different reasons, 
warning that “conditions in China are too fluid to support impulsive policy lurches. The most 
prudent course is to suspend official cooperation until the political situation sorts out.”853 
However, the editorial also warned against inaction because the United States might become 
associated, “in the eyes of the next generation of Chinese leaders, with Mr. Deng’s 
crimes.”854 President Bush clearly wanted to avoid making decisions based on emotions that 
did not take into account the United States’ long term interests — which many commentators 
saw as staying engaged with China. He argued forcefully that: 
 
I want to see us stay involved and continue to work for restraint and for human rights 
and for democracy. And then down the road, we have enormous commonality of 
interest with China, but it will not be the same under a brutal and repressive regime... 
So I would argue with those who want to do something more flamboyant, because I 
happen to feel that this relationship is vital to the United States of America...
855
 
 
Congress in most cases wanted a tough U.S. stance toward China — a stance tougher than 
Bush was willing to take. An article described the “pressure which was mounting in congress 
from both liberals and conservatives for a firm American reaction on behalf of the student 
‘pro-democracy’ movement” and “Congressional calls for more severe penalties.”856 A New 
York Times editorial supported Bush, arguing the “best way to honor the martyred students, 
and their survivors, is not to turn America’s back self-righteously on China’s convulsions.”857 
The conclusion was that Bush and his administration seemingly believed that the correct 
balance between idealism and pragmatism had been reached, since, “If those favoring change 
succeed, they will remember the Bush Administration for having materially and verbally 
demonstrated support But until then, a crack in the door has been left to the existing 
leadership to signal if they moderate their behavior, some measure of good relations can be 
maintained.”858 
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The situation in China was presented in Washington Post news coverage as one that required 
choices between different responses — what one article called the “difficult choice the U.S. 
government faces.”859 This same article described these choices: “While it supports pro-
democracy efforts, the government through a succession of administrations has worked to 
promote improved Sino-American relations that Bush ... would not want to see fall apart on 
his watch.”860 Editorial commentary noted that “Americans find themselves hard put to 
define a policy that expresses the new outrage as well as the factor of national interest built 
up laboriously over the years.”861 The idea of productivity is useful for understanding the 
pragmatic viewpoint — that it seemed foolish to waste what was called the “major American 
investment in political and strategic cooperation with China.”862 Both President Bush and 
Republican Senator Warren Rudman (N.H.) termed what they deemed as excessive reaction 
“counterproductive.”863 
 
The position of the idealists as represented in the Los Angeles Times was that the United 
States should take immediate “stem action” and that “sanctions against China were necessary 
if only for their symbolic action.”864 The position of the pragmatists (such as Henry 
Kissinger) was that a relationship with China was needed to balance the influence of the 
Soviet Union in Asia. A further concern of the pragmatists was that even so-called “punitive 
sanctions... held out little hope that such action would force a halt to the crackdown.”865 
President Bush’s concern about maintaining a link with China was represented as his 
“seeking to walk a narrow line between his support of the demonstrating students and his 
desire to maintain relations with the government of the world’s most populous nation.”866 
Both the idealist position (held generally within congress) and the pragmatist position (held 
by Bush and several so-called China experts) were extensively represented in the Los Angeles 
Times' news and editorial coverage.
867
 
 
As in the other newspapers in this study, the New Orleans Times - Picayune coverage made 
clear that, while human rights concerns were seen as playing a valid role in foreign policy, 
tension did exist in the implementation of morally-based policy. The position of so-called 
foreign policy pragmatists was represented through such terms as “cautious,” “diplomatic,” 
“careful,” “calm,” “stable”; on the other hand, calls by the idealists for a stronger United 
States response were called “emotional,” “abrupt” and “precipitous.”868 The editorial stance 
was that “cautious sympathy” was the best approach since “a less threatened tyranny is a less 
dangerous tyranny, at least as far as military threats go.”869 The editorial stance also endorsed 
Bush’s approach of America looking to “its own interest as well as that of a champion of 
democracy.”870 
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In all these discussions of balancing idealism and pragmatism, what was not in question was 
that notions of human rights had a role to play in the making of foreign policy. Whatever the 
response being considered, it was clear in news coverage that a response to the events in 
China was needed — whether condemnation, sanctions or other actions. Editorial 
commentary in the Washington Post outlined this perspective, saying: 
 
it is clear the American policy requires more than appeals for Chinese nonviolence 
and restraint. China has repudiated the hope invested in that reasonable standard and 
has established a new requirement for American policy to reflect the reality of a 
massacre by a failed party reduced to ruling by force alone.
871
 
 
Los Angeles Times coverage relied heavily upon the notion of the presence of international 
standards and indeed the idea that the attacks on students constituted the crossing of a clear 
moral line. An editorial used such terms as “appalled” and “morally odious” to depict this 
crossing and suggested that violation of such international standards would be associated with 
great costs to China, including its internal stability, “international standing” and “prospects 
for future development"
872
 Use of these value terms and others, such as “repugnant” 
implicitly assumes the presence of moral standards and the need for such standards to play a 
role in foreign policy.
873
 That such standards were seen as universal is illustrated through 
allocation of responsibility to respond to the violations not only to the United States but to the 
United Nations and concerned individuals around the world. 
 
International organizations, such as Amnesty International and Freedom House, have played 
a role in establishing the principle that nations have responsibilities towards each other. In the 
case of the events in China, the New York Times reported appeals from Freedom House for 
the United States to “condemn China” for its actions.874 Demonstrations around the world 
also called for world leaders to “take a strong stand against the violence.”875 The New York 
Times coverage made clear that it was appropriate (and expected) for international leaders to 
make statements regarding the violence. Quoted were statements by Western heads of 
government, the Pope and Asian leaders; there were also comments on the fact that the 
“Soviet Union did not comment” and that “China’s Asian neighbors were slower to react.”876 
The coverage also emphasized personal contacts between heads of government including 
attempts by President Bush to contact Chinese leaders -- his statement that he called “on the 
Chinese leadership publicly as I have in private channels” as well as his failure to “get 
anyone to answer his calls” — and exchanges between Bush and Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher of Great Britain to “discuss the Western response.”877 Members of the president’s 
administration also made clear that in the United States it was considered appropriate to pay 
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attention to events in other countries. White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said the 
administration “certainly watch[s] these developments with grave concern.”878 
 
The New Orleans Times - Picayune coverage paid more attention to the notions of world 
community and responsibility in international relations than found in the other newspapers. 
The main component of this notion was the argument that “in today’s world such things 
[human rights violations] can be neither concealed nor disguised.”879 Given this, the 
perspective was presented that members of this world community had a responsibility to 
respond to violations of human rights that over-rode the concerns of sovereignty. Although 
all members of the world community were held to be responsible, the president of the United 
States was held to higher expectations. For example, members of the New Orleans 
community were “asking President Bush to step in and ‘stop the massacre’”; pleading for 
Bush’s intervention; urging Bush to “immediately exert moral leadership” and condemning 
him for “being too soft” in his actions.880 
 
In addition to connecting human rights and foreign policy through the idea that nations have 
responsibilities towards each other, news coverage presented the perspective that the two can 
be tied together through basing policy decisions on the human rights record  of another 
country. Almost every article in the New York Times about the events in China and the United 
States’ response to them seemed based on the assumption that diplomatic actions and 
sanctions of various kinds were an appropriate response to human rights violations. However, 
a fine line was identified as existing between the valid imposition of sanctions and such 
actions a s commenting on internal affairs, which - in the words of an unnamed American 
official ~ “would be seen as interfering in the internal affairs of China, and that would 
probably not be appropriate for us to do.”881 
 
A whole range of foreign policy actions was identified by various individuals and agencies as 
appropriate responses, including recalling the American ambassador, suspension of American 
aid to China, halting arras sales, extending the visas of Chinese students studying in the 
United States, acting against China in such international organizations as the United Nations 
and various other symbolic gestures.
882
 President Bush clearly linked violations of human 
rights and American policy decisions, saying that he was ordering particular actions, being 
“mindful of... complexities and yet of the necessity to strongly and clearly express our 
condemnation of the events of recent days.”883 He went on to say, “We can’t have totally 
normal relations unless there is a recognition of the validity of the students’ aspirations.”884 
 
A response was required by the United States to events in China because of the proposition 
that the relationship between the two countries was based on certain human rights standards. 
This proposition was illustrated in the Washington Post coverage by President Bush’s early 
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statement of hope that “China will rapidly return to the path of political and economic reform 
and conditions of stability so that this relationship, so important to both our peoples, can 
continue its growth.”885 Similarly illustrative was Representative Solarz’s widely reported 
comment that the “United States will not continue to conduct business as usual with a 
government that engages in the wanton slaughter of its own people.”886 Other members of 
congress said that relations with China had been “dealt a bloody blow” and that events 
“cannot help but affect relations between the U.S. and China.”887 Bush later made stronger 
comments, suggesting that “We can’t have totally normal relations unless there’s a 
recognition... of the validity of the student’s aspirations” — what was called in the 
Washington Post coverage a sign that “violence may doom a budding commercial and 
diplomatic Sino-American relationship.”888 
 
Linked to the presence of international moral standards is the proposition that the relationship 
between the United States and China is dependent on China adhering to these standards. 
Close attention was paid in the Los Angeles Times coverage both to congressional statements 
and those of Bush about linking reform and liberalization in China to continued good Sino-
American relations.
889
 The simple assumption that continued violation of human rights in 
China would prompt further United States moves against China made clear that a continued 
relationship depended on adherence to certain standards.
890
 Not only was the relationship 
portrayed as dependent on adherence to human rights standards by China, but the United 
States was portrayed as willing to enforce such adherence — or to punish disregard of these 
standards. This notion was illustrated by the argument that the “blatant and bloody nature of 
the Chinese action represented a human rights violation too horrific to be addressed with the 
kind of special treatment that has become typical of U.S. foreign policy toward China" and 
that different policies were in the works, including sanctions and verbal condemnations.
891
 
Senator Edwards argued that “diplomatic messages of disapproval are a pretty puny reaction 
to the murdering of innocent civilians... the Defense Department, the State department and 
the Commerce Department ought to act immediately, in unison, to put some substance into 
the U.S. condemnations."
892
 Senator Helms made this linkage clear by his announcement that 
congress would pass legislation “that would cut off all trade, investment and financial 
dealings between the United States and China unless the Chinese government halts its use of 
violence to quell the protests.”893 Further illustration of this linkage was the statement that 
“U.S. actions will be affected by how far Beijing pushes its repression against the students 
who led China’s movement for democracy.”894 The position of congress as represented by 
Republican Senator William Cohen was that the United States was not attempting to tell 
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China what to do but was simply expressing the “views of the American people clearly, 
unequivocally, unambiguously.”895 
 
In presenting the proposition that the Sino-American relationship depended on human rights 
standards. New Orleans Times - Picayune coverage relied on the same sources in other 
newspapers examined -- the statements of President Bush, administration officials and 
members of congress that the violent actions of the Chinese government would result in a 
more strained relationship with the United States.
896
 This proposition was closely tied to the 
idea that foreign policy decisions should be made in response to violations of these standards. 
This linkage was clearly illustrated by such statements as “President Bush suspended U.S. 
arms sales to China on Monday to protest the military’s bloody weekend crackdown, 
declaring Chinese leaders must learn ‘it’s not going to be business as usual.”897 An editorial 
comment added an endorsement of Bush’s actions, saying, “[T]he Chinese brutality requires 
an immediate, specific response, and President Bush hit on an appropriate preliminary 
one.”898 
 
The final notion related to the role of human rights in foreign policy was the suggestion that 
violations of human rights were matters of primary concern and should take precedence in 
international relations. In this case, the proposition was specifically related to the suggestion 
that the events in Tiananmen Square on June 4 should affect China’s bid to join the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) -- that violation of human rights could be linked to 
a lack of modernization and liberalization that might preclude membership in international 
organizations.
899
 
 
Human Rights and American Identity in the Print Media 
Coverage in all four of the newspapers rested on the implicit assumption that concern for 
human rights was linked in a special way to United States identity. Simply describing the 
relationship between China and the United States as dependent on adherence to human rights 
standards made this connection. The imposition of sanctions as a result of perceived Chinese 
violations of standards suggested certain assumptions in American ideas of human rights — 
firstly, that human rights are important and, secondly, that the United States has a 
responsibility to share and/or enforce those ideas. Outside of these basic assumptions, several 
other connections were made in the individual newspapers. 
 
The New York Times coverage linked notions of human rights with specifically American 
ideals and what one article called “America’s conscience.”900 An editorial suggested that 
“America has no business equipping forces like those who carried out the butchery in 
Tiananmen.”901 Coverage also linked concern about the specific case of Tiananmen with 
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ethnic identity and values — noting the thousands of American Chinese protesting on the 
streets of American cities, “many of them with relatives in China.”902 However, the protests 
in various American cities were linked to Chinese identity -- rather than American identity — 
with descriptions, such as “the crowd, composed mainly of people of Chinese origin,” 
Chinese banners with Chinese “ideographs,” and interviews with Chinese students.903 
 
The argument was also presented that the protests in China were a result of Chinese contact 
with the United States — that the spread of American values of democracy and freedom had 
led to the desire for greater freedom in China. President Bush stated succinctly at a news 
conference that the “budding of democracy which we have seen in recent weeks owes much 
to the relationship we have developed since 1972.” 904 Bush overtly linked human rights with 
American values and identity, saying: 
 
The demonstrators in Tiananmen Square were advocating basic human rights... These 
are goals we support around the world. These are freedoms that are enshrined in both 
the U.S. Constitution and the Chinese Constitution. Throughout the world we stand 
with those who seek greater freedom and democracy. This is the strongly felt view of 
my Administration, of our Congress, and most important, of the American people... 
this relationship is vital to the United States of America, and so is our adherence to 
democracy and our encouragement for those who are willing to hold high the banner 
of democracy.
905
 
 
Articles in the Washington Post also linked events in China with American influence. It did 
so by focusing attention on two aspects of American influence — commercial contact with 
China that, in the words of Secretary of State Baker, “for the most part, have led toward 
openness,” and historical example, represented through the student protesters’ use of the 
symbol of the Statue of Liberty.
906
 Human rights were additionally connected with American 
ideals through editorial use of value-terms, such as “revulsion” and “disgust,” to describe 
American responses to the events in China.
907
 Americans in general, and American 
lawmakers “at both ends of the political spectrum,” were portrayed as deeply concerned by 
human rights violations.
908
 
 
The Los Angeles Times coverage both implicitly and explicitly linked human rights and 
American values, in addition to the connections found in other newspapers. Explicit linkages 
included President Bush’s statement that “We are strongly committed to democracy around 
the world... It is the underpinning of our being as a nation.”909 A similarly explicit linkage 
appeared in a later article that said Deng Xiaoping had engaged in “violent repression of 
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freedoms that lie at the core of American values.”910 Other linkages implicitly connected 
American values and human rights by indicating widespread support for actions against the 
Chinese government, such as the reference to a Senate resolution condemning China that 
“passed by a rare 100-0 vote” and a description of shopkeepers coming out of their stores in 
Los Angeles to applaud a human rights demonstration.
911
  The Statue of Liberty was again 
used as a symbolic reference to American values in a description of New York Mayor Ed 
Koch calling for United Nations action against China “with the Statue of Liberty in the 
background.”912 Other descriptions of the events in China used such terms as “repugnant,” 
“murdered” and “disturbing,” which indicated assumptions about American values. Outside 
the assumption that American values dictated the relationship with China, no explicit 
connections between human rights and American identity were found in the New Orleans 
Times - Picayune coverage. In fact, reference was made to the fact that the events in China 
had horrified people around the world, not just in the United States.
913
 However, an editorial 
did identify the United States as a “champion of democracy,” thus linking American identity 
with one aspect of human rights.
914
 
 
Domains of Human Rights in the Print Media 
As might be expected in news coverage of a specific case of brutal violation of human rights, 
the domains of discourse were largely political and moral, although several of the newspapers 
also talked about human rights in the economic domain. The New York Times coverage 
largely talked about human rights in terms of civil and political rights -- of assembly, security 
of person, democracy and press, among others. Human rights in the political domain were 
discussed in the Washington Post coverage solely in terms of democracy, security of person, 
and various freedoms -- such as press and individual rights. Heavy emphasis was laid in the 
Los Angeles Times coverage on ideas related to political rights, such as assembly, democracy, 
security of person and descriptions of the violence and repression in Tiananmen Square. 
Human rights were discussed in the New Orleans Times - Picayune coverage simply in terms 
of political and civil freedoms, political legitimacy and repression of freedoms. 
 
The domain of morality was apparent in the New York Times coverage also through links of 
American concerns for the Chinese people with the notion of conscience, principles and 
values as well as in such value terms as “revulsion,” “outrage and anger,” “repugnant,” and 
identifications of Deng Xiaoping as the “Butcher of Beijing1* and Prime Minister Li Peng as 
a “murderer.”915 Morality also was clear in such phrases as “the right thing to do” and “it is 
not right.”916 The domain of general morality in the Washington Post coverage appeared in 
value terms, such as “deplorable,” “excessive,” “revulsion” and “repugnant,” and in 
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assumptions of the existence of international standards and norms of behavior.
917
 The moral 
domain appeared in descriptions of the events in the Los Angeles Times as “morally odious” 
and “shameful,” as well as through description of American responses as “appalled,” and 
finding the events “repugnant” and “disturbing.”918 In the New Orleans Times - Picayune 
coverage, discussions of American “moral leadership” and the United States standing for 
“something” occurred in a discourse of morality.919 Description of American outrage and 
shock at the “morally unthinkable” acts of the Chinese government similarly places 
discussions of human rights in the domain of morality.
920
 
 
Human rights also were discussed in New York Times coverage in ways fitting the economic 
domain by linkage of development and modernity with political freedom and democracy and 
explication of the perceived link between capitalism, freedom and democracy.
921
 Economics 
were mentioned in the Washington Post coverage only in terms  of economic reform being 
linked to political reform.
922
 The economic domain was incorporated into discussions of 
human rights by writers in the Los Angeles Times through linking economic and social 
progress and modernization with the provision ofpolitical rights.
923
 
 
Symbols of Human Rights Discourse in the Print Media 
All of the newspapers studied set up opposing symbols to represent differences between the 
provision of human rights and their denial. In the specific case of China, ideas associated 
with change and progress were prevalent in discussion of human rights in the print media. In 
the New York Times coverage, progress was represented as a linear process from a closed 
totalitarian society towards an open democratic society. Democracy was talked about in terms 
of the “process of democratization” and the “move to democracy,” which is portrayed as 
“inexorable.”924 In a similar vein, democracy was also represented as a “genie” that could not 
be put back into the bottle.
925
 The ideals of the democratic society were portrayed as “non-
violence, restraint and dialogue.”926 Resistance was identified as a virtue connected with 
change and progress in the sense that exposure to ideas of freedom was represented as 
bringing the ability to continue pushing for change and resisting repression.
927
 Human rights 
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were associated with change, progress, struggle, resistance and non-violence. Denial of 
human rights was represented through metaphors of Hitler, Nazism and fascism, repression 
and violence, crimes, dirt and destruction, and the unraveling of society through adherence to 
communism. 
 
In a similar manner, opposing symbols in the Washington Post coverage conveyed ideas 
about human rights. For example, reform and order were positioned opposite disorder; good 
relationships versus bad relationships; democracy versus totalitarianism and symbolic versus 
concrete statements. Reform was closely tied to order and “normality” as well as the idea of 
enlightenment.
928
 In contrast disorder was represented as “great uncertainty, tension and 
distraction,” “ugly and chaotic” and as “ugly and anachronistic.”929 The relationships 
between the United States and China was presented in dichotomous terms as either 
constructive and positive or as tenuous and a “matter of ‘great concern.’”930 Similarly, 
democracy — the “new passion” and “hunger” — was presented in opposition to the 
“mysteries of totalitarian rule.”931 Democracy and the concern for individual rights was also 
countered by depiction of the “suppression,” “bloody confrontation” and related synonyms 
for brutality and repression — “violence,” “massacre,” “crackdown,” “murder'* and 
“killing.”932 A further dichotomy between symbolic statements and clear declarations 
included on one side, “rhetorical protest” and a “symbol of American disgust,” and on the 
other, “direct signals,” “openly said” and “deploring... but making plain.” 933 
 
Although the Los Angeles Times carried more reports on American responses to the events in 
China than did the other newspapers, a narrower range of symbols was found in discussions 
of human rights. As in the coverage of the other newspapers, several ideas were positioned as 
binary opposites. Progress and order were positioned opposite chaos and disorder. Progress 
was linked with development, reforms, change and openness.
934
 Depiction of the protection 
of citizens and settled conditions were associated with the “restoration of order.”935 In 
contrast, chaos and disorder were linked with the bloodshed and turmoil of the crackdown 
and with upheaval.
936
 Brutality and violence — “blatant and bloody” crimes and 
“government-ordered brutality” — were further positioned against the “core of American 
values.”937 Democracy was positioned opposite the notions of a police state, totalitarian 
government, “wave of repression,” “secrecy, distortions and lies,” power struggles between 
hardliners and “crippling state controls.”938 
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Coverage in the New Orleans Times - Picayune, as in the other newspapers studied, 
positioned various symbols and ideas associated with human rights opposite symbols 
associated with the violation of human rights. Non-violence was positioned opposite 
violence; order opposite disorder; democracy opposite imperialism and invalid government 
versus valid government. The “path of peace,” “non-violent tactics” and “nonviolent means” 
were symbolically placed opposite depiction of violence as “bloody suppression,” 
“murdering” and a “bloody blow.”939 Order was associated with political and economic 
reform and stability and progress — as well as being compared with the disorder of 
repression and violence.
940
 Democracy was represented by “popular and peaceful 
demonstrations,” “peaceful national uprising” and “popularly supported pragmatism” versus 
the imperialism, dictatorship and “tenor-enforced ideology” of Chinese hardliners.941 Linked 
with this was the image of a valid government — defined as democratically elected — versus 
a government rendered invalid by “violence against its people.”942 
 
In other ways of talking about human rights the New York Times coverage represented denial 
of human rights through ideas and images related to historical examples of repression, 
including references to Hitler, Nazi swastikas and descriptions of students carrying posters 
portraying Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese leaders in “fascist garb.”943 The metaphors of 
shackles was used to depict the communist government of China, and its violent repression 
was represented by images of blood, bloodstains, butchery, tyranny, executioners and 
massacres compared to “that nice fuzzy China of panda bears.”944 Chinese society was 
described as unraveling as a result of such blatant violations of human rights.
945
 Violent 
repression was also presented in classical terms of folly and tragedy as well as in modem 
legal terms as crimes.
946
 Metaphors of dirt and destruction were also associated with 
violations of human rights, including depiction of Deng as having “defiled his reputation,” 
“poisoning his legacy” and as having become “discredited and disabled.”947  
 
Other symbols linked with human rights in the Washington Post coverage were the Statue of 
Liberty, crime — identified as “wanton slaughter'’ — and the related need to punish the 
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perpetrators of crimes.
948
 Topographic metaphors depicted violation of human rights as the 
“abyss of terror” and adherence to human rights standards as the “road back to 
responsibility.”949 Across all of the Washington Post coverage a wide range of emotional 
language described American responses to violations of human rights, including anger, 
outrage, “deeply deplored,” unacceptable, American “sympathy and support” for the Chinese, 
revulsion, disgust and disappointment.
950
 
 
The Washington Post coverage included a final extended metaphor used by Senator Jesse 
Helms. Helms described the Communist government as “rattlesnakes,” saying, “There is no 
such thing as a moderate Communist government. They are all rattlesnakes and they will turn 
around and bite you when the occasion arises.”951 In contrast respect for human rights was 
represented through the notion of restraint and respect.
952
 
 
Attribution of Agency in Foreign Policy in the Print Media 
During the time period of study, the New York Times coverage assigned agency to a wider 
range of individuals and organizations than that in all the newspapers. This is so whether one 
considers participation in foreign policy or responsibility for incorporation of human rights 
concerns into foreign policy. The greatest amount of agency in any aspect of foreign policy 
was attributed to the president and his administration, particularly the Secretary of State and 
the State Department The president clearly concurred with this. He responded during his 
news conference on the American response to events in China to questions about 
congressional pressure for increased criticism and tougher sanctions by saying, “I’ve told you 
what I am going to do. I’m the President I set the foreign policy objectives and actions taken 
by the Executive Branch.”953 Former administration officials, such as Henry Kissinger and 
former members of the National Security Council, were also assigned agency both in general 
foreign policy and in the incorporation of human rights concerns, as were other experts 
outside the administration, such as academics.
954
 Other parties with agency in the making of 
foreign policy included congress in general, and specific congresspeople, heads of 
government of other nations, diplomatic representatives, and the United Nations (specifically 
recommendations by the Human Rights Commission and Security Council). The American 
people were also given a measure of agency through having supported the development of a 
relationship with China over a period of years.
955
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When considering questions of responsibility for incorporation of human rights into foreign 
policy, it was found that coverage assigned congress a greater role than in general foreign 
policy, including for individual congresspeople and for committees, such as the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee.
956
 Congress was portrayed as influencing administration 
decisions in such comments as, “In the face of widespread Congressional outrage... the Bush 
Administration is considering...” and the suggestion that “[t]he Administration will have to 
act quickly, though, if it is to stay ahead of a galloping Congressional movement for 
immediate action. Democratic and Republican leaders in congress joined forces today to 
demand that President Bush take steps to punish Beijing.”957 Other articles referred to the 
“pressure which was mounting in Congress” and the need for Bush to seek “middle ground 
between Congressional calls for more severe penalties and his own instincts.”958 The role of 
individual members of congress, such as Senator Moynihan and Representative Stephen 
Solarz — who suggested that “unless the White House acts, Congress will do it for him” — 
was also highlighted.
959
 
 
The American people were also assigned a role in pushing for the inclusion of human rights 
concerns into foreign policy. The role of protesters was reported, with their calls for 
American action against China -- what was called demands by “citizens and political leaders” 
for “tough sanctions against China.”960 Another article suggested that, “with the American 
public’s having watched live on television the dramatic rise of the prodemocracy movement 
and its tragic ending, the Administration will probably have to do more than ’deplore the 
violence’ as President Bush has done.”961 Individual actions, such as making telephone calls 
to members of congress, were also identified as having the potential to play a part in policy 
decisions.
962
 Other groups assigned agency were the media; coverage of events in China was 
portrayed as influencing policy decisions, human rights groups, such as Freedom House, and 
city and local government officials, such as mayors and local assembly-persons calling for 
policy changes.
963
 
 
The Washington Post coverage assigned agency to a much narrower group of individuals and 
institutions. In the making of foreign policy, the president and his administration and 
congress had agency. References were also made to general American policy, such as 
“Americans find themselves hard put to define a policy,” and references to “American 
policy.”964 Members of the administration with special influence in foreign policy were 
Secretary of State James Baker, the State Department in general, the president’s National 
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Security Advisor and White House officials. The role of congress was portrayed as allowing 
Bush to take the lead in foreign policy — but as being ready to “take action if the president 
doesn’t move immediately.”965 One article indicated that the president had only acted so as 
not to seem overly influenced by congressional opinions: “[A]ll of Bush’s advisers agreed 
that the administration should have a more definitive reaction than the statement issued when 
the violence first erupted on Saturday ‘so we wouldn’t seem to be dragged along by the 
Hill.’”966 The same parties were portrayed as having agency in getting human rights into 
foreign policy — with the addition of the general American public whose “strong protest,” 
“disgust” and “revulsion” were seen to drive congressional and presidential policy 
initiatives.
967
 
 
The Los Angeles Times coverage assigned agency in the making of foreign policy to the 
president and his administration, congress, “experts” on international relations and specific 
countries and to the United Nations. Agency in the administration came across clearly 
through such comments as the “[administration had been considering possible additional 
measures against the Chinese government.”968 Specific branches of the administration 
mentioned as playing a role in policy decisions were the State Department and its associated 
embassy in China, national security advisors, and the Departments of Defense and 
Commerce.
969
 Congress was portrayed as pushing the President to act in an “unusual alliance; 
liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans” ; and individual senators were portrayed as 
particularly active in policy suggestions.
970
 Experts from academia and former 
administrations (such as Kissinger) were portrayed as having roles, as was the United 
Nations. The United Nations was suggested as having agency because of its role as the target 
of protesters demanding actions — that is, that members of the public assigned agency to the 
United Nations by their actions in protesting outside it.
971
 
 
The same actors as above were assigned agency in the incorporation of human rights in 
foreign policy — with the addition of members of the public and members of city and local 
government The role of demonstrators in demanding sanctions was extensively covered as 
were the statements of members of city and local government such as city mayors.
972
 
Individual actions were also portrayed as having the potential to influence policy decisions in 
the case of President Bush’s reactions to “accounts of a Chinese man who halted a column of 
10 tanks and 10 armored personnel carriers Monday near Tian An Men Square.”973 Again, 
tension was seen to exist between the president’s perception of appropriate action and 
congressional suggestions. One article discussed the fact that administration officials felt 
pressured by members of congress and “refused to discuss individual options.”974 Another 
suggested that the Senate, through its Foreign Relations Committee, and other policy 
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committees was more interested than the House in incorporating issues of human rights into 
policy.
975
 
 
The New Orleans Times - Picayune coverage assigned agency in foreign policy very 
similarly to coverage in the Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times — that is, largely to 
the president and his administration and to congress. The president was portrayed as in 
control of foreign policy, either directly or by implication through such statements as the 
“sanctions he announced”; ‘lie hopes to ‘preserve the relationship’”; “firm in his support for 
the students” and “he was disappointed in the course of events.”976 Within the administration, 
agency was assigned to the U.S. State Department, national security advisors and the 
departments of defense and commerce. Congress’ role both in pushing the president to make 
specific policy changes and in endorsing the president’s actions were reported with reference 
to the coalition of liberal and conservative members of congress joining “forces ... to demand 
that President Bush end military aid to the Chinese government” and to congress “backing the 
President’s moves.”977 
 
Regarding the question of the inclusion of human rights concerns into foreign policy, it was 
found that the coverage assigned agency to the president, congress and to a cross-section of 
the general public. The local community in New Orleans was presented as involved in 
attempts to “apply effective pressure on the government in Peking”; Chinese students were 
portrayed as trying to “flood telephone lines into the Chinese embassy in Washington and the 
Chinese Consulate in Houston with protest calls,” and the Chinese people themselves were 
portrayed as influential through the “power of sheer numbers.”978 Reference was also made to 
the right of United States citizens to demand action from their government.
979
 
 
Human Rights in Congress, 1989 
Although subject categories in the Congressional Record of 1989 clearly separated 
discussions of human rights from discussions of other rights, this dissertation looked only at 
congressional responses to the Tiananmen Massacre. Thus, the period of study is June 1989. 
 
Congressional Definitions of Human Rights 
Congressional discourse defined human rights almost entirely in terms of civil rights. In fact, 
at times this linkage was made explicit through comparison of the student movement in 
Beijing to the American civil rights movement.
980
 The greatest amount of attention was paid 
to definitions of human rights within the context of security of person and the right to 
freedom from repression. Other freedoms included in discussions of rights were press, 
speech, assembly, emigration and general unspecified freedoms. Human rights were 
extensively discussed in terms of democracy and again in unspecified terms — that is, as 
references to human rights without further explication. The right to self-determination and 
entitlement of citizens to legal protection were also identified as human rights. 
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Human rights were also talked about using a wide range of other definitions, including those 
within the realm of morality (civilization, progress, reform, disorder, judgment, American 
values and explicitly moral terms of right, morality, moral indignation, crime and God). The 
hopes and yearnings of individuals were discussed in terms of rights. Freedom was identified 
as the right to bear arms and as linked with economic liberalization. Denial of human rights 
was discussed in terms of a list of -isms, including Communism, totalitarianism, Nazism, 
Stalinism and Orwellianism. 
 
In summary, of all the case studies, the events in China provoked the greatest amount of 
congressional discussion of human rights. Almost every member of congress took the 
opportunity to make a one-minute statement about the events in Tiananmen Square and the 
appropriate United States response. Some members were able to make longer speeches or to 
incorporate outside material into the Congressional Record. The end result was over three 
thousand pages of text. It is difficult to thoroughly examine such a mass of material, and 
analysis must necessarily be illustrative rather than exhaustive. 
 
As mentioned above, the bulk of discourse concentrated on definitions of human rights as 
security of person and the right to freedom from repression. Underlying all the responses was 
the assumption that “[i]t is unacceptable behavior within the community of nations to 
viciously attack and slaughter hundreds of nonviolent civilian demonstrators.”981 The central 
ideas were the violence perpetrated on the protesters and the innocent nature of the protests. 
Tied to this was the definition of freedom of assembly as a right that was being denied. Many 
members of congress drew attention to the fact that it was the Chinese government 
perpetrating these acts. Examples of this are such statements as: “Government, of, by, and for 
the people is not a government that turns against itself’ and what Senator George Mitchell 
called “organized murder — terror by a government against its own people seeking to 
intimidate them to permit that government to remain in power.”982 Representative William 
Lipinski expressed deep concern that the actions were taken by “citizens of the same country, 
members of the same ethnic group, individuals of the same historical and cultural 
background.”983 Almost every commentary articulated the non-violent nature of the protests 
— “peaceful unarmed youth”; “unarmed nonviolent demonstrators”; “young peaceful student 
demonstrators” ; “innocent and unarmed citizens”984 — and most often identified the goals of 
the protests as democracy and freedom. Other suggested goals of the protesters were resisting 
tyranny, “modest demands ... for a voice in their own future” and attempts to “join the free 
world’s privileges.”985 
 
The concept of democracy was central in defining human rights in this discourse. In addition 
to frequent references to pro-democracy demonstrations and the causes of freedom and 
democracy, democracy was explicitly identified as an “inalienable human right” and as “that 
which we in America accept as given: The rights of democracy.”986 Some members of 
congress used a more multifaceted definition than simple references to democracy and 
freedom. Representative Donald Lukens of Ohio specifically talked about “pluralistic 
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democracy” and “political choice.”987 Senator Mitchell called for “a just and democratic 
society with a free and open political system that would protect the essential human rights of 
all the Chinese people.”988 
 
House Resolution 182, proposed by Stephen Solarz and drafted by Richard Gephardt, clearly 
outlined the definition of human rights under which the House was operating. It begins, 
“Whereas a wide cross-section of Chinese society recognized their own inalienable rights and 
attempted to exercise their right to free speech by conducting demonstrations for democratic 
change which adhered to the highest goals of peace and nonviolence.”989 The right to free 
speech was thus inextricably tied to democracy and to human rights in general. One 
association made in congressional discourse was that the violence against the demonstrators 
began “when they began to freely assemble and to freely speak” and to “air their grievances 
in public.”990 With this association, these rights were presented as threats to authoritarianism. 
Other members of congress tied together a number of freedoms in defining human rights — 
“freedoms of speech, association, press, and human dignity” and “freedom of speech, press, 
assembly, association, and of demonstrations.”991 
 
A great deal of congressional discourse was much less specific about freedom; the term was 
used as a general notion or catch phrase. Many references were made to the demonstrations 
for freedom in China and the “flame,” “cause” and “human desire for” freedom there 
exhibited.
992
 Representative Donald Ritter contrasted “peace and freedom, human life and 
human dignity” with the “butchers of Beijing.”993 Representative Patricia Schroeder talked 
about freedom as the “free world’s privileges.”994 Such ways of talking about freedom 
seemed to use the phrase as shorthand for human rights. Other members of congress were 
more verbose but still did not explicitly define the constituent components of freedom. 
Senator Daniel Coats of Indiana identified freedom as a challenge to authoritarianism by 
saying that: 
 
they fear, most of all, when men burdened by oppression stand upright and shout their 
defiance. They fear, above all, the chanted refrains of freedom ... It is freedom that 
occupies the imagination of passionate reformers. It is liberty that shapes the visions 
of the disaffected ... For freedom has an inevitability of its own — an inevitability 
rooted, not in the myth of an unseen dialectic, but in the highest hopes of common 
man.
995
 
 
Freedom was not the only term used in a reductionist manner. Human rights themselves were 
often used as a phrase without additional definition. References were made to “basic human 
rights,” “recent human rights violations in China,” a “new respect for human rights” and 
“fundamental human rights violations,” amongst others.996 
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One of the few specific freedoms identified, other than those discussed above, was the 
freedom to emigrate. Senator Daniel Moynihan identified a central mark of a free country as 
a “nation’s willingness to permit emigration.”997 This freedom was discussed in relation to 
both China and to the Soviet Union. Another specific right identified in congressional 
discourse was an individual’s entitlement to legal protection. Senator Henry Heinz expressed 
great concern that the Chinese constitution provided for due process but the right was not 
being granted to citizens, while Representative Lukens talked about the suspension of the 
Chinese legal system “whenever they feel any threat at all to their dictatorial regime.”998 
Senator Dennis DeConcini declared that the “government of the People’s Republic of China 
has violently discarded all respect for human rights, human dignity, and due process.”999 
Several members also identified self-determination as a right, though the phrase was used 
clearly in the individualistic rather than the nationalistic sense, with comments such as those 
of Dick Gephardt referring to “self-determination and personal dignity.”1000 Representative 
Lipinski, however, spoke specifically about the Tibetan push for self-determination.
1001
 
 
Ideas related to morality dominated other definitions of human rights. In addition to explicitly 
moral definitions, ideas about civilization and progress were tied to moral judgments about 
the events in China. The notion of civilization was employed most often in identifying events 
in China as actions that civilized nations could not tolerate. The term used most often to 
describe the actions of the Chinese government was barbarism — and variations such as 
“barbaric behavior,” “barbaric and reactionary,” “stark barbarism” and “depths of 
barbarism.”1002 Barbarism was tied to “brutal, calculated slaughter” — what one member 
called a “descent to mindless brutality” — and repression in general.1003 Civilization was 
positioned as the opposite of this brutality. Senator Robert Byrd argued that the actions of the 
Chinese government “runs afoul of the core of values and the principles of civilized 
governance,” while Representative Gerald Solomon described the “civilized world” as having 
“recoiled in horror” ; and Senator John Kerry described the actions as tearing at the “civilized 
world’s conscience.”1004 Representative Lipinski went even further, saying that the Chinese 
government demonstrated that “they have no right to be considered civilized citizens of a 
world rapidly approaching the 21st century.”1005 
 
This last comment is important because it ties together ideas of civilization and progress in 
defining human rights. Congressional discourse clearly identified progress and modernity 
with its definition of the provision of human rights through democracy. In this context 
democracy was tailed about as the “doorway to a better, more fulfilling life” and the “journey 
to civilization requires the fight for democracy.”1006 Modernity was talked about in terms of 
“modem standards of decency, conscience, and personal liberty” and as an “open society 
where people could freely air their thoughts and ideas.”1007 Several members referred to a 
“loss of progress,” a “great leap backward” and what Senator Robert Dole called the need to 
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“resume their path toward reform and progress.”1008 Civilization and progress were contrasted 
with disorder ~ what some called “repression and chaos” and “political turmoil bordering on 
chaos.”1009 
 
Explicitly value-laden ideas were also used in defining human rights. Representative Charles 
Bennett called for the Chinese government to exercise better “judgment,” implying that 
clearer thinking and moral values were associated with human rights.
1010
 Clear associations 
were made through identification of the demonstrators’ cause as being that of 
“righteousness”; references to the “moral authority” of a “just cause”; identification of events 
in China as a “moral issue of worldwide consequence and proportion” and indictment of the 
“moral bankruptcy of a government that can sustain itself in power only by killing its own 
people.”1011 
 
Moral outrage appeared in discussions of Tiananmen and human rights. Phrases expressing 
moral outrage included “unacceptable behavior”, “atrocity”; “shocked and appalled”; 
“ghastly tragedy”; “outrage and revulsion”; “the civilized world is repulsed”; “helpless 
outrage”; “deplorable”; and “shocking and dastardly behavior,” amongst others.1012 Moral 
outrage was tied to two other moral concepts — crime and the notion that rights were 
universal gifts of God. The actions of the Chinese government were thus referred to as 
“heinous crimes” against people “demonstrating peacefully for their God-given rights.”1013 
Human rights were also linked to American values, with Senator Mitchell calling the protests 
in China “a ringing endorsement of American democracy and the concept of self-
determination for which we have stood for two centuries.”1014 
 
The idea of universality was also tied to definition of human rights in terms of human 
yearnings and hopes. The universal nature of these was explicitly addressed by comments 
such as Representative Steven Gunderson’s declaration that: 
 
the events in China of the last month have told each and every one of us that there is 
truly no such thing as the American dream. Rather there is a universal dream in the 
hearts and minds of people all over the world who simply yearn for the chance to be 
free and the right to chart their own destiny.
1015
 
 
Senator David Boren similarly talked about the tragedy of the deaths in China for people 
“seeking what human beings all around the world seek most, spiritual value of democracy, 
and freedom to develop their potential to the fullest.”1016 
 
A far less universal definition of human rights was that of Representative Ronald Marlenee 
who argued strongly for the inclusion of the right to bear arms as a fundamental human right 
He suggested that: 
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If the Chinese had the right to keep and bear arms, they would be free today. The 
administration and gun-control advocates propose that we turn over — to a 
government agency — the authority to decide what firearms are legitimate for 
‘sporting purposes’ ... The Chinese did that a long time ago. And they died in Beijing 
Sunday, June 8 [sic].
1017
 
 
Congressional discourse also tied together freedom, human rights and economic 
liberalization. Economic reform was portrayed as essentially linked with political reform — 
what Senator Christopher (Kit) Bond called the “undeniable fact that economic reforms ... are 
impossible without equal and coordinated political and social reforms.”1018 Other senators 
talked about the fact that China’s government desired “Western economic modernization” but 
was “not willing to pay the price of the accompanying political democracy”; they noted “how 
universal is the human desire for freedom and economic opportunity and how totally 
communism has failed to provide either.”1019 
 
This indictment of communism was a common thread through congressional responses to the 
Chinese government’s actions on June 4. Communism was inextricably tied to definition of 
human rights in the negative — that is, it equated denial of human rights. Members of 
congress tended to use the terms communism, totalitarianism, authoritarianism, Nazism, 
Stalinism and Orwellian metaphors interchangeably. References were made to “Gestapo-type 
films,” “elements of Nazism,” a “Stalin-type hotline” to denounce protesters and “Orwellian 
actions.”1020 Representative John Porter talked about the “bankruptcy of totalitarian 
communism,” while others cited the “Communist dictatorship” and the “tyranny of a 
totalitarian Communist government”1021 Most importantly, violations of human rights were 
explicitly talked about in terms of communism. Representative Gephardt presented his 
perspective that: 
 
I think we knew instinctively that Communists do things differently from other 
cultures and other peoples. They hold human life more cheaply. What has happened 
in Tiananmen Square confirms that and bears that out... So I think history is 
constantly the reference point for proving sadly and tragically that communism views 
human beings as units of production and consumption and considers them 
expendable, rather than as human beings with human dignity and human rights.
1022
 
 
Senator Helms concurred with this perspective, arguing that he was not surprised by the 
events in China because “After all, this is what communism is all about." He then called the 
Chinese government “an organization of gangsters masquerading as a government.”1023 
Senator Coates declared that “socialism has failed amid mountains of the innocent dead," 
while Senator Moynihan similarly argued that the “totalitarian idea is dead,” but the 
“totalitarian practice is alive and well, stripped of its ideological pretension, and wielded, 
now as always, to defined the power of an elite.”1024 These statements did not simply 
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condemn the communist government of China; they went further and used communism as a 
synonym for violation of human rights. 
 
Congressional Linkage of Human Rights and Foreign Policy 
The congressional discussion of human rights contained several linkages between human 
rights and foreign policy. Firstly, the relationship between China and the United States was 
portrayed as dependent on China’s adherence to certain human rights standards. Foreign 
policy in general was subsequently portrayed as being made in response to human rights 
violations. Linked with this was the proposition that the United States government had a 
responsibility to respond to violations of human rights, even if this raised issues of 
sovereignty. This responsibility was presented in terms of moral obligation, as sharing 
American values and experiences, as investment for the future and as an obligation 
concomitant with world leadership.Finally, linkages between human rights and foreign policy 
were discussed in terms of the tension between idealistic and pragmatic approaches to policy-
making. 
 
The Sino-American relationship’s dependence on human rights standards was articulated in 
terms of American inability to maintain normal relations in the face of Chinese government-
sponsored violence against demonstrators. This inability was expressed most often through 
phrases indicating that the relationship would not be “business as usual” — that the United 
States’ “respect for human rights outweighs business as usual” or that “The American 
government cannot conduct normal relations with a regime that believes itself free to act that 
way.”1025 The idea of normal relations was discussed largely in diplomatic terms — of feeling 
“no obligation to maintaining diplomatic ties with any brutally suppressive regime” — and in 
terms of continuing to extend Most Favored Nation status to China. Senator Alan Cranston 
expressed this argument as “China cannot be a favored nation while at the same time 
shooting down its citizens.”1026 Senator Byrd clearly expressed congressional sentiment on 
this matter saying: 
 
America cannot possibly be in the position of rewarding, appearing to reward, or to in 
any way countenance such acts... For America to allow business as usual in the face 
of these despicable acts runs afoul of the core of values and the principles of civilized 
governance... There should be no confusion about where America stands in the face of 
the barbaric acts of the Chinese Government.
1027
 
 
Similarly Representative Barney Frank argued passionately that the Chinese government: 
 
must not delude themselves into thinking that they can engage in that kind of 
brutality, turn their backs on the principles of freedom, and continue nonetheless to 
enjoy the land of warming relations between societies and governments that we have 
had ... The Chinese Government has the ability to pull back ... If they value good 
relations with us, they should do that.
1028
 
 
Making policy decisions on the basis of human rights violations was seen as appropriate by 
members of congress. Senator Cranston argued, “It is not enough just to regret actions taken 
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by the Chinese Government. We must take actions of our own.”1029 Senator Moynihan was 
even more explicit in linking policy decisions and human rights, saying that the appropriate 
response to totalitarianism was to “notice, remember and react And each time democracy 
triumphs... we must be ready to reward.”1030 Other members of congress talked about the 
need to “go beyond rhetoric” or paying “Lip service to freedom” to instead send strong 
signals and to use policy to force change.
1031
 
 
Policies to force change were talked about in terms of both negative and positive actions. The 
positive came through such acts as granting MFN status, which Senator Moynihan explicitly 
identified as a tool for spreading human rights, saying that it was used to “buttress America’s 
defense of human rights around the world.”1032 Other forms of positive reinforcement came 
through granting commercial contracts, such as boosting American satellites with Long 
March rockets as “an important American gesture of support for the trend towards 
modernization and democratization.”1033 The imposition of sanctions, removal of MFN status 
and denial of foreign aid were seen as ways to “make it clear... to the Chinese authorities that 
their conduct is not acceptable” and to “support those Chinese who believe in peace and 
freedom, human life and human dignity.”1034 
 
Linked to the notion that policy decisions should be made with consideration of human rights 
issues was the argument that governments, and specifically the United States government, 
have the responsibility to respond to human rights violations — even if such responses raised 
issues of sovereignty. Representative James Leach expressed his perspective that “[i]t is 
always awkward to comment on the affairs of other states, but there comes a time in the 
affairs of states when it is fitting and proper for outsiders to speak.”1035 Senator Mitchell 
expressed similar sentiments when he concluded, “The United States cannot and should not 
attempt to dictate the course of internal events in China. But we can and should state clearly 
and unequivocally our strong support for those who are placing their lives and futures on the 
line in support of democracy in China.”1036 This obligation was placed in a historical context 
by Representative James Bilbray, who expressed his concern: “What has happened to the 
Chinese students is an abomination and reminiscent of what happened in Nazi Germany, 
where the American Government stood by and said, ‘That is an internal matter of the German 
Government; we cannot do anything.”1037 
 
The idea that certain issues overrode the concerns of sovereignty was tied to ideas of world 
community. The world was presented as a community where human rights violations could 
no longer take place in private. This notion was presented through descriptions of people as 
the “villagers of the globe... looking out the front window via television and seeing what is 
really happening” and through descriptions of the world watching “as the Chinese 
Government tries to intimidate its own people.”1038 The reason given for people’s interest and 
concern was the interdependence of the world community — the idea that a “threat to human 
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rights anywhere is a threat to human rights everywhere” — and that “human rights are not an 
internal matter but are the basis for relationships among people.”1039 
 
This responsibility to act was most often discussed in terms of moral obligation. The idea of 
obligation was expressed through frequent use of such phrases as “must” (“we must stand up 
for them and with them”) and “must not” ( “this Congress must not be silent.”)1040 Others 
articulated this moral obligation even more explicitly with such declarations as “Our moral 
imperative demands that we be unequivocal” and “We have the right, and an obligation, to 
speak out.”1041 Sentiment was clear in congress that this moral obligation arose from 
American historical experience and values -- what Senator Mitchell called the result of the 
world looking to the United States as the “arsenal of democracy, the beacon of freedom, the 
voice of self-government and self-determination.”1042 
 
This idea that Americans had a responsibility to share their own experiences and values came 
through clearly. Many members of congress said that the demonstrators in China had drawn 
inspiration from American history and described the students as “trying to emulate what we 
accomplished over 200 years ago”; the students were taking ‘Thomas Jefferson and other 
American heroes as their inspiration for this struggle.”1043 Representative William 
Broomfield argued that “the students look to the United States as a model for human rights,” 
and others spoke about students having learned about freedom while studying in the United 
States and taking that knowledge back to China with them.
1044
 Still other members of 
congress said the United States had a special responsibility because of her historical 
experience; Representative Benjamin Gilman said, “As the longest standing democracy in the 
world, the United States has the obligation to provide a leading example to all nations in 
supporting basic liberties for all citizens of the world”; and Representative David Skaggs 
argued, “They drew their inspiration in no small part from the ideals and even the symbols, 
the goddess of democracy, of this country. We can do no less than to stand with them 
now.”1045 In addition to having responsibilities, Americans were also presented as having a 
special understanding of the concerns of the Chinese students because of their own history. 
Americans needed to take a stand to be true to their own nature because “[e]ach shot that 
takes a life, when met by silence or indifference or a sense of impotence, also takes with it a 
piece of who we are and what we are supposed to stand for as a nation.”1046 
 
Another connection made between foreign policy and human rights was that concern for 
human rights as expressed through policy decisions was an investment for the future — that 
is, something that would benefit the United States. This investment was presented in two 
different lights. One was the assumption that the student protesters were eventually going to 
take power in China and would remember American support.
1047
 The other was that the 
future path of China was dependent on United States actions in the present Senator Simon 
argued that “our long term interest lies in a free democratic China” and gave the reason that 
actions at that moment would strengthen the role of so-called moderates in the Chinese 
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government.
1048
 Senator Mitchell argued more forcefully that a stand must be taken to ensure 
future relations because the “Chinese Government is an institution that will exist beyond the 
men now organizing and directing this mass terror... this Chinese Government cannot 
permanently endure, given its brutal acts against its own people... we must make clear how 
America feels and where America stands on this issue.”1049 
 
A further sense of obligation to incorporate human rights concerns into foreign policy was 
presented as coming from the perceived role of the United States’ world leadership.Over and 
over the United States was presented as having a responsibility to act as “leader of the free 
world” and as “leader of the world’s democracies, as the symbol of freedom throughout the 
world”; as needing to “lead the Western response” and as being watched by a whole world 
“looking for leadership.”1050 
 
It was not until June 14, six days after news of the attacks on students reached the United 
States, that congressional discourse turned from pure rhetoric to practical considerations of 
the implications of certain foreign policy stances and decisions. At this point, the debate arose 
between the idealists, who were presented as wanting sanctions against China at any cost, and 
the pragmatists, who tended to want to preserve ties with China. The idealist position was 
represented by the arguments that the United States  response was “overly timid and 
cautious”; that “economic considerations cannot outweigh our commitment to human 
freedom”; that are some values that take precedence over commerce, and that there is a point 
beyond which we will not stomach business as usual”; that the events in China “must be met 
with public rage... by an unrelenting and unmistakable willingness to change immediately 
and significantly the status quo ofour relationship” and that the “protection of human rights is 
something that must never be sacrificed for the sake of political or economic expediency.”1051 
Senator Heinz criticized a decade of American relations with China, saying, “We have used 
the desire to normalize relations with China for geopolitical reasons as an excuse to sweep 
under the rug any impulse to criticize China’s human rights violations.”1052 
 
The pragmatist position was that the relationship with China needed to be maintained in order 
for the United States to have any influence over China. Representative Broomfield argued, 
“We still have a bit of leverage with the Chinese leadership.We can throw that influence 
away to register our righteous indignation at China’s policies, or we can use that leverage to 
help move China away from repression.”1053 The pragmatist position in general supported 
President Bush — particularly pragmatists like Senator Dole who argued that the president 
has “sent a clear, measured message, and I am convinced it is exactly the right message, true 
to our ideals and consistent with our interests.”1054 Senator Boren also praised the president 
for having “left the door open” to China and argued that maintenance of the relationship 
would ultimately be to the best benefit of the United States and those in China “working for 
change and reform.”1055 There appeared to be little middle ground in this highly partisan 
division over policy. The only form of middle ground was that occupied by members like 
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Representative Sangmeister, who described the United  States as being in a dilemma -- but 
one where solution had to be to condemn the actions of China. His conclusion was that: 
 
There is no way we can, or would want to, back down on our commitment to human 
rights. However, what do we do with a regime that occupies a strategic position and 
has been a real offset to the Soviet Union... I frankly do not see how we can turn our 
backs on these students even though we ride a setback to both our strategic and 
commercial interests.
1056
 
 
Congressional Attribution of Agency in Foreign Policy 
Unanimity being rare in congress, there existed little agreement as to which parties had the 
greatest proportion of power in the making of foreign policy. Agreement was possible that 
both congress and the executive branch of government had agency, but individuals differed 
on division power between the two. In assigning power to the president and his 
administration, two different approaches were taken. In the first approach, calls for the 
president to take action against the Chinese government implicitly gave agency to the 
administration — for example, such statements as Representative Joseph Brennan’s “call on 
President Bush and Secretary of State Baker to immediately remove most-favored-nation 
trade status from China” and Senator Byrd’s gentle expression of hope that “when we, the 
Senate, returns [sic], the administration will have acted.”1057 In the second approach, the 
administration was explicitly given agency and congress was criticized for seeking input into 
the foreign policy process — which was seen to lessen the impact of the United States 
speaking with “one voice.” 
 
This notion of “one voice” was central to the second approach. This was elaborated through 
such comments as the “United States must speak with one voice at this critical juncture in 
world history”; “we have a Nation that speaks with one voice. The voice in this case is the 
President of the United States”; and “Only when we speak with a single voice in a situation 
like this can the United States have maximum impact.”1058 Senator John Danforth extended 
this notion in outlining his and Senator Boren’s attempts to establish a bipartisan foreign 
policy, describing the: 
 
seeming irresistible impulse for the Congress of the United States to want to weigh in 
on every foreign policy issue with microscopic detail. We have pointed out that when 
that happens, the country does not speak with one voice. It tends to be a message of 
confusion, a cacophony of confusion to the rest of the world ... We should support the 
President at this time ... we are of one mind in the United States, so let us act as 
though we are of one mind. Let us support the President of the United States in 
addressing this major issue of foreign policy.
1059
 
 
The most important point in Senator Danforth’s statement is his belief that all Americans held 
the same view on the events in China — basically his disallowance of alternate 
interpretations and policy responses. Senator Mitchell came out even more strongly in favor 
of President Bush, declaring, “Only the President of the United States speaks for all 
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Americans. Only the President of the United States is the leader of the free world ... It is the 
President of the United States and he alone who can give voice to American ideals.”1060 
 
Other members of congress assigned a greater measure of agency to themselves than to the 
president. This view of power was largely implicit through exclusive focus on congressional 
policy decisions and actions. Thus, members discussed such actions as refusal to renew MFN 
status — and specifically the Jackson-Vanik Amendment linking human rights and foreign 
aid -- refusal of World Bank loans, and denial of participation in the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation.
1061
 Representatives Meldon Levine and Barbara Boxer spoke out 
clearly about taking actions “in terms of a resolution and in terms of a foreign aid bill” and 
asking “for the killings to stop.”1062 Similarly, Senator Mitchell described sending “a strong 
signal to the Government of China that the U.S. Senate 
condemns the actions they have taken.”1063 
 
A third approach to assigning agency in foreign policy was that both congress and the 
administration played a part Representative George Sangmeister made reference to the 
“President, Congress, or both acting in concert,” while others talked about “we in the 
Congress, along with the administration”; some referred to “speaking in unison, Democrats 
and Republicans, the administration and the Congress” and to the fact that “the Bush 
Administration and Congress will consider additional steps.”1064 Representative Broomfield 
outlined the balance between the role of congress and that of the president as being that: 
 
There is a need for continued consultation between Congress and the executive 
branch... It is important that the Bush administration have the option to respond 
quickly to changes should the situation deteriorate, and that the Congress stay 
continuously informed on administration actions ... I hope that we can fashion a 
comprehensive amendment which would maintain the bipartisan spirit while giving 
Congress the opportunity to provide policy direction on this important question.
1065
 
 
Thus, Broomfield aptly summed up the tension between the branches of government -- the 
need for flexible responses to foreign policy crises on the part of the president and the need 
for congress to remain informed and to provide advice and input into the foreign policy 
process. 
 
The American Discourse of Human Rights in 1989 
Print media discussion of human rights in 1989 focused on definition of human rights as 
political and civil rights — especially freedom, democracy and security of person. In doing 
so, the discourse of human rights in 1989 looks very similar to that in 1976. Greater emphasis 
was placed by media coverage in 1989 than was the case in 1979 on the provision of human 
rights through the establishment of democratic government. Analysis  of congressional 
statements also found an emphasis on democracy — similar to congressional emphasis in 
1976. Over the period of study, congress consistently portrayed human rights as best 
provided through democracy, and it seems that the print media discourse gradually moved 
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closer to such congressional definitions of human rights. Inasmuch as print media and 
congressional discussions were responding to the brutal events in China, social and economic 
rights were a limited part of the discourse. Any discussion of these aspects of human rights 
was tied to provision of political rights — that economic liberalization would lead to political 
liberalization. This linkage allowed discussion of second-generation (social, cultural and 
economic) rights only in terms of first-generation (civil and political) rights and reinforced 
the argument that human rights are best provided through Western capitalist democracy. 
 
Other than the addition of democracy to definitions of human rights, the discourse of human 
rights in the print media remained remarkably consistent from earlier case studies — an 
international standard of behavior guiding political and civil rights provided through 
democracy and denied through communism. Present in earlier print media discussions of 
human rights, but absent in those of 1976, notions of progress were re-introduced in ways of 
talking about human rights in 1989. Definition of human rights in terms of civilization 
became discussion of human rights in terms of modernity and capitalism. However recast, 
these ideas remained the same: that a “modern” nation (defined as a capitalist democracy) 
acknowledged that international standards governed the way a government could treat its 
people and that it conducted its internal affairs in accordance with these standards. The 
congressional discourse of human rights was similar, with progress equated with civilization 
and additional linkage of progress to more overt statements of moral values — and 
identification of these values as American. 
 
As argued earlier, by 1976, both in print media coverage of human rights issues and in 
congressional discussions of these issues, it was largely accepted that human rights were a 
valid part of foreign policy and that the United States had a responsibility — as a member of 
a world community and as a world leader ~ to support efforts to provide human rights to 
citizens of other countries and to consider human rights in forming relationships with other 
countries. Although these notions were prevalent in discourses of human rights, questions 
remained how best these could be incorporated — questions about the implications to 
national interests. American history and values were portrayed by all the sources studied as 
necessitating inclusion of human rights in foreign policy, but their inclusion was to be on the 
basis of negotiation between the competing interests of sovereignty and participation in world 
affairs. 
 
Having identified some aspects of a twentieth-century American discourse of human rights in 
the preceding chapters, the implications of this discourse for the larger questions guiding this 
dissertation must be addressed. These questions include how ideas come to be seen as 
“common sense”; the role of news media in the construction of national identity and 
discourse — how the media articulate and circulate ideas in society and implications of an 
American discourse of human rights for international discussions of human rights. The final 
chapter speculates on the implications of the findings of this research for addressing these 
questions, the contributions of this research to media, political and historical studies and 
potential future directions for research. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
Twentieth-Century American Stories of Human Rights 
 
Analysis of print media and political discussion of the Paris Peace Talks in January 1919, the 
San Francisco conference of 1945, the Ford-Carter foreign policy debate of October 1976 and 
U.S. responses to the Tiananmen massacre of 1989 found a consistent American discourse of 
human rights across almost a century. In its simplest form, this discourse equated human 
rights with the political and civil rights provided through a democratic political system and 
denied by other forms of government — specifically by communist systems. Human rights 
were couched in terms of civilization, progress, modernity and capitalism under the umbrella 
of universal standards of behavior -- standards that derived from moral values linked to 
American history and experiences. 
 
This discourse then is one of morality, constructed largely — as moral discourses often are — 
in terms of dichotomies. Good was contrasted with bad, right with wrong, principles with 
immorality, justice with injustice, civilization with anarchy, order with disorder, modernity 
with antiquity, freedom with imprisonment and democracy with communism. The language 
of the discourse emphasized the dichotomies through the language of battle, construction 
(“building a new world”), progress (growth, change, travel along a road, pioneers striking out 
into the wilderness), curing illness and negotiation between the competing concerns of 
sovereignty and national interest. 
 
This last contrast was apparent not only in the language of the discourse, but appeared also as 
a major theme of any discussion of the role of human rights in foreign policy. As discussed 
more fully below, the United States was seen as having a responsibility to share its 
experience of freedom with the world, but that responsibility was tempered always with a 
fear that participation in a world community would lead to undesirable results — such as loss 
of sovereign power and entanglement in complex, unsolvable political situations. 
 
American historical experience was a primary reason for the inclusion of human rights in 
foreign policy. This linkage of human rights and foreign policy occurred as early as 1919 in 
both media and political discourse. A nation based on moral principles was seen to have been 
successfully created — one perceived to be free of the taint of the secret power-politics of 
Europe. President Wilson in a speech to congress in 1917 referred to the “old way” of doing 
politics as “little groups of ambitious men who were accustomed to use their fellow men as 
pawns and tools.”1066 In contrast, the U.S. constitution was portrayed as guaranteeing 
freedom and individual human rights. The United States was thus portrayed as having a 
responsibility to share the values and experience that had been gained from 
many years of democratic government. 
 
Findings suggest that the ideas that comprise the American discourse of human rights and 
that motivated the inclusion of human rights concerns in foreign policy derive from earlier 
discourses -- such as that of Manifest Destiny. The threads identified in the construction of an 
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ideology of universal rights are interwoven with religious concepts and a clear perception of 
the role played by God in bringing the American people to this point in history. Thus, it can 
be said that linkages between human rights and foreign policy were evident during the peace 
discussions after World War One. This is significant because it is a much earlier linkage than 
many historians suggest However, these linkages can also be seen to have arisen out of the 
traditional discourse of Manifest Destiny — with Woodrow Wilson’s annotation of a 
Frederick Jackson Turner paper on internationalism in his Paris conference files as interesting 
supporting evidence of these ties. Thus the question remains, when did the linkage between 
human rights and foreign policy become common in the media and in political discourse? 
Further research would have to trace the development of the concept of Manifest Destiny and 
its role in foreign policy through media reports of the Spanish-American and Mexican wars 
and congressional debate of the time to ascertain whether human rights and policy decisions 
were explicitly linked. 
 
Ideas and Ideology 
Having identified an American discourse of human rights in twentieth century news media 
and politics, one can examine the implications of this discourse for the larger questions 
driving this research. In many ways these larger questions are unanswerable at this point 
However, informed speculation can be made about such questions as how ideas become 
“common sense” in society; the role of the news media in constructing national discourse; the 
role of the media in the foreign policy process; implications of U.S. discourse for 
international discussions of human rights and the potential contribution of this research to 
media, political and historical studies. 
 
Telling Stories About Human Rights 
Analyzing the way in which human rights were talked about in various print media sources 
and by congress and presidents, this research rests on the assumption that stories are 
important in understanding ideas and ideology. Political scientists Sanford Schram and Philip 
Neisser argue that “stories, wherever told, whether unconsciously articulated through the 
invocation of prevailing discourse or consciously fashioned by participating in the rumor 
mill, are critical constitutive forces in politics and public policymaking.”1067 Schramm and 
Neisser go on to say that stories: 
 
construct political space itself, letting us know where it begins and where it ends, who 
populates it and who does not, which of their concerns are to be included and which 
are to be excluded. Stories... create a narrative coherence that not only defines but 
helps to realize political spaces, and they necessarily do so in politically biased ways. 
Stories map space and keep time in ways that impose coherence on identities, 
interests, and institutionalized groupings.
1068
 
 
Storytelling as a mapping of space that imposes coherence on ideas is illustrated by this 
research. Continual retelling of a particular story of human rights over the course of nearly a 
century inscribes that story as the story of human rights at least in a part of the world. 
Another way to say this is to use Stuart Hall’s notion of the naturalistic illusion and 
Fairclough’s argument about the naturalization of ideology to talk about how the “common 
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sense” story of human rights outlined in previous chapters came into existence.1069 By telling 
and retelling a particular story of human rights, the fact that it is a story, and, as such, a 
particular ideological representation, becomes lost and the story simply becomes the way to 
talk about human rights. 
 
The Storytellers of Foreign Policy 
In telling the twentieth-century American story of human rights, the print media play an 
important role. It is difficult to ascertain whether human rights were linked first in the press 
or in public policy. However, it is clear that over the course of nearly a century, the discourse 
of human rights in the print media and in congressional debate became largely 
indistinguishable, and indeed, interacted to tell a coherent story of human rights. In this story, 
the media were not seen as actors in their own right, but the role of the media cannot be 
ignored as storytellers and as disseminators of notions of human rights. The media are also 
important in identifying the characters in the story — what Schramm and Neisser describe 
above as “who populates it ” Thus, it is difficult to identify whether media merely play 
supporting roles in foreign policy rather than roles of direct advocacy. 
 
It is clear that congress and the president have power in foreign policy and that both are 
important narrators of foreign policy. Across the period of study, perceptions of the role of 
congress and the president in foreign policy fluctuated (even in congress) between attribution 
of power to congress and to the president and his administration. Each president attributed the 
greatest role in foreign policy to himself. In contrast, analysis of congressional discussions 
showed significant debate over congress’ own role in policymaking. Not until 1976 did 
congress take a larger role by formulating an independent path to the inclusion of human 
rights in foreign policy. The 1976 and 1989 case studies showed strong congresses seeking to 
influence presidential decision-making in foreign policy. The earlier case studies revealed 
debate in congress over the appropriate role of congress in policymaking but not the same 
level of congressional independence. What remained consistent was the debate over 
constitutional and customary allocation of power between the branches of government The 
role of the media is less clear. Although the media do not have formal power in foreign 
policy, it can be argued that as narrators, storytellers and disseminators of information, the 
media are an important part of foreign policy in the United States. 
 
Implications and Future Directions 
Three further questions were suggested in the process of identifying a twentieth-century 
American discourse of human rights. These questions related to the ideology of human rights: 
why particular stories of human rights were told; the results of certain stories being told and 
not others, and whose interests were served by these constructions of human rights. Possible 
answers to these questions emerge through consideration of the role of hegemony in the 
creation of an ideology of human rights. 
 
American political discourse emphasizes civil and political rights over other rights, such as 
social, cultural and economic rights. Such an emphasis illustrates the Gramscian idea of 
negotiation as part of the process of hegemony. That is, civil and political rights are rights 
that Western capitalist democracies can provide without undermining their own bases of 
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power. Social, economic and cultural rights (often referred to as second- and third- generation 
rights) undermine, or have the potential to undermine, and destabilize some of the 
fundamental tenets of Western capitalism ~ such as the notion of the free market and 
government non-interference outside the political domain. Conversely, human rights defined 
as civil and political rights undermine authoritarian bases of power. Thus, by acceptance of 
certain definitions of human rights, dominant groups in society can be seen to address human 
rights concerns of individuals and human rights organizations, while defusing potential 
challenges to their authority and dominance. The role of the media can be seen as 
transmitting the concerns of individuals and groups to those in power and circulating a 
refashioned definition of human rights in society. This refashioned definition becomes 
“common sense”; that is, it is naturalized as an universal truth. 
 
This dissertation discusses an American discourse of human rights in the twentieth century. 
To fully explore the theoretical proposition discussed above requires a comparative study of 
authoritarian and social democratic societies. If the theoretical direction indicated in this 
work proves useful, the discourses of human rights in these different kinds of political 
systems should differ from those of the United States. The discourse of human rights in social 
democracies should contain a balance of political, civil, social, economic and cultural rights, 
while the discourse in authoritarian systems should emphasize second-generation social and 
economic rights. The implication of this for international discussions of human rights is to 
provide different ways of approaching debates over human rights. Awareness of differing 
historical stories of human rights developed to meet different political and social 
requirements opens an universalizing discourse of rights to multiple voices. 
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